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Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks

Abstract

Auction theory is of central importance in the study of markets. Unfortunately, we do not know equilibrium bidding strategies for most auction games. For realistic markets with multiple items and value interdependencies, the Bayes Nash equilibria (BNEs) often turn out to be intractable systems of partial differential equations. Previous numerical techniques have relied either on calculating pointwise best responses in strategy space or iteratively solving restricted subgames. We present a learning method that represents strategies as neural networks and applies policy iteration on the basis of gradient dynamics in self-play to provably learn local equilibria. Our empirical results show that these approximated BNEs coincide with the global equilibria whenever available. The method follows the simultaneous gradient of the game and uses a smoothing technique to circumvent discontinuities in the ex post utility functions of auction games. Discontinuities arise at the bid value where an infinite small change would make the difference between winning and not winning. Convergence to local BNEs can be explained by the fact that bidders in most auction models are symmetric, which leads to potential games for which gradient dynamics converge.

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Fig. 1
Fig. 2: The empirical impact of risk-aversion on market efficiency.
Fig. 3: The effect of bidder correlation and risk attitudes on seller revenue.

Data availability

All data analyses in this study are based exclusively on data generated by our custom simulation framework (see Code Availability). Raw simulation artefacts (all-iteration logs and trained models) will be made available by the corresponding author on request. Source data are provided with this paper.

Code availability

The source code of our simulation framework62, including instructions to reproduce all models and datasets referenced in this study, is freely available at https://github.com/heidekrueger/bnelearn, licensed under GNU-GPLv3.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful for funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation; grant no. BI 1057/1-9). We thank V. Bosshard, B. Lubin, P. Mertikopoulos, P. Milgrom, S. Seuken, T. Ui, F. Maldonado and participants of the NBER Market Design Workshop 2020 for valuable feedback on earlier versions.

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Contributions

M.B. conceived and supervised the project and contributed to the overall study design, theoretical analysis of NPGA and writing the manuscript. M.F. contributed to the theoretical analysis of NPGA. S.H. contributed to the design, implementation and optimization of the algorithm and simulation framework, the theoretical analysis, and to the writing of the manuscript. N.K. contributed to the optimization of the algorithm, the design, implementation and optimization of the simulation framework, the theoretical and empirical analysis, and the writing of the manuscript. P.S. contributed to design and implementation of the algorithm and simulation framework, and the empirical analysis.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Martin Bichler.

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Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Additional information

Peer review information Nature Machine Intellligence thanks Pierre Baldi, Neil Newman and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

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Supplementary information

Supplementary Information

Description and discussion of additional experiments (including Supplementary Figs. 1–4 and Tables 1–3); proof of auxiliary lemmata used in the proof of Proposition 1 of the main manuscript; mathematical derivation of conditional distributions required for evaluation in the absence of equilibria.

Supplementary Data Source Data Table 1

Last-iteration loss measurements of approximate equilibria found by NPGA for 10 runs each in LLG settings.

Source data

Source Data Fig. 2

Aggregate last-iteration efficiency measurements (mean and s.d. over 10 runs each) of learned NPGA policies in NVCG LLG for several risk parameters.

Source Data Fig. 3

Last-iteration seller revenue measurements of learned NPGA policies in NVCG LLG for several risk and correlation parameters.

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Bichler, M., Fichtl, M., Heidekrüger, S. et al. Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks. Nat Mach Intell 3, 687–695 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00365-4

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