Abstract
Lasting community-based governance of common-pool resources depends on communities self-organizing to monitor compliance with rules. Monitoring serves an important function in community-based governance by establishing conditions for long-term cooperation, but the factors that foster its provision are poorly understood. We have analysed data from 177 forest user groups to assess the relative importance of 15 potential drivers of compliance monitoring, as well as the direction and form of their relationships. The results suggest that user groups are most likely to successfully self-organize to monitor compliance when rules are designed by local user groups (local rulemaking), and when those user groups are located close to or far from markets for forest products and have a larger number of members. Additionally, local leadership plays an important role in certain contexts, such as groups that are smaller in size and located near markets for forest products.
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Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available as a supplement to this paper and at https://github.com/gbepstein/Compliancemonitoring.
Code availability
The code that supports the findings of this study is available as a supplement to this paper and at https://github.com/gbepstein/Compliancemonitoring.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center (SESYNC) through funding received from the National Science Foundation (DBI-1639145).
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All authors contributed equally to research design and the writing of this manuscript. G.E. performed the analysis.
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Compliance monitoring data.
Supplementary Data 2
Compliance monitoring code in R.
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Epstein, G., Gurney, G., Chawla, S. et al. Drivers of compliance monitoring in forest commons. Nat Sustain 4, 450–456 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-020-00673-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-020-00673-4
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