Science advisers should have confidence in their data, or risk being undermined by more dogmatic and vociferous stakeholders during the policy-making process.
Policy-makers receive formal and informal advice from all quarters: scientific, legal, political and public. Each piece of advice is considered mandatory by the giver, and it often conflicts with other advisers' points of view. Uncertainty is a feature of all advice, but it is usually only acknowledged by the scientific adviser.
I have worked as a scientist, policy-maker and adviser, mostly managing marine resources. As an ecologist specializing in fisheries population dynamics, I naively assumed that scientists develop advice that is passed on to policy-makers who then make decisions in the light of it.
When in 1995 I moved into policy-making, managing fisheries in the northeastern United States, I learned that advice comes from all directions. Scientists would present data with many caveats; others would give advice based mainly on opinion. Fishermen coming to the microphone in a public meeting might categorically state that the science was wrong, the rules wouldn't work and everyone would go out of business. Scientists tended to emphasize their uncertainty, and would be unwilling to speculate.
Emphasizing what we don't know often drowns out what we do know.
As scientists, we learn to analyse uncertainty and we explore decision-making in the light of that uncertainty. This is important, but we must also recognize that the precautionary approach will be adopted only slowly in policy-making. Uncertainty undermines political will in environmental decision-making. Officials are more likely to support a vociferous interest group that is apparently certain of the dire economic consequences of new restrictions, than scientists who advocate caution and prioritize the environment.
Over time, I learned that the solution for an adviser is not to hide careful analyses of uncertainty, but to distinguish the almost certain from the less certain. For example, it became clear in the 1980s that overfishing in New England, the North Sea and many other areas was critically depleting resources. Exploitation of species such as cod was removing 60–70% of the standing stock every year. Unfortunately, the debates were too often about whether the sustainable exploitation rate should be 20 or 25%. The conclusion drawn by many in industry and politics was that the science was uncertain. Hearing people say in debates, “fisheries science is not an exact science,” made me wonder which other field they were comparing fisheries to, and indeed what an exact science is.
There is little uncertainty that overfishing was, and in many cases still is, occurring and that exploitation needed to be reduced by half or more. Emphasizing what we don't know often drowns out what we do know. In the event, strong action in New England reduced exploitation rates on some stocks, such as haddock, down to reasonable levels. As scientists predicted, the stocks began to recover. On other stocks such as cod, exploitation has remained relatively high, and their numbers have not recovered. There is little mystery, and only very slow progress is being made. Unfortunately, the fish may not wait for us to learn our lesson.
Statements of policy are still a far cry from implementing policy. It is easier to agree to the general principle of ending overfishing and rebuilding resources than it is to put the principle into effect. Few argue that overfishing and resource depletion are good things; many argue about whether their fishing activity, their business or their recreation really contributes to overfishing.
For example, the US Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 is a strong mandate to protect all marine mammals; its reauthorization in 1994 was passed unanimously by the Senate. But in the northeastern United States, protection of whales from entanglement in fishing gear — one of the main causes of death for whales in coastal waters — means that restrictions on fishing are necessary. Implementing these restrictions caused huge controversy. Disagreement between different interest groups was exemplified by the elected official who opposed the restriction, telling me to, “go save the whales somewhere else”.
Political decision-making inevitably leans towards minimizing the impacts of policies on those constituents who are most affected. The public cares about the general outcome, such as saving whales, but individuls are unlikely to change their political view or support for an official because of local issues such as catch quotas or protected areas; fishermen will because the issue is immediate and vital to them.
In the 1990s, when I was a senior manager of the US National Marine Fisheries Service, I viewed my job as maximizing conservation without someone higher in the policy-making structure taking away my authority. Each decision was a judgement call about how far I could go, and without a doubt my judgment was imperfect. Science led my logic. I would start by asking: what do we know, and what does that mean we should do? In every case, I would then have to consider: what can be done, given the forces at play? As an adviser, I learned that adhering closely to the scientific advice is always the best course — as long as you can save some fish in the process.
For more essays and information see http://nature.com/nature/focus/arts/scipol/index.html .
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Rosenberg, A. Fishing for certainty. Nature 449, 989 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1038/449989a