London

Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has taken a step towards persuading countries to relinquish control of their nuclear fuel.

Supporters accept that there is a very long diplomatic fight to come.

On 7 November, ElBaradei announced that the United States and Russia have agreed to contribute to an international fuel bank. The move paves the way for the first stage in a programme to bring the entire nuclear-fuel cycle under multilateral control, says ElBaradei, who, along with his agency, won this year's Nobel Peace Prize. In theory, the bank will help dissuade nuclear-hungry nations from developing facilities to enrich uranium.

Enrichment technology can also be used to develop weapons-grade material and is at the heart of current tensions between the IAEA and Iran.

Under the fuel-bank programme, nations that meet certain security standards, such as observing non-proliferation treaties, would be guaranteed a supply of fuel. Non-proliferation experts are applauding the idea of the bank, but caution that ElBaradei's long-term aims are unrealistic in today's political environment.

So far, the United States has said it will supply more than 17 tonnes of highly enriched uranium, taken from dismantled nuclear weapons. This will be ‘downblended’ to create reactor fuel. Russia has not said how much it will contribute.

The bank is meant to build confidence in nuclear security, says Geoff Shaw, policy adviser to ElBaradei at the IAEA's Geneva headquarters. If IAEA members can agree to the creation of the bank — perhaps when the agency's governors meet next March — they could be open to considering further parts of ElBaradei's non-proliferation plans, Shaw adds.

But such ambitions are not easy to realize. ElBaradei's second proposal is a moratorium on the development of technology for uranium enrichment and reprocessing, which can be used to recycle nuclear fuel and create weapons-grade material. Nations with this ability, such as the United States, Russia, France and Britain, would be allowed to retain it. But others would agree not to develop it in the next ten years, despite the fact that non-proliferation agreements allow them to do so for civilian purposes.

Sceptics point out that there are few incentives to sign up to the moratorium. “Are we going to say to other countries that they have to forgo their right to develop the fuel cycle?” asks Lawrence Scheinman, a nuclear-policy expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Washington DC, and an adviser to three former US governments.

Mohamed ElBaradei wants to see the whole of the nuclear-fuel cycle under multilateral control. Credit: L. GILLIERON/KEYSTONE/AP

There are a number of reasons why nations might reject the moratorium, he says. Uranium suppliers such as Australia and Canada might find it profitable to enrich fuel before selling it, for example. Other countries will want fuel-cycle capability so that they can at least keep the option of developing weapons. What would make Iran join the scheme, asks Mark Fitzpatrick, a non-proliferation expert at the Institute for International Strategic Studies in London. “They want enrichment for their nuclear weapons programme,” he alleges.

But if the second stage of ElBaradei's plan is tough, the third and fourth are truly ambitious. Part three would bring the reprocessing of spent fuel under multilateral control, perhaps at a series of dedicated regional facilities. Finally, existing enrichment facilities would come under international ownership. Countries that rely on such facilities to fuel their nuclear arsenals are extremely unlikely to agree, say experts. “For the United States, that's a dream,” says Fitzpatrick.

He acknowledges that the fuel bank, if it can be made to work, would be a useful step towards achieving at least some of ElBaradei's plans. But even supporters accept that there is a very long diplomatic fight to come. “No one is naive on this point,” says Shaw. “The longer term will be much more difficult.”