Contrary to the opinion of Genya Dana and colleagues (Nature 483, 29; 2012), the greater sophistication of modified microbes created by synthetic biology could make them less, not more, difficult to regulate, manage and monitor than their naturally occurring counterparts.

Several routes could lead to a hypothetical disaster scenario, in which artificially produced microorganisms spread unchecked in the environment (see go.nature.com/pncgxs). But we need to take into account that some of these paths would be favoured over others, and that ecological and other interactions might attenuate or amplify those different probabilities. Synthetic biology could then be used to engineer environmental safety into these organisms.

There is a danger that adverse public opinion could hinder the development of synthetic biology's potential. To prevent this, the media must refrain from hyping the benefits or risks of the technology. That will ensure that synthetic biology can be developed safely under a regulatory system that is based on the probability of occurrence of hazardous events, rather than on imagined possibilities.

The questions raised by Dana et al. should be considered as part of any risk-governance system for synthetic biology. Governance must be adaptive and scientifically and economically robust, given that most outcomes of technological innovation are still speculative. At the Economic and Social Research Council's Innogen Centre in Edinburgh, UK, we are developing such a strategy, to enable beneficial innovation with minimal risk to people and the environment while balancing stakeholder interests (see go.nature.com/khvykc).

Dana et al. propose that an investment of US$20–30 million over 10 years is needed to assess the risks associated with synthetic microbes. But, in our view, this is not yet justified. A more balanced and wide-ranging analysis is called for before major funding decisions are made relating to governance of the technology.