London

Biologists must begin a process of self- regulation for projects that have potential applications in developing bioweapons — or risk the imposition of restrictive controls from outside. That is the sobering message being delivered by a senior scientific adviser to the US defence department.

George Poste: wants to restrict access to data.

George Poste, who chairs a Department of Defense task force on bioterrorism and sits on its advisory Defense Science Board, told a pharmaceuticals-industry conference in London on 6 November that biology must “lose its innocence”. He criticized biologists for what he regards as their naivety in failing to consider malign applications of data generated in legitimate projects, and urged them to start considering how access to such data could best be regulated.

“What I think is untenable is the status quo — just allowing highly sensitive information to enter the public domain,” says Poste, a former head of research at the drugs company SmithKline Beecham. “Equally dangerous would be a draconian legislative response.”

With the United States reeling in the face of anthrax attacks against media outlets and politicians, Poste fears that unduly restrictive legislation could be hurried through. He points to a bill that is now before Congress that would impose sweeping restrictions on non-US citizens handling potential bioweapons agents, which has already caused alarm among biologists (see Nature 414, 3–4; 2001).

In an interview with Nature, Poste expanded upon his concerns. He is particularly worried about projects in which viruses are engineered to evade or manipulate the immune system. For instance, earlier this year Australian researchers revealed that they had inadvertently created a supervirulent strain of mousepox in a project aimed at creating a contraceptive vaccine (see Nature 411, 232–235; 2001). And gene therapists, grappling with the problems caused by immune reactions to the viral vectors they use to introduce therapeutic genes, are now designing 'stealth' vectors that would escape the attention of the immune system.

Such technologies could be applied to viral bioweapons with devastating effects, argues Poste. Yet he has been disappointed by the reactions of some researchers working on such projects when this possibility is raised: “They look at you first of all with a blank stare, followed by arrogant denial,” he says.

Poste believes that a larger number of projects addressing the issue of biodefence may in future have to be classified. More generally, he suggests that researchers submitting grant proposals to bodies such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) might have to declare whether they have considered potential malign applications. For projects deemed to be particularly risky, manuscripts might even be vetted, he says, with the possibility that permission to publish could be denied.

Poste also suggests that anyone wishing to access genomic sequence data for dangerous pathogens might be required to provide evidence of their accreditation with a legitimate lab — a stipulation already applied by suppliers of microbial cultures.

But Poste stresses that wider debate among biologists is needed to develop an appropriate framework for self-regulation. “These are not formal proposals,” he says.

Poste's suggestions are highly controversial, given that the freedom to publish and to share data is central to the culture of modern bioscience. “We consider openness in publication as sacrosanct in our work,” says Tony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in Bethesda, Maryland. “I think that's something that we are going to have to be very careful about treading on.”

Fauci is similarly sceptical about proposals to restrict access to genome-sequence databases. “I'm not sure how much safer the public would be” as a result of such controls, he says.

Gene therapists, who are already subject to stringent controls, view any suggestion of additional regulation with horror. “I spend 90% of my time dealing with regulatory authorities,” says Malcolm Brenner of Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas, president of the American Society of Gene Therapy. “Any further regulation will be the kiss of death.”

Mark Wheelis, a microbiologist at the University of California, Davis, and a member of the Federation of American Scientists' working group on bioweapons, is alarmed by Poste's suggestion of classifying a greater proportion of work on defence against bioweapons. He argues that this could allow states to hide offensive bioweapons programmes under the guise of classified biodefence projects — or at least to create suspicions that they are doing so.

On the basis of his conversations with members of Congress, Fauci says he is confident that legislators will not impose draconian restrictions. But both he and Wheelis agree that biologists must become more aware of potential destructive applications of their work. They urge scientific societies to take a lead in promoting debate.

Fauci says the NIH could play a part by hosting discussion meetings, and believes that heightened awareness could lead to biologists deciding not to go ahead with certain projects.