Abstract
Sustainable use of common-pool resources is a major environmental governance challenge because of possible overexploitation. Communities devise self-governing institutions that avoid overuse and attain long-term benefits of cooperation. It is still unclear, however, what conditions allow cooperation to emerge, leading to greater long-term benefits. Until recently, studies of the sustainable governance of common-pool resources have overlooked feedback between user decisions and resource dynamics and failed to test the ability of shared goals to actually induce cooperation. Here we develop an online game to perform a set of experiments in which users of the same common-pool resource decide on their individual harvesting rates, which in turn are influenced by the resource dynamics. We show that if users share common goals, a high level of self-organized cooperation emerges, leading to long-term resource sustainability. Otherwise, selfish/individualistic behaviours lead to resource depletion. To explain these results, we develop a model of resource-decision dynamics based on optimal control theory and show how it is able to reproduce empirical results. We find that players self-organize and engage in collective action conducive to sustainable governance of common-pool resources by trade-off strategies that balance individual and collective payoff as well as short-term and long-term rewards.
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Data availability
Data for all analyses are available at OSF (https://osf.io/txus6/).
Code availability
Code for all analyses is available at OSF (https://osf.io/txus6/).
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by Microsoft AI for Earth (C.T.); Experimental Social Science Laboratory at University of California Berkeley (C.T. and P.D.); Natural Science Fund of Zhejiang Province under Grant No. LZ18G010001, LZ22G010001; Science Foundation of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University under Grant No. 18092125-Y, 22092034-Y (C.T.); LINCON INFN grant (S.S.) and BIRD_UNIPD grant (S.S.).
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C.T. and S.S. conceptualized the project. C.T., Z.L. and S.S. developed the methodology. C.T., P.D. and S.S. conducted the investigations. C.T. and S.S. performed visualization. C.T., P.D. and S.S. acquired funding. P.D. and S.S. administered the project. S.S. supervised the project and wrote the original draft. C.T., P.D. and S.S. wrote, reviewed and edited the manuscript.
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Nature Sustainability thanks Christiane Runyan and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.
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Supplementary Notes, Figs. 1–28 and References.
Supplementary Table 1
All the details of the box-and-whisker charts shown in Fig. 2 and Supplementary Figs. 9–12, including mean, standard deviation, median, minimum, maximum, first quartile and third quartile.
Supplementary Table 2
Detailed description of the statistical tests for Fig. 2.
Supplementary Table 3
Detailed description of the statistical tests for Supplementary Figs. 9–12 by ANOVA.
Supplementary Table 4
Detailed description of the statistical tests for Supplementary Figs. 9–12 by Mann-Whitney test with Bonferroni correction.
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Tu, C., D’Odorico, P., Li, Z. et al. The emergence of cooperation from shared goals in the governance of common-pool resources. Nat Sustain 6, 139–147 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-022-01008-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-022-01008-1
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