Sir

With reference to Thomas May's Commentary article “Isolation is not the answer” (Nature 429, 603; 2004), we would like to comment on European progress towards the goal of harmonizing international research on high-risk biological agents. Some of the obstacles along the way have been noted by J. van Aken and colleagues in Correspondence (“Biosecurity must be internationally supervised” Nature 431, 17; 200410.1038/431017a).

Activities that speed the development of viable vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostic tools are a key component to combat the threat of bioterrorism. To this end, the European Commission has mobilized start-up funds to strengthen networking activities among researchers, industry and the public-health sector.

One such network, Anthrax-EuroNet (http://www.anthraxeuronet.org), unites leading anthrax researchers in France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy to discuss ways to harmonize research practices, to exchange information and materials, and to strengthen networking with countries in and beyond the European Union.

One goal is to develop a handbook of current and recommended protocols to improve comparison and interpretation of research data. Therefore, we circulated a questionnaire to all leading anthrax research labs working on vaccines and therapeutics. Because much research on this topic is done in the United States, the input of US scientists was essential to this survey; the feedback we received from them was supportive. The survey revealed that the possible exchange of information was restricted by US regulations. In general, US scientists seem unsure how to interpret existing rules and fearful of releasing what could be considered sensitive information.

Follow-up discussions are under way to see what restrictions we are facing and how we can overcome them. Access to scientific information and materials exchanges could be greatly facilitated if there were clear international regulations in place.

Without such regulations and support for international networking, progress in biodefence research, especially the expertise needed to develop new prophylactics and tools for rapid detection and containment of diseases, will be significantly hindered.