Advocacy, Ecology, and Environmental Ethics

In this essay, I consider three questions: is ecology "value-laden," what values are found in ecology, and what values should ecologists advocate (if any)? I conclude that ecology is laden with a variety of values and that ecologists should be very careful what sort of values they advocate, on pain of losing scientific credibility.

Many philosophers of science concede that there are values in science — specifically epistemic values (Kuhn 1977). Hypotheses are evaluated in terms of their accuracy, simplicity, scope, etc. Each of these values can be imprecise and can be prioritized over the others depending on the scientist doing the evaluation. Of course, how these different values are related to each other is the subject of tremendous debate.
More controversially, some philosophers claim there are moral values in the sciences as well (Douglas 2009, Kitcher 2001, Longino 1990), including ecology and conservation biology. Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Ed McCoy (1992), for instance, offer the following argument. In hypothesis testing, we test our null hypothesis which claims that a given factor has no observable effect. However, there are two types of error that can occur. First, we can reject our null hypothesis given that it is true. This is a Type I error. Second, we can accept our null hypothesis given that it is false. This is a Type II error. Given we cannot minimize both, we must choose to minimize one or the other. However, this choice involves moral values. For example, if our null hypothesis says that an exotic species does not have an effect on local flora and fauna, then minimizing a Type I error will make it much harder to reject the null even when it is false. Likewise, minimizing a Type II error will make it much easier to reject the null even when it is true. Which error we choose as most important can have serious ethical consequences and risks. Thus, in ecology, moral values are present even in its methodology.

However, regardless of whether there are ethical values in the science itself, it is clear that scientists including ecologists bring them to the science. For example, ecologists Rachel Carson, Paul Sears, Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich, E. O. Wilson, Thomas Lovejoy, etc. often advocated ethical values as scientists in order to raise awareness regarding ecological degradation including its implications for human well-being.

Given that there are epistemic and moral values in ecology, what specific values are present? In articulating those values, it is useful to employ the conceptual framework offered in Helen Longino's Science as Social Knowledge (1990). She distinguishes between constitutive and contextual values in scientific inquiry. Constitutive values are those values that make science the practice it is. We have seen that values like simplicity, empirical accuracy, and explanatory power are used when scientists choose between hypotheses. These values contribute to characterizing what science is. On the other hand, contextual values are those that arise from the contexts in which science is done. They enter via individual scientists, scientists as a group, or from society at large. Personal contextual values include those that inform the scientists, the sort of analysis they perform, and the character they exemplify. As an example of individual contextual values, biologist E. O. Wilson has spoken out against anthropogenic species extinction in part because of the moral values at stake (Wilson 1999) (see also Noss 2007). As an example of group contextual values, consider the Ecological Society of America's (ESA) Code of Ethics. Here are two obligations that members of the ESA must discharge:

Ecologists will conduct their research so as to avoid or minimize adverse environmental effects of their presence and activities, and in compliance with legal requirements for protection of researchers, human subjects, or research organisms and systems. Ecologists will not discriminate against others, in the course of their work on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, marital status, creed, religion, race, color, national origin, age, economic status, disability, or organizational affiliation. Ecological Society of America, Code of Ethics (2000). (link)

Note that avoiding negative environmental impacts of one's research and arbitrary discrimination are moral obligations — the pursuit of scientific knowledge alone does not require compliance with these claims.

The above mentioned moral values are not controversial and very few would be argue that they should not be a part of the ESA's Code of Ethics. However, there are more controversial societal values that some ecologists argue are part of their discipline. For example, conservation biologist Reed Noss writes,

Conservation biology has been described throughout its history as "value-laden," "mission-oriented," "normative," and sometimes in less flattering terms. The entire field rests on the value assumption that biodiversity is good and ought to be conserved. Human actions that protect and restore biodiversity are good; those that destroy or degrade biodiversity are bad. (Noss 2007, 18)

Consider the claim that biodiversity has intrinsic value. Is this true and do ecologists, or at least conservation biologists, accept it? First, it is not obviously true since it is not clear what it means. Environmental ethicists disagree over what intrinsic value is. Is something intrinsically valuable in virtue of its intrinsic properties or because it is valued for its own sake? Second, not all ecologists agree with the principle or how to interpret it. Here are examples of prominent ecologists on the topic of intrinsic value.

David Ehrenfeld: "For biological diversity, value is. Nothing more and nothing less.... Well, I couldn't prove it, I guess. I just believe it." Paul Ehrlich: "...I just can't have the feeling that the only value they [species] might have is what they might mean to us. But you can't possibly defend that scientifically." Jerry Franklin: "Oh, I basically think so, yes. But I haven't given a whole lot of thought to it." Daniel Janzen: "The word value is anthropocentric.... That's a contradiction in terms." S. J. MacNaughton: "I don't see how anything can have value outside of a value that human beings place on it, because value is really something uniquely human, isn't it?" David Pimmentel: "[I]n trying to protect or conserve nature, to use the argument of intrinsic value gets you-well, I don't think it sells very well" (Takacs 1996, 249–52).

Thus, there are constitutive and contextual values in ecology and with regard to the latter there are individual, collective contextual values, some of which are non-controversial, such as those encoded in the ESA's Code of Ethics and some that are controversial, like the claim that biodiversity has intrinsic value.

Let us now consider how these more controversial values should or should not affect scientific decision-making. For scientific work to impact policy, science should appear objective (Pielke Jr. 2007). However, if one advocates personal contextual values, then one's scientific work may appear subjective (Burke and Lauenroth 2009; however see Strong 2008). For example, if one advocates protecting biodiversity because it is intrinsically valuable and this value isn't shared and cannot be rationally defended, there is a serious risk that one's work will be dismissed. On the other had, if one advocates collective contextual values held by scientists and non-scientists, then one's values are more widely shared and less controversial. For example, if ecologists advocate protecting biodiversity on the basis of ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration, waste decomposition, purification of air and water, seed dispersal, etc., and the loss of these this services would have widespread negative impacts on human well-being, then advocating the protecting of ecosystem services would be less controversial (Brussard and Tull 2007). More generally, if a scientist advocates collective contextual values shared by scientists and non-scientists, then the science will appear less contentious. Society shares these values and would agree that they should be promoted.

It is clear that science is value-laden. Scientists ought to understand the values in science. Are those values personal or collective? Ecologists provide crucial information about the natural world to policymakers. But, they must be advocates with care.

There are two responses one might offer in response to the above argument. First, if the consequences are great enough, then scientists should advocate controversial values. For example, if as Noss notes, it is not the case that "policy makers are honest and altruistic and therefore will behave ethically in the best interest of the public" (Noss 2007, 19), then scientists may have to act on behalf of the public's interests. Though this might be so, we would have to examine particular cases to evaluate the objection. Second, one might argue that the problem is not scientific advocacy but the public's view that science is "value neutral." One way of improving the public's view of science is by the recognition that it is in the service of the common good. This too might be true, but as it stands scientists must be guarded in their advocacy.

Finally, there are several practical considerations for ecologists to think about regarding whether to be advocates or not (Lackey 2007). First, one should try to be clear about whether one is considering a scientific "is" claim or an ethical "ought" claim. Second, one can explain the scientific consequences of a policy without endorsing the policy or alternatives. Finally, if one chooses to enter policy discussions as an advocate, one must clearly consider the consequences for society, biodiversity, and science as well.

In conclusion, science, including ecology, is value laden. Nevertheless, ecologists must be aware of this fact and how those values enter in their own work. Otherwise, their scientific standing is jeopardized.