The red and black lines in the figures correspond to payoff constants with weak and strong empathy, respectively. In both setups we have β = 0.4, δ = 0.2, c0 = 1 and weak averseness (c0 > c1). In particular, we consider risk aversion constant c1 to be 3c1 > c0 > 2c1. The MMPE action for the strong empathy case is given by Fig. 2(b). The MMPE action at time t = 1 for weak empathy is given by Fig. 2(a). The sequence of networks at the top shows the disease state and MMPE action of each individual at each time on the network for the weak empathy & weak averseness case. In this case, the MMPE actions are such that all individuals socialize at all times unless a healthy individual has three sick neighbors when the healthy individual self-isolates–see times 12 and 13. This is because of the value of the risk aversion constant obeys the relation 3c1 > c0. Bottom figure represents the corresponding aggregate utility for each case.