Abstract
THE discussion in NATURE under the above heading appears to me to be based in large measure upon failure to realise the character of scientific knowledge. Such misunderstanding is to be deprecated as being contrary to the interests of further progress in biology. I beg leave, therefore, to reiterate that scientific hypotheses, otherwise known as laws of Nature, are created by the mind of man for purposes of prediction and generalisation. They do not represent absolute truth, and are always liable to be superseded by new hypotheses which are more widely embracing. The Mendelian laws are no exception. So long as these laws fulfil the function of helping men of science to generalise and to predict they may be held to reflect definite degrees of reality. If, however, they fail to serve this purpose they have no logical justification.
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MARSHALL, F. Biological Fact and Theory. Nature 119, 563 (1927). https://doi.org/10.1038/119563b0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/119563b0
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