Abstract
THE principle which I endeavoured some years ago to get recognised as the directive principle of research in Nerve Physiology, was that everywhere identity of Tissue carried with it identity of physiological Property, and that similarity in the structure and connections of Organs involved corresponding similarity in Function. Although these premisses were almost truisms, the conclusion drawn— that all nerve-centres must have a common Property, and similar Functions—was too much opposed to the reigning doctrine, to find general acceptance. Especially was it resisted in its application to the functions of the Spinal Cord; and this because of the two hypotheses current, namely, that Reflex Action did not involve Sensibility, and that the Brain was the sole Organ of the Mind. Following in the track so victoriously opened by Pflüger, I brought forward what seemed to me decisive evidence of the sensational and volitional functions of the Spinal Cord; but this evidence has not been generally deemed conclusive by those whose verdict is authoritative. Neither in Germany nor in England have the majority of physiologists consented to regard the actions determined by tthe Spinal Cord in the absence of the Brain as sensitive actions.
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LEWES, G. Sensation in the Spinal Cord . Nature 9, 83–84 (1873). https://doi.org/10.1038/009083b0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/009083b0
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