Polarization is the psychological foundation of collective engagement

The term polarization is used to describe both the division of a society into opposing groups (political polarization), and a social psychological phenomenon (group polarization) whereby people adopt more extreme positions after discussion. We explain how group polarization underpins the political polarization phenomenon: Social interaction, for example through social media, enables groups to form in such a way that their beliefs about what should be done to change the world—and how this differs from the stance of other groups—become integrated as aspects of a new, shared social identity. This provides a basis for mobilization to collective action.

p. 5 'now neglected15' is a reference from 22 years ago.A more recent reference might better illustrate that group polarization is currently neglected (maybe a textbook?).p. 10 'The creation of new opinion-based groups via group polarization (as per #2), who articulate their own position (only) in terms of how it differs to that of an opposing group; leads to political polarization' Check punctuation.p. 20 'lone wolf attacks' I understand that that this term is no longer favoured by the relevant experts and researchers.Its assumptions also seems in conflict with the group-based approach of the current paper.pp.20-21 I wonder about the term 'extremism'.The UK government and others seems to use it about activists the authors might not (such as environmental campaigners).Or, turning it around, if the authors are right that group polarization underpins political polarization then all groups discussed in the article are 'extremists' (is that ok?It sounds a bit problematic when many such groups are trying to avoid being marginalized -for example by placing debates around the climate crisis in the mainstream).p. 22 '(i.e., akin to group polarization' Why 'akin'?I thought the argument was it just is group polarization.John Drury Reviewer #2 (Remarks to the Author): I had the pleasure of reading the manuscript "Polarization is the Psychological Foundation of Collective Engagement and Extremism".In this article, the authors describe how group polarization can give way to political polarization, which ultimately might result in collective action.They specifically focus on the role of social media in this process.To make their claims, they draw both on literature and real-world examples from across the globe.Below I outline some recommendations for how to strengthen the theoretical arguments proposed.
1.The authors list six propositions for the connection between group think, polarization, and collective action (see table 2).Overall, I think that these propositions make a lot of sense and are clearly thought out.However, I would appreciate more acknowledgement of the interconnectedness between them.For instance, based on the way it is currently written, it sounds like these are six steps that occur in the order listed; however, many of the early steps serve as precursors for the later steps.For instance, as noted in the table, proposition 6 can be an outcome for proposition 1, 2 and 4. I recommend that rather than listing the propositions as a table, that the authors convert it to a diagram that highlights pathways between each proposition.I also recommend explaining such a figure in the text as well.
2. I am curious about the relationship between group polarization, political polarization, and collective action in contexts that have limited or no access to social media.The authors illude to this possibility when they discuss how Egypt cut off access to internet (see page 16), however, in this context, social media did still play an important role in propelling initial calls to collective action.Do similar processes/links between group polarization, political polarization and collective action exist in absence of SNS, or is it something unique about social media that strengthens these connections?I am not necessarily recommending that the authors spend a lot of time on this in the paper, but I find it important to discuss.Relatedly, SNS do not exist in isolation.
3. I appreciate how the authors list the different definitions of polarization and clarify that they refer to political polarization as "opinion-based" (see page 9).However, the other definitions of polarization are also particularly relevant to the arguments made.For instance, typically opinion-based/issue-based polarization can give way to affective polarization.Likewise, collective action can be fueled by coradicalization, which is likely also fueled by group polarization.Focusing on one type of polarization has the potential to limit theoretical impact of the current manuscript.I recommend either providing stronger justification for why issue-based polarization is the specific polarization of focus or integrating the other types of polarization into the model.

Reviewer #3 (Remarks to the Author):
Thanks for the opportunity to review this work.I really enjoyed reading this manuscript and found a lot to appreciate about it.The paper is on a very interesting and timely topic, and the integration of both the political polarization and group polarization literatures is a welcome addition as these are often situated in different areas when there are valuable synergies between these areas of study.I also found the paper very nicely written keeping the reader engaged throughout.I only have two comments about the paper in its current form that the authors should be able to address in a revision.First, while I really like the idea to present the work as taking a balanced approach to examining the effects of polarization, there are aspects of the current framing that may be too simplistically valenced.For example, in the early introduction, the promotion of collective action is framed as if it is inherently good, while collective action can lead to positive outcomes or disastrous ones.Even movements that may have seemingly good ideals and goals can turn toxic and destructive through polarization.For example, despite promises of greater collective welfare and giving power to peasants, polarization emerging from social movements in China and Cambodia led to death of millions.While seemingly extreme, the point is that social change emerging from collective action is not inherently good or bad.Anti-vax protests during the pandemic may have perceived their actions as positive for standing up against what they deemed to an authoritarian state, but it may have simultaneously increased risk of disease among the wider public and been destructive to others.Therefore, it would be better to further nuance the writing to clarify that polarization has the potential to bring people together to engage in collective action, but it is agnostic on whether such collective action can end up in destruction or human progress.I would argue that while I see what the authors are getting at here about its potential benefits, there is a risk that polarization undermines social cohesion and cuts people off from each other making it difficult to perspective take and understand each other in a liberal democracy with a pluralistic populace.However, I understand what the authors are meaning to contribute to the literature and suggest nuancing the writing without an insinuation of the valenced nature of social change emerging from collective action.
On a second, more minor point, the framing of page 23 about RWP leaders attacking the consensus that criticizing minority members as racist is difficult to understand.What types of criticism of minority groups are racist?Any criticism?While there has been a concept creep (see Haslam et al., 2020; Haslam, 2016) over the meaning of racist, this seems like an odd choice of words.I write this review in the midst of a global conflict that has led to a spike in antisemitism worldwide, and some argue that almost any criticism of Israel as antisemitic as the sole Jewish state in the world, while others see it as entirely justified, so who gets to decide what constitutes free speech and what is hate speech?The larger point is that what is deemed as bigotry is in the eyes of the beholder.
Besides these relatively fixable issues, I thought the paper read well and would make a useful contribution to the literature.I hope this work will encourage more empirical research on this useful topic of study.

COMMSPSYCHOL-23-0296, "Polarization is the Psychological Foundation of Collective
Engagement" Below, we outline the reviewers' suggestions (indented, in italics) and how we have addressed them in this revision (in bold).

Reviewer #1:
This We now cite evidence that demonstrates that the opinions shared during discussions often go over and above those that are associated with pre-existing category memberships.For example, on pp.14-15 we explain: "Whilst group polarization can occur through communication between members of preexisting groups and shape attitudinal extremity within and between longstanding groups (e.g., Democrat and Republican A key tenet of the social identity perspective is that people will use the available and contextually relevant information to make sense of a given social reality 7 .In the online environment, opinions are frequently the only clues to category membership 8 .Accordingly, we propose that new groups can emerge from interactions between people who share ideological opinions about an aspect of the social or political status quo 9 .Such groups can be characterized as opinion-based groups 10-12 , comprised of people who are united in their opinion about a desired state of affairs (pro, support; anti, opposed) 13,14 ."Indeed, we may go so far as suggesting that many of the groups in the group polarization literature could be understood as opinion-based groups (being anti-Black, pro-supporting the war effort) but they were not recognized as such because the concept didn't exist at that time: "The group polarization experiments 15 showed that when people who share an initial common opinion or attitudinal stance discuss an issue, they become more extreme together 16 .This extremization is partly because of the social frame of reference that exists within the group 17 : "what it means" to be a group member in that context (i.e., the identity content, or norm), is to express increasingly stronger opinions 18 .We also contend that it results in people being more staunchly committed to the group itself 8,16,18,19 .The prejudiced school children who participated in Myer and Bishop's 20 seminal group polarization research likely did not just emerge from their interaction with more strongly racist attitudes -they would also have felt a greater sense of belonging and commitment to those other participants who shared their position.Polarization is the process, and group formation along opinion-based lines is an outcome 8,9 .Opinion-based groups are new, shared social identities, that are created through social interaction with likeminded others 21 ."(p.15) 2. In a few places, I thought the arguments could be further/ better justified by reference to the relevant social identity literature.For example, I wondered why the proposition 4 discussion (p 13) didn't say more about basic social identity and self-cat processes (accentuation, prototypicality etc.) with the relevant references, as this is what is being referred to.
We now include more references to the social identity literature to justify the arguments.In the primary sections where we articulate our propositions, we have now clarified how this approach draws upon seminal theorizing from within the social identity tradition.For example, on page 13 we state that: "These observations are consistent with the social identity approach -that the groups that we stand "with" (versus those whom we are "against") are those with whom we feel we belong, but also those groups that help us to best make sense of the social context that confronts us 18,22 ." In the section on, "Social interaction leads to the formation of opinion-based groups" (pp.14-15), we clarify that a key aspect of the social identity approach is that people will use the available information to make sense of social reality but that, online, opinions are the only available social information (and hence become a primary basis for social categorization).
"A key tenet of the social identity perspective is that people will use the available and contextually relevant information to make sense of a given social reality.In the online environment, opinions are frequently the only clues to category membership." Following the suggestion of Reviewer 1, we also now mention prototypicality and accentuation, although we have been conscious of keeping our explanations as accessible as possible for our more generalist audience, so we avoid complex terminology where we can.We now write: "This extremization is partly because of the social frame of reference that exists within the group 17 : "what it means" to be a group member in that context (i.e., the identity content, or norm), is to express increasingly stronger opinions 18 .We also contend that it results in people being more staunchly committed to the group itself 8,16,18,19 ."(p.15) In the section on, "Opinion-based groups actively differentiate themselves from each other", we now clarify that one of the outcomes is accentuation: "That is, proponents -on both sides -will seek to accentuate the similarities that exist between them and other ingroup members, and exaggerate the differences that exist with outgroup members 23 ."(p.16) But also that these processes are not static or set in time but are constantly updating: "The social identity approach emphasizes that social categories are not just about who one stands "with" (one's ingroup) but also who one stands "against" (the contextually salient outgroup) 22 , but also that these are constantly being updated as new information is used to refine, re-evaluate and/or strengthen our understanding and affiliations."(p.16)

Similarly: p. 21 'Online radicalization towards support for political violence is thus a product of group polarization, even when an individual engages in online chat "alone".' Again this kind of claim could be justified by citing some of the earlier SCT work (for example Postmas and Spears on computer mediated communication).
Thank you for this suggestion, we now cite SIDE research 24,25 on p. 24: "…this connection to opinion-based groups through social media means that whilst radicalized internet users may be physically isolated, they are not psychologically isolated (as per Propositions 1-2) 17 .When people are visually anonymous online and a social identity is salient, they are likely to communicate with others along group lines 119,120 .This means that even when an individual engages in online chat "alone", they can be radicalized through group conversations and group polarization processes." 4. A related but bigger point is whether the process of group polarization in that literature is really the same as the process identified in the collective action literature cited in the paper.
EMSICA and the research following it which the authors cite is about identity content rather than extremity, isn't it?It's notable that in explaining the power of interaction, the authors don't really refer to the SCT explanation of group polarization.
Below, we explain how our conceptualization of the process of group polarization integrates and builds upon ideas from the SCT/RII literature, and from EMSICA.We have made the edits described in our response to Reviewer 1 #2, above, to explain how our approach is consistent with the SCT approach.
The SCT/RII explanation of polarization focused on attitude extremity (as an outcome).There was a focus on pre-existing, sometimes abstract, social categories (perhaps because SCT/RII predated Web 2.0 and the proliferation of research on opinion polarization and networks/echo chambers that followed).One of our novel arguments is that group polarization (the extremization process) leads to the development of new social psychological phenomena (pp.14-16): novel identities, homogeneity, identifications, and identity content (including norms for action): "This extremization is partly because of the social frame of reference that exists within the group 17 : "what it means" to be a group member in that context (i.e., the identity content, or norm), is to express increasingly stronger opinions 18 .We also contend that it results in people being more staunchly committed to the group itself

p. 5 'now neglected15' is a reference from 22 years ago. A more recent reference might better illustrate that group polarization is currently neglected (maybe a textbook?).
We have now removed the phrase "now neglected" from the manuscript.We were not able to identify another more current source for this (and publication data do not have good coverage over this timeframe).This point was not a central part of our argument.

p. 10 'The creation of new opinion-based groups via group polarization (as per #2), who articulate their own position (only) in terms of how it differs to that of an opposing group; leads to political polarization' Check punctuation.
We have amended this sentence as follows: "The creation of new opinion-based groups via group polarization (as per #2) -who articulate their own position in terms of how it differs to that of an opposing group -leads to political polarization."(Table 2, p. 10)

p. 20 'lone wolf attacks'
I understand that that this term is no longer favoured by the relevant experts and researchers.Its assumptions also seems in conflict with the group-based approach of the current paper.
We agree and have removed the term "lone wolf".

pp. 20-21 I wonder about the term 'extremism'. The UK government and others seems to use it about activists the authors might not (such as environmental campaigners). Or, turning it around, if the authors are right that group polarization underpins political polarization then all groups discussed in the article are 'extremists' (is that ok? It sounds a bit problematic when many such groups are trying to avoid being marginalized -for example by placing debates around the climate crisis in the mainstream).
We agree with this point, and as there is contention in both the academic literature and policy about definitions of "extremism" 30 , we have removed the term "extremist" and "extremism" from the manuscript, including the title.We instead focus on attitudinal "extremization", as per group polarization research, but we are very clear that this terminology is not to be conflated with violent extremism as an outcome: "It's important to note at the outset that attitudinal extremity (attitudinal extremism) is not the same as support for violent extremism, although the two are often conflated 30 , a point we return to below."(p.4) As Reviewer 3 suggested (#1), movements with seemingly prosocial ideals can engage in harmful forms of collective action.We agree, and on p. 25 of our original submission, we explained that: "A corollary of our arguments is that polarization and collective action can be progressive (promoting greater rights, access, freedoms for people), promoting revolutionary change in ways that are good for democracy; and reactionary (seeking to protect rights and access of privileged people and groups), promoting oppressive change in ways that may see societies slide back towards authoritarianism, or encourage commitment to political violence.This process need not favour or encourage any particular political views: indeed, our examples show that the same processes have occurred in a variety of different groups and contexts." We are happy to have the opportunity to make this clearer in the revision.We have now included the following sentences in the manuscript: "These basic social psychological processes can undermine social cohesion 22 and create psychological barriers to intellectual humility, open-mindedness, and cooperation with people on opposing sides 2,31 ."(p.17) "This "extremization" 32 that occurs through group polarization indicates a shift towards a more extreme end of a continuum of beliefs, attitudes, or opinions, as demonstrated via the group polarization studies 15,20 ."(p.9) Therefore, this does not place value upon the political orientation of the group.We note on p. 9 that, "Any group can undergo this process of extremization via polarization, but this does not mean that they are "extremists" 30 , or that they support the use of violence.The nature of collective action that follows these processes depends upon the social context and the norms that form within those groups 33 , and vary from benevolent support, conventional activism, to political violence.Thus, such collective action can have a range of impacts, from progress to conflict and harm."This point is also illustrated through our examples (p.18 onwards).

p. 22 '(i.e., akin to group polarization'
Why 'akin'?I thought the argument was it just is group polarization.
We agree and have deleted the words "akin to" from this sentence.

Reviewer #2:
I had the pleasure of reading the manuscript "Polarization is the Psychological Foundation of Collective Engagement and Extremism".In this article, the authors describe how group polarization can give way to political polarization, which ultimately might result in collective action.They specifically focus on the role of social media in this process.To make their claims, they draw both on literature and real-world examples from across the globe.Below I outline some recommendations for how to strengthen the theoretical arguments proposed.

The authors list six propositions for the connection between group think, polarization, and collective action (see table 2)
. Overall, I think that these propositions make a lot of sense and are clearly thought out.However, I would appreciate more acknowledgement of the interconnectedness between them.For instance, based on the way it is currently written, it sounds like these are six steps that occur in the order listed; however, many of the early steps serve as precursors for the later steps.For instance, as noted in the table, proposition 6 can be an outcome for proposition 1, 2 and 4. I recommend that rather than listing the propositions as a table, that the authors convert it to a diagram that highlights pathways between each proposition.I also recommend explaining such a figure in the text as well.
In line with Reviewer 2's suggestion, we now include a new figure (Figure 2), which visualizes the connection between the propositions in Table 2.We do not suggest that the propositions are stages or steps that occur in a specific order, but rather have tried to use the propositions to itemise, tease apart, and clarify the psychological processes that occur to connect the process of group polarization with collective action.We now clarify this on p. 9.

I am curious about the relationship between group polarization, political polarization, and
collective action in contexts that have limited or no access to social media.The authors illude to this possibility when they discuss how Egypt cut off access to internet (see page 16), however, in this context, social media did still play an important role in propelling initial calls to collective action.Do similar processes/links between group polarization, political polarization and collective action exist in absence of SNS, or is it something unique about social media that strengthens these connections?I am not necessarily recommending that the authors spend a lot of time on this in the paper, but I find it important to discuss.Relatedly, SNS do not exist in isolation.
To clarify, we now make the following three points on pages 13-14: (1) Group polarization occurs through communication (Table 1; Table 2, Proposition 1).This communication is necessary for people to collectivize over social issues.This is necessary even for people who engage in collective action alone, but take "collective" action because it is on behalf of their group 34 .For these actors, the communication may take place in the form of reading and internalising the arguments and opinions of likeminded others online.This is why some repressive regimes cut off access to SNSs to prevent "rebellion"; and some regimes implement offline curfews to prevent people meeting and communicating in person (Table 2, Proposition 5).Limited or no interaction can prevent social change 35 .
(2) The affordances of SNSs amplify and facilitate the processes of communication that lead to polarization.Before the internet and SNSs, the process of communication was slower/perhaps smaller in scale, but substantively the same, and communication still facilitated collective action 35 .For example, during the Protestant Reformation, Luther and his supporters leveraged the printing press to communicate their ideas.Therefore, communication offline versus via SNSs is similar, but SNSs include affordances that amplify the processes of offline communication, (sometimes) allowing for anonymity (see our response to Reviewer 1 #3), increasing reach, allowing many people to talk simultaneously, faster, and on a much larger scale; access to information is more instant, and recommendation algorithms make encountering likeminded others and material more likely 36 .
(3) We agree that SNSs do not exist in isolation -people cross-post, using multiple networked applications, sites, and forums, as well as engaging in online communication whilst simultaneously communicating in multiple offline modes.This occurs during collective action 37 .According to media multiplexity theory 38 , the number of communication modes people use is positively related to the strength of the relationship between them and the people they are communicating with, suggesting that using SNSs to communicate alongside other modes of communication may strengthen an ingroup, better equipping them to act collectively.At the same time, offline events and communications shape and influence SNS interactions, and vice versa.

I appreciate how the authors list the different definitions of polarization and clarify that they refer to political polarization as "opinion-based" (see page 9
).However, the other definitions of polarization are also particularly relevant to the arguments made.For instance, typically opinionbased/issue-based polarization can give way to affective polarization.Likewise, collective action can be fueled by co-radicalization, which is likely also fueled by group polarization.Focusing on one type of polarization has the potential to limit theoretical impact of the current manuscript.I recommend either providing stronger justification for why issue-based polarization is the specific polarization of focus or integrating the other types of polarization into the model.In this sense, political polarization is best conceptualized as a process incorporating both issue and affective polarization, with issuedriven dissent creating conditions for issue-driven polarization, while affective polarization being its manifestation (or the attitude -behavioral component within this process 40 ).
In relation to the next point made by Reviewer 2 on collective action being "fueled by coradicalization, which is likely also fueled by group polarization", we address it on pp.7-8 where we say: "Similarly, the inter-connections between different forms of polarization are clear in cases where collection action occurs in response to opposing groups becoming more extreme through exposure to each other's ideology and actions (co-radicalization; Table 1)." To clarify, we don't focus on issue based polarization over affective polarization.Rather, we call for clearer theorizing on these interaconnections, and focus on group polarization, which is the vehicle by which people consensualize over issues and associated emotions.Like EMSICA, we argue that they are integrated through discussion to form the "content" of new group identities (see our response to Reviewer 1, #4).We now clarify this on p. 15.

Reviewer #3:
Thanks for the opportunity to review this work.I really enjoyed reading this manuscript and found a lot to appreciate about it.The paper is on a very interesting and timely topic, and the integration of both the political polarization and group polarization literatures is a welcome addition as these are often situated in different areas when there are valuable synergies between these areas of study.I also found the paper very nicely written keeping the reader engaged throughout.I only have two comments about the paper in its current form that the authors should be able to address in a revision.
1. First, while I really like the idea to present the work as taking a balanced approach to examining the effects of polarization, there are aspects of the current framing that may be too simplistically valenced.For example, in the early introduction, the promotion of collective action is framed as if it is inherently good, while collective action can lead to positive outcomes or disastrous ones.If you revise the paper to meet the editorial requests detailed below and on the supporting documents, and if the revised paper is in Communications Psychology format, in an accessible style, and of appropriate length, we shall accept it for publication immediately.

EDITORIAL REQUESTS:
Reviewer #2 raised an important point in their previous report (point #2) to which you replied at length in your rebuttal.However, we ask that you also incorporate a briefer version of the explanation in the manuscript, for the benefit of future readers who may have similar thoughts as the referee but won't know unprompted about the detailed explanation in the transparent peer review file.
Moreover, as you implement the final revisions we ask you to pay particular attention to two requests.First, we ask that you review how references are used within sentences.It is currently often unclear which part of a complex argument, or a list of statements, is supported by a given reference.You will find some pointers regarding the issue on the attached manuscript.Second, although the use of realworld examples is a strength of your work, as currently presented, it also sets the text at risk of becoming less rather than more comprehensible to future readers (for example, a Ph.D. student in 2034, born in 2012, might struggle to recognize the many events from the 2010s that are referred to offhand).Please provide sufficient explanation and references to all real-world examples to ensure the timeliness of the piece does not work against its readability in future.
* Please review the changes in the attached copy of your manuscript, which has been edited for style, and address the comments and queries I have added.
*Please review our specific editorial comments and requests regarding your manuscript in the attached "Editorial Requests Table "

Reviewer 3
notes that "...typically opinion-based/issue-based polarization can give way to affective polarization."This is in line with an argument made by Bliuc et al. (2021), so we have now integrated this point in the revised text on pages 7-8 where we say: "…as Jost and colleagues have explained 1 , different types of polarization can affect each other.For instance, issue-based polarization is often a driver of affective polarization 39 , as in cases where dissent over a newly emerged issue in society (e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic) polarizes the public into opposing groups, which then develop hostile attitudes towards each other (affective polarization).

see our response to Reviewer 1, #8. We agree with Reviewer 3, and in the revised manuscript we have nuanced our stance on the valence of collective action, and on extremization (rather than extremism). Hopefully, taken together our clarifications avoid the inadvertent potential implication of our arguments that all collective action -of which violent extremism is one form -is inherently good.
Even movements that may have seemingly good ideals and goals can turn toxic and destructive through polarization.For example, despite promises of greater collective welfare and giving power to peasants, polarization emerging from social movements in China and Cambodia led to death of millions.While seemingly extreme, the point is that social change emerging from collective action is not inherently good or bad.Anti-vax protests during the pandemic may have perceived their actions as positive for standing up against what they deemed to an authoritarian state, but it may have simultaneously increased risk of disease among the wider public and been destructive to others.Therefore, it would be better to further nuance the writing to clarify that polarization has the potential to bring people together to engage in collective action, but it is agnostic on whether such collective action can end up in destruction or human progress.I would argue that while I see what the authors are getting at here about its potential benefits, there is a risk that polarization undermines social cohesion and cuts people off from each other making it difficult to perspective take and understand each other in a liberal democracy with a pluralistic populace.However, I understand what the authors are meaning to contribute to the literature and suggest nuancing the writing without an insinuation of the valenced nature of social change emerging from collective action.Haslam, 2016) over the meaning of racist, this seems like an odd choice of words.I write this review in the midst of a global conflict that has led to a spike in antisemitism worldwide, and some argue that almost any criticism of Israel as antisemitic as the sole Jewish state in the world, while others see it as entirely justified, so who gets to decide what constitutes free speech and what is hate speech?The larger point is that what is deemed as bigotry is in the eyes of the beholder.

have now clarified the point we were making on p. 23 of the original manuscript (by referring to strategies used in right-wing discourse to justify and normalize "divisive and discriminatory" attitudes (so that they become mainstream rather than fringe in society). See p. 26 of revised manuscript, where we explain, "First, RWP leaders reframed divisive and discriminatory rhetoric as free speech. That is, positions previously suppressed by laws and custom were shared and discussed, so that they became justified and normalized 41 , group polarization being therefore enabled (in line with Proposition 3)."
Besides these relatively fixable issues, I thought the paper read well and would make a useful contribution to the literature.I hope this work will encourage more empirical research on this useful topic of study.Your Perspective titled "Polarization is the Psychological Foundation of Collective Engagement" has now been seen by one reviewer (Reviewer #3), whose comments appear below.Based on our evaluation and in light of their advice I am delighted to say that we are happy, in principle, to publish it in Communications Psychology under a Creative Commons 'CC BY' open access license.
. Please outline your response to each request in the right-hand column.Please upload the completed table with your manuscript files as a Related Manuscript file.Please use the following link to submit the above items: [Link redacted] ** This url links to your confidential home page and associated information about manuscripts you may have submitted or be reviewing for us.If you wish to forward this email to co-authors, please delete the link to your homepage first ** We hope to hear from you within two weeks; please let us know if the process may take longer.As Marike Schiffer will handle your work from this point forward, please direct all inquiries to her.Remarks to the Author): I was one of the original reviewers of the paper.The authors have done a great job addressing my concerns and comments.Congrats on an interesting paper!