Can we achieve the ambitious mitigation targets needed to avert dangerous global warming? Research now shows that local sanctioning institutions may succeed where global agreements fall short.
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A bargaining experiment on heterogeneity and side deals in climate negotiations
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Tavoni, A. Building up cooperation. Nature Clim Change 3, 782–783 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1962
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1962
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