The literature on action control is rife with differences in terminology. This consensus statement contributes shared definitions for perception-action integration concepts as informed by the framework of event coding.
Main
In scientific communication, precise language and clearly outlined terms and definitions are of utmost importance. Precise terminology prevents misunderstandings and misconceptions, thus boosting scientific progress. Research in cognitive psychology has seen many highly paradigm-specific theoretical debates in their respective domain, which also resulted in paradigm-specific terminology. This is particularly true in the research area of action control. In general, action control describes how humans interact with their environment. Because actions are a hallmark output of the human cognitive system, the use of imprecise or inconsistent language to describe or explain phenomena within the domain of action control impedes scientific progress, particularly as regards unified theoretical approaches.
We present consensus definitions of central action control concepts from an event-coding perspective. Modern event-coding approaches including the Theory of Event-Coding (TEC1); or the Binding and Retrieval in Action Control framework (BRAC2); describe human action in an ideomotor context3. The basic assumption inherent in these approaches is that humans plan and execute actions through the anticipation of the perceptual effects of such actions. The anticipation (the mental representation) can retrieve motor patterns from memory necessary to ultimately achieve the anticipated effects. Accordingly, response, stimulus, and effect features can be represented together in feature compounds (or event-files, the central concept of these approaches). An event-file is an internal representation of characteristics of stimuli, responses, and effects elicited by the response, which can also be decoded in neural signals4. While object-files link perceptual features into coherent object representations (e.g., color, location, shape etc.), event-files add the response and effect component to the concept5. Event-files thus link perception and action and are conceptually similar to so-called instances in the Instance Theory of Automatization6. The consensus definitions we present here stem from approaches that are concerned with event-files (TEC) and how they are dynamically managed (BRAC).
Contemporary research in cognitive (neuro-)science on human action commonly employs so-called action control paradigms like, e.g., task switching, priming, and response-binding tasks. Event-coding approaches can describe results from these and further paradigms in terms of event-file binding and event-file retrieval due to one methodological aspect these entire tasks share: their sequential nature. In these tasks, participants respond to sequences of trials, a prime followed by a probe. Particular emphasis is given to how the characteristics of the prime trial n−1 impacts behavior in the probe trial n (see Fig. 1). Often, the probe immediately follows the prime, but there is also research examining longer prime-probe intervals. In many paradigms, half of the trials function as the prime and the other half as the probe. However, in other paradigms, each trial comprises both prime and probe based on the specific pair of trials taken in consideration. In most paradigms, prime and probe trials require participants to perform an overt response (like a keypress) and behavioral effects are typically measured at the time of the probe only. The basic assumption of event-coding approaches is that stimuli, responses, and effects encountered in the prime are integrated (bound) into an event-file (Box 1). This event-file is created after the prime, and decays in the time interval between prime and probe. If any feature is repeated at the time of the probe, the prime event-file is retrieved/reactivated and will influence probe responding. Specifically, retrieval facilitates performance when all the retrieved features match with the current features. However, retrieval hinders performance when the retrieved prime features are incompatible with the probe features (Box 2). Event-coding can thus unify paradigm-specific approaches in the action control literature as it provides a single account for a multitude of specific experimental effects. Figure 1 depicts the definitions provided in the current paper in relation to the typical stream of events occurring in an action control task. Of note, the presented consensus-definitions cannot only prove useful to researchers following an event-coding approach but also for all experimental approaches where sequential action control tasks are used7. The primary empirical evidence that we draw on for this framework and many details mentioned in these definitions can be found on OSF (https://osf.io/t6549/) for further reading.
Limitations
The event-coding perspective on action control discussed here is mostly concerned with “simple actions” in the laboratory which, however, also occur in real world settings, (e.g., pressing a brake, typing, grasping objects). Complex cognitive functions like decision making, attitude formation, etc. are beyond the current scope of this approach. In addition, when event-coding is used to explain behavior outside the laboratory, it becomes clear that it is harder to define what constitutes an “event,” e.g., when a simple action is a step in a sequence to reach an overarching goal. In such situations, it seems to be promising to relate event-coding to other approaches like event-segmentation8. Finally, event-coding approaches are overarching frameworks describing human action beyond the scope of a particular paradigm. Yet, there are alternatives. For instance, another overarching approach is predictive coding9. Predictive coding refers to a theoretical framework that explains how the brain processes and interprets sensory information. It suggests that the brain generates predictions about incoming sensory inputs based on prior knowledge and expectations, and then compares these predictions with the actual sensory signals. Any discrepancies between the predictions and the actual inputs are used to update the internal models and refine future predictions. The same principle of prediction error minimization has also been used to provide an account of behavior10, in which motor actions are not commands but descending proprioceptive predictions. Yet, concerning the comparison to TEC/BRAC one might argue that predictive coding focuses on the top-down processing and generation of predictions, while binding and retrieval processes are more concerned with the bottom-up integration of sensory information and the retrieval of information. Predictive coding and processes as described by TEC/BRAC are not mutually exclusive and might interact with each other.
Open questions
At the time of this writing, it is still unclear when the formation of an event-file starts and when it ends. Binding processes can be expected at the time of response execution or the completion of an action plan, but partial repetition costs have also been observed for unpredictable effects and the latest response, and also for subsequent responses that were only planned after execution of the last. Furthermore, further characteristics of the environment (e.g., changes in context or effectors) might attenuate bindings between sequential stimuli, responses, or events, likely due to segmentation (Box 3).
In addition, it is a crucial question how transient bindings relate to more enduring and longer lasting learning effects. While some authors use the terms “binding” and “learning” interchangeably, others argue that binding and learning can be disentangled, and even suggest that binding products can be seen as building blocks of learning. Learning may reflect more consolidated representations of event-files. Given the scarcity and inconsistency of empirical findings on the relation of binding and learning more systematic research is needed that incorporates known modulators of learning in the action control literature11.
Conclusion and outlook
The goal of this paper is to reduce confusion about these terms and definitions in the field that may also be relevant to counteract the “replication crisis.” The latter has been attributed to emerge from underpowered studies, publication bias, problems with applying statistical procedures, as well as imprecise theories12 and/or misunderstandings and uncertainties to dealing with terms in such theories13. Therefore, having a clear basis of communication will be of help to counteract replicability problems. In addition, it will facilitate efforts, such as the ManyLabs initiative in psychological and neuroscience fields, in which different laboratories (with scientists from different professions as well as terms and definitions) work together. Recently, it has been outlined that effects of efforts related to replications and pre-registrations to counteract the replication crisis are limited because they cannot overcome problems that refer to the “base rate” of phenomena; i.e. the probability that a sought-after effect is truly present in the population14. Clearly, when communities use similar terms for different phenomena that are focused in their research (linked to base rates in the population), replicability must be low and scientific progress slow. We therefore think that this article will advance the field providing a better common ground in terms and definitions to be used in future studies and focusing on basic principles of how perception and action become integrated during action control.
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The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) supported the research reported in this article (FOR 2790 and FOR 2698). The DFG had no role in preparation of the manuscript and the decision to publish.
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C.F., C.B., E.B., and M.M.: conceptualization, resources, writing—original draft, writing—review and editing, supervision. D.D., C.G.G., B.H., A.K., I.K., W.K., S.M., V.M., B.M., A.M., J.P., B.P., R.P., A.M.P., R.Q., A.R., K.R., M.S., P.S.: conceptualization, writing—original draft.
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Frings, C., Beste, C., Benini, E. et al. Consensus definitions of perception-action-integration in action control. Commun Psychol 2, 7 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-023-00050-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-023-00050-9