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Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers

Nature Photonics volume 10, pages 312–315 (2016)Cite this article

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Abstract

Security in quantum cryptography1,2 is continuously challenged by inventive attacks3,4,5,6,7 targeting the real components of a cryptographic set-up, and duly restored by new countermeasures8,9,10 to foil them. Owing to their high sensitivity and complex design, detectors are the most frequently attacked components. It was recently shown that two-photon interference11 from independent light sources can be used to remove any vulnerability from detectors12,13. This new form of detection-safe quantum key distribution (QKD), termed measurement-device-independent13 (MDI), has been experimentally demonstrated13,14,15,16,17,18,19 but with modest key rates. Here, we introduce a new pulsed laser seeding technique to obtain high-visibility interference from gain-switched lasers and thereby perform MDI-QKD with unprecedented key rates in excess of 1 megabit per second in the finite-size regime. This represents a two to six orders of magnitude improvement over existing implementations and supports the new scheme as a practical resource for secure quantum communications.

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Figure 1: MDI-QKD scheme and experimental set-up.
Figure 2: Characteristics of the PLS-enabled light source.
Figure 3: MDI-QKD key rates.

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Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge useful discussions with M. Curty. L.C.C. acknowledges personal support via the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council funded Centre for Doctoral Training in Photonic Systems Development and Toshiba Research Europe.

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Author notes

  1. L. C. Comandar and M. Lucamarini: These authors contributed equally to this work

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Toshiba Research Europe, 208 Cambridge Science Park, Cambridge, CB4 0GZ, UK

    L. C. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Fröhlich, J. F. Dynes, A. W. Sharpe, S. W.-B. Tam, Z. L. Yuan & A. J. Shields

  2. Department of Engineering, Cambridge University, 9 JJ Thomson Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 0FA, UK

    L. C. Comandar & R. V. Penty

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  1. L. C. Comandar
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  9. A. J. Shields
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Contributions

Measurements and calculations were performed by L.C.C. and M.L., respectively. The system was readied by B.F., J.F.D., A.W.S., L.C.C. and S.W.-B.T. Z.L.Y. and A.J.S. conceived the experiment and guided the work. L.C.C. and M.L. wrote the manuscript with contributions from the other authors. All authors discussed experiments, results and the interpretation of results.

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Correspondence to M. Lucamarini.

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The authors declare no competing financial interests.

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Comandar, L., Lucamarini, M., Fröhlich, B. et al. Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers. Nature Photon 10, 312–315 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1038/nphoton.2016.50

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