Abstract
FROM age to age, men have contemplated the problem of good; not infrequently, however, they have found themselves discussing what things are good, an entirely different question. Dr. A. C. Ewing is quite clear ; his concern is with the former. This being so, he sets out to offer stout resistance to subjectivism and to naturalism in ethics. Why exactly does he do this ? Because these tanets erode, as it were, any rational basis, and therefore render the superstructure of moral obligation insecure. The approach is positive and impressive—criticism, counter—criticism and the development of an appropriate alternative. The author modestly (and no doubt rightly) declines to put pressure upon "people to do what they know to be their duty" ; unluckily, however, the number of readers of this book cannot be expected to be very great, and outside them must be a multitude by whom guidance—perhaps even direction—would willingly be accepted. In a word, we need an interpreter, somebody like Thore, who in his day demonstrated to the uninitiated the power and majesty of the Barbizon painters; for, power and majesty these pages possess, but they are not easy reading.
The Definition of Good
By Dr. A. C. Ewing. Pp. vii + 215. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947.) 12s. 6d. net.
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RAWLINS, F. The Definition of Good. Nature 162, 944–945 (1948). https://doi.org/10.1038/162944a0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/162944a0