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John Nash, who died in a car crash in May 2015, was a mathematician famed for both his work and his troubled life. He received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his work on game theory that has had wide influence in evolutionary biology, and the Abel Prize for his work on algebraic geometry and partial differential equations that brought him recognition from mathematicians. Here, we bring you research and comment related to Nash’s life and work from the archives of Nature Publishing Group.
A Nash equilibrium is a highly desirable situation in game theory, which earned its discoverer a Nobel prize. Such a fundamental result might seem hard to improve on, but new work has multiplied the situations in which Nash equilibria can apply.
When individuals differ in their cooperative behaviour, it pays to take a partner’s reputation into account when deciding one's own levels of cooperation. Here the authors use game theory to analyse how this feeds back to change levels of cooperation as individuals change their reputation so as to change the behaviour of future partners.
It is shown that if individuals vary in their degree of cooperativeness, and if they can decide whether or not to continue interacting with each other on the basis of their respective levels of cooperativeness, then cooperation can gradually evolve from an uncooperative state. These results highlight the importance of individual behavioural differences in fostering the evolution of cooperation.
Progress towards reaching an international climate agreement has been painfully slow and fraught with difficulty. This work presents a newly developed game theoretic model aimed at the conceptual clarification of some key obstacles in current international negotiations. The model is then used to suggest possible solutions to these obstacles.