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Evolution of cooperation through cumulative reciprocity

Nature Computational Science volume 2, pages 677–686 (2022)Cite this article

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Abstract

Reciprocity is a simple principle for cooperation that explains many of the patterns of how humans seek and receive help from each other. To capture reciprocity, traditional models often assume that individuals use simple strategies with restricted memory. These memory-1 strategies are mathematically convenient, but they miss important aspects of human reciprocity, where defections can have lasting effects. Here we instead propose a strategy of cumulative reciprocity. Cumulative reciprocators count the imbalance of cooperation across their previous interactions with their opponent. They cooperate as long as this imbalance is sufficiently small. Using analytical and computational methods, we show that this strategy can sustain cooperation in the presence of errors, that it enforces fair outcomes and that it evolves in hostile environments. Using an economic experiment, we confirm that cumulative reciprocity is more predictive of human behaviour than several classical strategies. The basic principle of cumulative reciprocity is versatile and can be extended to a range of social dilemmas.

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Fig. 1: CURE in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
Fig. 2: The evolutionary dynamics of pairwise strategy competitions.
Fig. 3: Evolution of CURE in populations of memory-1 players.
Fig. 4: CURE, GTFT and WSLS dominate the population in different payoff regions.
Fig. 5: CURE in stochastic games and the repeated public goods game.
Fig. 6: CURE in an economic experiment.

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Data availability

Source data for Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 6 are available with this manuscript. Source data for Fig. 5 are available on Zenodo58.

Code availability

All Java codes based on Eclipse (version Oxygen.3a release 4.7.3a), MATLAB codes (MATLAB 2020b) and oTree software (version 5.8.0b5, based on Python 3.8.10) can be obtained from Code Ocean57.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant 71871042 (to H.X.) and the Humanities and Social Science Project of the Ministry of Education of China grant 18YJA630118 (to H.X.). Part of this work was conducted during H.X.’s visit at Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supported by the Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program, jointly with the Chinese Scholarship Council. H.X. thanks P. Gloor for hosting the visit and D. Rand for discussion on an early draft of this work. H.X. and J.L. thank Y. Qian for technical assistance in preparing the simulation platform. C.H. acknowledges generous support by the European Research Council starting grant 850529: E-DIRECT.

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Author notes

  1. These authors contributed equally: Christian Hilbe and Haoxiang Xia.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Systems Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China

    Juan Li, Xiaowei Zhao, Bing Li & Haoxiang Xia

  2. Center for Big Data and Intelligent Decision-Making, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China

    Juan Li & Haoxiang Xia

  3. School of Software Technology, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China

    Xiaowei Zhao

  4. Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany

    Charlotte S. L. Rossetti & Christian Hilbe

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Contributions

H.X. conceived the original idea for this work with the help of X.Z. and designed the computational experiments, collaboratively with C.H. J.L., X.Z. and B.L. wrote the computer programs for the simulations and implemented the simulations. C.H. derived the analytical results. J.L., C.H. and H.X. analysed the results based on X.Z. and B.L.’s earlier successive contributions. C.S.L.R. designed and implemented the game software for the behavioural experiment, and collected the data. C.H. and C.S.L.R. analysed the respective results. J.L., C.H. and H.X. wrote the manuscript, and J.L. prepared the figures. H.X. and C.H. supervised the study. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Correspondence to Christian Hilbe or Haoxiang Xia.

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Nature Computational Science thanks Ethan Akin, Isamu Okada and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work. Handling editor: Kaitlin McCardle, in collaboration with the Nature Computational Science team. Peer reviewer reports are available.

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Li, J., Zhao, X., Li, B. et al. Evolution of cooperation through cumulative reciprocity. Nat Comput Sci 2, 677–686 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s43588-022-00334-w

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