Abstract
More than 100 countries have adopted a global warming limit of 2 °C or below (relative to pre-industrial levels) as a guiding principle for mitigation efforts to reduce climate change risks, impacts and damages1, 2. However, the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions corresponding to a specified maximum warming are poorly known owing to uncertainties in the carbon cycle and the climate response. Here we provide a comprehensive probabilistic analysis aimed at quantifying GHG emission budgets for the 2000–50 period that would limit warming throughout the twenty-first century to below 2 °C, based on a combination of published distributions of climate system properties and observational constraints. We show that, for the chosen class of emission scenarios, both cumulative emissions up to 2050 and emission levels in 2050 are robust indicators of the probability that twenty-first century warming will not exceed 2 °C relative to pre-industrial temperatures. Limiting cumulative CO2 emissions over 2000–50 to 1,000 Gt CO2 yields a 25% probability of warming exceeding 2 °C—and a limit of 1,440 Gt CO2 yields a 50% probability—given a representative estimate of the distribution of climate system properties. As known 2000–06 CO2 emissions3 were
234 Gt CO2, less than half the proven economically recoverable oil, gas and coal reserves4, 5, 6 can still be emitted up to 2050 to achieve such a goal. Recent G8 Communiqués7 envisage halved global GHG emissions by 2050, for which we estimate a 12–45% probability of exceeding 2 °C—assuming 1990 as emission base year and a range of published climate sensitivity distributions. Emissions levels in 2020 are a less robust indicator, but for the scenarios considered, the probability of exceeding 2 °C rises to 53–87% if global GHG emissions are still more than 25% above 2000 levels in 2020.
Determining probabilistic climate change for future emission scenarios is challenging, as it requires a synthesis of uncertainties along the cause–effect chain from emissions to temperatures; for example, uncertainties in the carbon cycle8, radiative forcing and climate responses. Uncertainties in future climate projections can be quantified by constraining climate model parameters to reproduce historical observations of temperature9, ocean heat uptake10 and independent estimates of radiative forcing. By focusing on emission budgets (the cumulative emissions to stay below a certain warming level) and their probabilistic implications for the climate, we build on pioneering mitigation studies11, 12. Previous probabilistic studies—while sometimes based on more complex models—either considered uncertainties only in a few forcing components13, applied relatively simple likelihood estimators ignoring the correlation structure of the observational errors14 or constrained only model parameters like climate sensitivity rather than allowed emissions.
Using a reduced complexity coupled carbon cycle–climate model15, 16, we constrain future climate projections, building on the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report (AR4) and more recent research. In particular, multiple uncertainties in the historical temperature observations9 are treated separately for the first time; new ocean heat uptake estimates are incorporated10; a constraint on changes in effective climate sensitivity is introduced; and the most recent radiative forcing uncertainty estimates for individual forcing agents are considered17.
The data constraints provide us with likelihood estimates for the chosen 82-dimensional space of climate response, gas-cycle and radiative forcing parameters (Supplementary Fig. 3). We chose a Bayesian approach, but also obtain 'frequentist' confidence intervals for climate sensitivity (68% interval, 2.3–4.5 °C; 90%, 2.1–7.1 °C), which is in approximate agreement with the recent AR4 estimates. Given the inherent subjectivity of Bayesian priors, we chose priors for climate sensitivity such that we obtain marginal posteriors identical to 19 published climate sensitivity distributions (Fig. 1a). These distributions are not all independent and not equally likely, and cannot be formally combined18. They are used here simply to represent the wide variety of modelling approaches, observational data and likelihood derivations used in previous studies, whose implications for an emission budget have not been analysed before. For illustrative purposes, we chose the climate sensitivity distribution of ref. 19 with a uniform prior in transient climate response (TCR, defined as the global-mean temperature change which occurs at the time of CO2 doubling for the specific case of a 1% yr-1 increase of CO2) as our default. This distribution closely resembles the AR4 estimate (best estimate, 3 °C; likely range, 2.0–4.5 °C) (Supplementary Information).
Figure 1: Joint and marginal probability distributions of climate sensitivity and transient climate response.

a, Marginal probability density functions (PDFs) of climate sensitivity; b, marginal PDFs of transient climate response (TCR); c, posterior joint distribution constraining model parameters to historical temperatures, ocean heat uptake and radiative forcing under our representative illustrative priors. For comparison, TCR and climate sensitivities are shown in c for model versions that yield a close emulation of 19 CMIP3 AOGCMs (white circles)16. Data sources for curves 1–25 are given in Supplementary Information.
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Maximal warming under low emission scenarios is more closely related to the TCR than to the climate sensitivity19. The distribution of the TCR of our climate model for the illustrative default is slightly lower than derived within another model set-up19, but within the range of results of previous studies (Fig. 1b), and encompasses the range arising from emulations by coupled atmosphere–ocean general circulation models16 (AOGCMs) (Fig. 1c).
Representing current knowledge on future carbon-cycle responses is difficult, and might be best encapsulated in the wide range of results from the process-based C4MIP carbon-cycle models8. We emulate these C4MIP models individually by calibrating 18 parameters in our carbon-cycle model16, and combine these settings with the other gas cycles, radiative forcing and climate response parameter uncertainties gained from our historical constraining.
Additional challenges arise in estimating the maximum temperature change resulting from a certain amount of cumulative emissions. The analysis needs to be based on a multitude of emission pathways with realistic multi-gas characteristics20, 21, as well as varying shapes over time. AOGCM results for multi-gas mitigation scenarios were not available for assessment in the IPCC AR4 Working Group I Report22. Consequently, IPCC AR4 Working Group III23 provided equilibrium warming estimates corresponding to 2100 radiative forcing levels for some multi-gas mitigation scenarios, using simplified regressions (Supplementary Fig. 6). Thus, 15 years after the first pioneering mitigation studies11, 12, there is still an important gap in the literature relating emission budgets for lower emission profiles to the probability of exceeding maximal warming levels; a gap that this study intends to fill.
We compute time-evolving distributions of radiative forcing and surface air temperature implications for the set of 26 IPCC SRES21 and 20 EMF-21 scenarios20 shown in Fig. 2a and b. We complement these with 948 multi-gas equal quantile walk emission pathways24 that share—by design—similar multi-gas characteristics (Supplementary Fig. 5) but represent a wide variety of plausible shapes, ranging from early moderate reductions to later peaking and rapidly declining emissions towards near-zero emissions (Supplementary Information). Whereas Fig. 2e shows a standard plot of global-mean temperature versus time for two sample scenarios, Fig. 2f highlights the strong correlation between maximum warming and cumulative emissions. The fraction of climate model runs above 2 °C (dashed line in Fig. 2f) is then our estimate for the probability of exceeding 2 °C for an individual scenario (as indicated by the dots in Fig. 3a). We focus here on 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels, as such a warming limit has gained increasing prominence in science and policy circles as a goal to prevent dangerous climate change25. We recognize that 2 °C cannot be regarded as a 'safe level', and that (for example) small island states and least developed countries are calling for warming to be limited to 1.5 °C (Supplementary Information). We chose the twenty-first century as our time horizon, as this time frame is sufficiently long to determine which emission scenarios will probably lead to a global surface warming below 2 °C. Under these scenarios, temperatures have stabilized or peaked by 2100, while warming continues under higher scenarios.
Figure 2: Emissions, concentrations and twenty-first century global-mean temperatures.

a, Fossil CO2 emissions for IPCC SRES21, EMF-2120 scenarios and a selection of equal quantile walk24 (EQW) pathways analysed here; b, GHGs, as controlled under the Kyoto Protocol; c, median projections and uncertainties based on our illustrative default case for atmospheric CO2 concentrations for the high SRES A1FI21 and the low HALVED-BY-205030 scenario, which halves 1990 global Kyoto-gas emissions by 2050; d, total anthropogenic radiative forcing; e, surface air global-mean temperature; f, maximum temperature during the twenty-first century versus cumulative Kyoto-gas emissions for 2000–49. Colour range shown in e also applies to c, d and f.
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Figure 3: The probability of exceeding 2 °C warming versus CO2 emitted in the first half of the twenty-first century.
![Figure 3 : The probability of exceeding 2|[thinsp]||[deg]|C warming versus CO2 emitted in the first half of the twenty-first century. Unfortunately we are unable to provide accessible alternative text for this. If you require assistance to access this image, or to obtain a text description, please contact npg@nature.com](/nature/journal/v458/n7242/images/nature08017-f3.0.jpg)
a, Individual scenarios' probabilities of exceeding 2 °C for our illustrative default (dots; for example, for SRES B1, A2, Stern and other scenarios shown in Fig. 2) and smoothed (local linear regression smoother) probabilities for all climate sensitivity distributions (numbered lines, see Supplementary Information for data sources). The proportion of CMIP3 AOGCMs26 and C4MIP carbon-cycle8 model emulations exceeding 2 °C is shown as black dashed line. Coloured areas denote the range of probabilities (right) of staying below 2 °C in AR4 terminology, with the extreme upper distribution (12) being omitted. b, Total CO2 emissions already emitted3 between 2000 and 2006 (grey area) and those that could arise from burning available fossil fuel reserves, and from land use activities between 2006 and 2049 (median and 80% ranges, Methods).
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For our illustrative distribution of climate system properties, we find that the probability of exceeding 2 °C can be limited to below 25% (50%) by keeping 2000–49 cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil sources and land use change to below 1,000 (1,440) Gt CO2 (Fig. 3a and Table 1). If we resample model parameters to reproduce 18 published climate sensitivity distributions, we find a 10–42% probability of exceeding 2 °C for such a budget of 1,000 Gt CO2. If the acceptable exceedance probability were only 20%, this would require an emission budget of 890 Gt CO2 or lower (illustrative default). Given that around 234 Gt CO2 were emitted between 2000 and 2006 and assuming constant rates of 36.3 Gt CO2 yr-1 (ref. 3) thereafter, we would exhaust the CO2 emission budget by 2024, 2027 or 2039, depending on the probability accepted for exceeding 2 °C (respectively 20%, 25% or 50%).
To contrast observationally constrained probabilistic projections against current AOGCM and carbon-cycle models, we ran each emission scenario with all permutations of 19 CMIP326 AOGCM and 10 C4MIP carbon-cycle model emulations16. The allowed emissions are similar to the lower part of the range spanned by the observationally constrained distributions, suggesting that the current AOGCMs do not substantially over- or underestimate future climate change compared to the values obtained using a model constrained by observations, although no probability statement can be derived from the proportion of runs exceeding 2 °C (black dashed line in Fig. 3a). Using an independent approach focusing on CO2 alone, Allen et al.27 find that a range of 2,050–2,100 Gt CO2 emissions from year 2000 onwards cause a most likely CO2-induced warming of 2 °C: in the idealized scenarios they consider that meet this criterion, between 1,550 and 1,950 Gt CO2 are emitted over the years 2000 to 2049.
We explored the consequences of burning all proven fossil fuel reserves (the fraction of fossil fuel resources that is economically recoverable with current technologies and prices: Fig. 3b and Methods). We derived a mid-estimate of 2,800 Gt CO2 emissions from the literature, with an 80%-uncertainty range of 2,541 to 3,089 Gt CO2. Emitting the carbon from all proven fossil fuel reserves would therefore vastly exceed the allowable CO2 emission budget for staying below 2 °C.
Although the dominant anthropogenic warming contribution is from CO2 emissions, non-CO2 GHG emissions add to the risk of exceeding warming thresholds during the twenty-first century. We estimate that the so-called non-CO2 'Kyoto gases' (methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and SF6) will constitute roughly one-third of total CO2 equivalent (CO2 equiv.) emissions based on 100-yr global warming potentials28 over the 2000–49 period. Under our illustrative distribution for climate system properties, and taking into account all positive and negative forcing agents as provided by Table 2.12 in AR417, the cumulative Kyoto-gas emission budget for 2000–50 is 1,500 (2,000) Gt CO2 equiv., if the probability of exceeding 2 °C is to be limited to approximately 25% (50%) (Table 1).
For the lower scenarios, Kyoto-gas emissions in the year 2050 are a remarkably good indicator for probabilities of exceeding 2 °C, because for these scenarios (with emissions in 2050 below
30 Gt CO2 equiv.), radiative forcing peaks around 2050 and temperature soon thereafter. This is indicated by the narrow spread of individual scenarios' exceedance probabilities for similar 2050 Kyoto-gas emissions, as shown in Supplementary Fig. 1b. If emissions in 2050 are half 1990 levels, we estimate a 12–45% probability of exceeding 2 °C (Table 1) under these scenarios.
Emissions in 2020 are a less robust indicator of maximum warming (note the wide vertical spread of individual scenario dots in Supplementary Fig. 1c)—even if restricted to this class of relatively smooth emission pathways. However, the probability of exceeding 2 °C rises to 75% if 2020 emissions are not lower than 50 Gt CO2 equiv. (25% above 2000). Given the substantial recent increase in fossil CO2 emissions (20% between 2000 and 2006)3, policies to reduce global emissions are needed urgently if the 'below 2 °C' target29 is to remain achievable.
Methods Summary
To relate emissions of GHGs, tropospheric ozone precursors and aerosols to gas-cycle and climate system responses, we employ MAGICC 6.016, a reduced complexity coupled climate–carbon cycle model used in past IPCC assessment reports for emulating AOGCMs. Out of more than 400 parameters, we vary 9 climate response parameters (one of which is climate sensitivity), 33 gas-cycle and global radiative forcing parameters (not including 18 carbon-cycle parameters, which are calibrated separately16 to C4MIP carbon-cycle models8), and 40 scaling factors determining the regional 4 box pattern of key forcings (Supplementary Table 1). Other parameters are set to default values16.
To constrain the parameters, we use observational data of surface air temperature9 in 4 spatial grid boxes from 1850 to 2006, the linear trend in ocean heat content changes10 from 1961 to 2003 and year 2005 radiative forcing estimates for 18 forcing agents17, in addition to a constraint on the twenty-first century change of effective climate sensitivity derived from AOGCM CMIP3 emulations16. With a Metropolis-Hastings Markov chain Monte Carlo approach, based on a large ensemble (>3
106) of parameter sets using 45 parallel Markov chains with 75,000 runs each, we estimate the posterior distribution of different MAGICC parameters. Estimated likelihoods take into account observational uncertainty and climate variability from various AOGCM control runs, HadCM3 being the default.
For forward projections with the model, we combine, at random, 600 sets of the 82 historically constrained parameters with one of 10 carbon-cycle calibrations. We supplemented 26 multi-gas IPCC SRES21 and 20 EMF-21 reference and mitigation scenarios20 by 948 equal quantile walk multi-gas pathways24. The proven fossil fuel reserve estimates for natural gas, oil and coal were compiled from various sources4, 5 by combining the reserve estimates with net calorific values and emission factors (and their 95% uncertainty ranges) according to IPCC 2006 guidelines6 (Supplementary Information).
Full methods accompany this paper.

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