A basic tenet of scientific freedom has been the right to research any topic and to publish the results. But that freedom is now under pressure as awareness grows that biological research could be misused to create bioweapons that are directed at human beings, staple crops and livestock1. Balancing scientific freedom and public security has become an important challenge for both the scientific community and society.
In reconciling those interests, it is helpful to recall that in most countries there is no clear set of legal rights that protect what scientists may do. In the United States, for example, the rights to free speech protect a scientist's choice of research topic and the publication of results, but they leave room for government restrictions in the methods that are used and the projects that are funded. The right to research and publish does not include the right to use any method to achieve this goal, such as the use of human subjects without their consent, or the use of chemicals or pathogens that pose a high risk of harm. Funding agencies can also set limits on the topics that can be pursued, the methods that can be used and what may be published2.
Against this backdrop, the attempts of governments to reduce the chance that biological research could be used to produce bioweapons raise issues of policy more than of rights. The main question is whether the burdens on free inquiry and exchange are justified by the threats or dangers that they might pose. The scientific community has made clear its willingness to cooperate in minimizing threats to security3. For example, the editors of 20 leading scientific journals have announced that they will weigh the potential harm of publication against the scientific benefits of an article, and make the decision to modify or to publish on that basis4. It is essential that the government be also sensitive to the needs of science.
Of special concern in the United States is the maintenance of the longstanding policy that ensures that the results of nonclassified funded research may be published. The scientific community has strongly opposed the creation of a new category of “sensitive, nonclassified research” to restrict publication. Such a category is inherently vague and would probably be administered by nonscientists who are less sensitive to the needs of scientific research5.
Also of concern are restrictions on who may work with certain “select agents” that recent security laws now require to be registered and inventoried. Should past drug use, consultation with a psychiatrist, or having been born in certain countries disqualify individuals from working with those materials?
The halcyon days of scientific research that was unfettered by larger concerns about how results might be misused are now over for microbiologists and molecular biologists, as has long been the case for the scientists involved with nuclear energy. Inquiries into the genomic and protein structure of viruses and other microorganisms must continue, but scientists must also act responsibly in publicizing techniques that could yield bioweapons.
References
1. Fraser, C. M. & Dando, M. R. Genomics and future biological weapons: the need for preventive action by the biomedical community Nature Genet. 29, 253–256 (2001)
2. Robertson, J. A. The scientists right to research: a constitutional inquiry. Southern California Law Review 51, 1203–1281 (1978)
3. Alberts, B. & May, R. M. Scientist support for biological weapons control. Science 298, 1135 (2002)
4. Editorial. Statement on the consideration of biodefence and biosecurity. Nature 421, 771 (2003)
5. Schemo, D. J. Scientists discuss balance of research and security. New York Times A12 (1 January 2003).
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Robertson, J. Bioterrorism and the right to research. Nat Rev Genet 4, 248 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg1048
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg1048
