Abstract
LONDON. Aristotelian Society, March 8.—Prof. Wildon Carr in the chair.—M. Ginsberg: Is there a general will? The term “general will” has been used in many different senses. Especially important are the view of Wundt based on an analysis of the mutual implications of presentation and will, and leading to a theory of a series of will-unities of varied complexity, and the doctrine of a “real” will worked out by Prof. Bosanquet and other idealists. All the theories, in varying degrees, involve a confusion between the act of willing, which must always be individual, and the object of will, which may be common. Prof. Bosanquet's view in particular is based, upon a hypo-statisation of contents, and a tendency to deny the reality of acts, of experience. Generally, in so far as the psychological forces operative in society are general they are not will, and in so far as there is present self-conscious volition it is not general. The State and other associations exhibit a kind of unity, but this unity is a relation based on community of ideals and purposes, and must not be spoken of as a person or will. For the purpose of social theory, what is required is not a common self, but a common good. The latter is an ideal and not an existent, and must not be identified with a general will.
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Societies and Academies. Nature 105, 155–156 (1920). https://doi.org/10.1038/105155a0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/105155a0