To scientists, the philosophy of science seems an irrelevance, as does the empirical practice of science to philosophers, preoccupied as they are with the logical consistency of their methods. The gulf between the philosophy of science, which has its roots in the growth of positivism in the late nineteenth century, impoverishes both. But there is now hope that the gulf will be bridged by the evolution of philosophy into theory of science.
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Gale, G. Science and the philosophers. Nature 312, 491–495 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1038/312491a0
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