Figure 4 : Offers and thresholds in the splitting phase behave qualitatively as predicted by Nash equilibrium.

From: Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation

Figure 4

Mean offer and threshold in the ultimatum game with (hierarchy-based) outside option41 vs k, the groups of rank differences organized as indicated in the text, with rank difference being smaller with increasing k. Plots (A) through (E) correspond to our five treatments: (A) no hierarchy, full experiment (cooperation plus splitting); (B) earned hierarchy, no cooperation task; (C) random hierarchy, no cooperation task; (D) earned hierarchy, full experiment, and (E) random hierarchy, full experiment. In all plots, red circles correspond to the proposer’s offer, blue triangles correspond to the responder’s minimum acceptable offer, and the green solid line is the theoretical prediction of the Nash equilibrium for both the minimum acceptable offer and the proposer’s offer.