Spinoza

Abstract

IF proof were requisite that the standard of value in philosophy is different from that which obtains in the estimation of scientific research, it would only be necessary to point to the case of Spinoza. There is probably no thinker of the nature of whose work there obtain conceptions more hopelessly irreconcilable; there is certainly none about whose position there is more general unanimity. To refer to the more recent of his English critics, Prof. Caird and Mr. Frederick Pollock are at one in assigning to Spinoza most important functions in the development of philosophical inquiry. Yet there is scarcely a single point in his system as to which their respective interpretations are not mutually exclusive. But as regards the broad feature which makes Spinozism deeply interesting to students of science in the strict sense there can be no doubt. The application of the method of geometiy to philosophical problems finds its counterpart in the prevailing, and apparently by no means diminishing, disposition to bring certain questions of metaphysics within the scope of scientific inquiry. That any one should have rejected the current method of metaphysics in favour of a geometrical investigation into the nature of God and existence, cannot be otherwise than significant to persons who seek to determine the psychological problem of the nature of consciousness by physiological means. Hence it is that there are some students who think that, if any philosophy were possible, it were that of Spinoza, and others who say that in the work of Mr. Spencer and Prof. Clifford they find the inheritance which Spinoza left behind him.

Ethic.

By Benedict de Spinoza. Translated from the Latin by William Hale White. (London: Trübner and Co., 1883.)