Introduction

Royal Dutch Shell declares that three core values, honesty, integrity and respect for people, govern the company, but “The oil giant Shell has agreed to pay $15.5 million (£9.6 million) in settlement of a legal action in which it was accused of having collaborated in the execution of the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders of the Ogoni tribe of southern Nigeria” (Pilkington, 2009). Whatever the interpretation of this contradiction is, society sees unconscious, innocent, neatly dressed workers at petrol stations and omnipresent, vivid, joyful advertisements. Who is to blame?

Numerous critical authors, like G. Debord, M. Albert, J. Bakan, N. Chomsky, S. Žižek, N. Klein, and M. Yunus, think that organizational and corporate discourse on morality has become a part of a pseudo-moral, illusionist spectacle as a more or less indeterminate boast that aims to protect the concentration of power and capital. Like politicians’ speeches, the discourse of integrity can resemble obscuring rhetoric or even an Orwellian newspeak when we read business magazines or lofty declarations on companies’ websites. Even less radical scholars admit that Corporate Social Responsibility or corporate codes of ethics are sometimes used as a front to conceal immoral or criminal activities of big companies. The disturbing social situation of moral integrity under capitalism is an impulse behind my philosophical analysis. My objective is not to collect new empirical data on social life, but to organize some of them with ethical tools, first and foremost by means of ethical typologies. Theory of integrity is a multidisciplinary issue.

We need better understanding of integrity, false and true, good or bad, so the paper has two purposes—theoretical and practical. Its theoretical purpose is to build up a fragment of a conception of moral integrity as moral commitment, and to clarify the idea of false (counterfeit) moral integrity. The concept of counterfeit moral integrity demands certain fundamental characteristics of integrity, but does not require any fully elaborated theory of integrity. The paper will demonstrate certain possibilities for developing the ideas of real and counterfeit integrity. This paper aims to preserve the notion of moral integrity as a moral commitment. This article offers a “bird’s eye view” of the proposed approach to integrity. This text combines analytic descriptions with preliminary synthetic perspective.

The political purpose of the paper is to create a prototype of a practical tool to identify good and bad false moral integrity. It is is political because counterfeit integrity produces political results: organizations regarded wrongly as morally praiseworthy entities are able to continue with their immoral trajectory under the cover of morality if their true identity is unknown, and ethical organizations can do more good if they gain support to apply good fake integrity. The word “political” is used here in the broad sense: it signifies all relations of power: parliamentary, economic, cultural etc. The concept of integrity is not neutral and therefore it requires Critical Theory in the meaning originated by the Frankfurt School and developed by its successors.

Counterfeit integrity needs critical thinking and critical action to expose it and blow it up when it is applied by oppressors against the oppressed. However, false moral integrity of the oppressed can be presented as a method of defense, attack or counter-attack against detrimental illusions, as a beneficial mirage, a strategic cover. I am going to describe good false moral integrity as related to appearances, outer layers of wrong or bad morality. I hope these abstract deliberations on moral integrity can somehow help to weaken or defeat ideological use of integrity.

Morality and definitions of integrity

Integrity is criticized as a highly ambiguous or vague notion (e.g., Audi and Murphy, 2006). The question arises if every concept of integrity should be eliminated from scientific or philosophical literature as useless and rhetorical, something suitable as a means of moralizing, and as a trick of business propaganda in order to create shiny corporate images.

One of the reasons that the concept is so nebulous and confusing is that its content orbits around different definitions and theories of morality. Conceptualizations of moral integrity as parts of moral theories can be founded on descriptive or normative meanings of the term “integrity”. Depending on the results of the choice between them, integrity can turn into something subjective, objective, absolute or relative, vary from something non-contradictory to contradictory, from irrational to rational, from partial to impartial, etc.–hence the outcome is able to fundamentally change inferences and shape incompatible points of view.

Integrity and moral integrity, descriptive and normative approaches

The term “morality” has both descriptive and normative senses, but—as in most philosophical moral theories—my arguments are grounded in the latter. The normative senses differentiate between good and bad morality, right and wrong morality, rational or irrational morality (see, for instance, Nietzsche, 1998; Bergson, 1977; Harris, 2010). In ethical theories one can find repeated features of preferred morality, usually with reference to coherence, rationality, and fundamental values (see, for instance, Singer, 2002; Gensler, 1996; Mepham et al., 2006; Harris, 2010; Gert and Gert, 2016). My concept of integrity is based on those highly general notions. I do not develop them. The function of this chapter is to show the background to the concept of integrity.

Good morality can be described as rational, supported by high quality moral thinking. Rational morality contains the three principles of rationality: the principle of coherence, the principle of right sources, and the principle of right methods.

The principle of coherence. The principle “Be coherent in your moral life” is formal. The principles are formal i.e., “expressible using only variables and constants—where the constants can include logical terms, terms for general psychological attitudes (like believe, desire, and act), and other fairly abstract notions (like ought and ends-means)” (Gensler, 1996, p 17).

Coherence can be understood as “a form of entailment” or “explanatory support between propositions” (Young, 2015). Consistency is “a special case of coherence” (Wintgens, 2012, p 238). Coherent moral life means coherence in true descriptions of moral life.

In good morality described by good ethical theory, consistency includes logicality, ends-means consistency, and conscientiousness. “Logicality: Avoid inconsistency in beliefs. Ends–means consistency: Keep your means in harmony with your ends. Conscientiousness: Keep your actions, resolutions, and desires in harmony with your moral beliefs”. (Gensler, 2010, p 315).

One can also add that fundamental principles must be coherent, and derivative rules must be coherent with fundamental principles whatever notion or theory of coherence is chosen. Rational morality must be free of serious contradictions, otherwise moral thinking and behavior is paralyzed by them: “You ought to be just and simultaneously you ought not to be just”.

Impartiality can be deemed a form of coherence. The principle of impartiality says: “Make similar evaluations about similar actions, regardless of the individuals involved” (Gensler, 2010, p 317). Impartial morality does not favor any conscious being due to non-moral reasons or because of their identity, e.g., racial or sexual. This type of morality is universal and not particular, since moral principles are applicable to every moral patient (Rowlands, 2013). The morality must employ something similar to “the veil of ignorance” (Rawls, 1999), equal consideration of interests (Singer, 1993) or “the point of view of the universe” (Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2014) to jettison particularism, e.g., racism, classism or species chauvinism.

Other types of principles of consistency encompass: “Golden rule: Treat others only as you consent to being treated in the same situation. Formula of universal law: Act only as you’re willing for anyone to act in the same situation—regardless of imagined variations of time or person” Gensler, 2010, p 317).

Dialectical types of ethics exclude the condition to some extent: “For Adorno, there is simply no noncontradictory ethics” (Hohendahl and Fisher, 2002), but this is a relative and not an absolute exclusion of coherence. “Marx did not repudiate the principle of non-contradiction, but he clearly felt that it had limited usefulness when studying a system in motion. As A. Anthony Smith pointed out, in dialectics “the same thing is not both affirmed and denied of the same object at the same time and in the same respect,” and the dialectical method goes beyond, while including, the principle of identity and non-contradiction” (Wilde, 1991).

Coherence is not necessarily something static and absolute. If we adopt a more empirical or phenomenological stance, our coherent descriptions must be modified by new facts, new situations, new discoveries, new understanding.

The principle of right sources says: the sources of moral beliefs are experience and reason. We should use perception, introspection, phenomenological experience, or even a-priori reasoning to find moral truths. The same sources are regarded as more or less reliable in epistemology (Steup, 2016). The sources do not originate in biases, prejudices, wishful thinking, desires, unquestionable authorities or dogmas. The principle does not exclude any type of experience, usually accepting empirical and phenomenological experiences. Morality of high quality stands on knowledge about particular situations and at least partly on knowledge about certain features of the world, especially society.

The principle of right methods says: the methods of acquiring moral knowledge are various types of correctly applied observations and experiments, as well as inductive or other reasoning (cognitive rationality). It does not follow that ethical thinking cannot be inspired by religion or mysticism, but that religious or mystical moral claims must be rationally justified.

Both principles are linked to moral cognitivism and moral realism. They assume that “moral statements do express beliefs and that they are apt for truth and falsity” and “moral statements are apt for robust truth and falsity and that many of them are in fact true”(van Roojen, 2016). They are also connected to moral naturalism, the meta-ethical view stating that moral beliefs describe objective facts, whether they are reducible or not reducible (the case of supervenience) to non-moral features of the universe.

The principle of fundamental values: good morality focuses at least on four values: justice, freedom, happiness, love Justice, freedom, happiness and love are prevalent in Western moral theories and present in other ethical traditions (Mepham et al., 2006). If they belong to core values of moral systems, the systems and related practises are less vulnerable to anti-values, such as injustice, slavery, misery, and hatred. The morality of fundamental values harmonizes with moral intuitions that enable us to refute wrong moralities that maximize anti-values, moral systems more or less similar to the Viking morality or to the Nazi morality.

Four types of normative morality emerge from the division: coherent morality, right source morality, right method morality, and fundamental values morality. If a morality fulfils the first three conditions, it will be named “rational morality”, if it applies all the conditions, it will be called “maximalist morality”. Maximalist morality is the foundation of my ideals of material ethical integrity (MEI) and organizational material ethical integrity (OMEI). Formal integrity itself is founded on coherent morality. Material integrity itself is grounded on fundamental values morality.

The necessary condition to accept the theses of this paper is to approve the existence of any good morality as the opposite to bad morality, and to recognize any interpretation of the features of good morality in question. You cannot reconcile them with conceptions according to which all moralities are equally valuable or incommensurable, and according to which Genghis Khan and Saint Francis or Adolf Hitler and Janusz Korczak have the same moral level.

Definitions of moral integrity

It is better to use multiple concepts of integrity (integrity + attribute) than to argue about which concept is the right one. I do not deny that some authors have contributed to moral theory by working on integrity in general, but I believe that we should change our direction to get more scientific outcomes. Very general discussions seem to be a waste of time, because they may be a struggle for our favorite terminology. The most general conceptual conventions without relative agreement in the research community lead to tremendous diversity in ethical discourse that may be possibly limited by more dense, practice-oriented concepts (this is my strategy in the text) or categorical resignation with extremely polysemous words (like in logical positivism). If social sciences and philosophy do not have standard, common definitions for the most general terms, no unifying body, nor their own one meter rod in Paris, it is easier to elaborate specific, detailed concepts, and more technical terms strictly related to certain practices than to cling to highly problematic ordinary language. Therefore I am here developing notions of moral integrity and counterfeit moral integrity—less general ethical concepts. However my attempt is skeptical. It is just a part of an interesting debate.

Numerous authors have complained about ill-defined, ambiguous or vague ideas of integrity: “Integrity remains vague and ill-defined after more than 50 years of research” (Rieke and Guastello, 1995, p 458). In social sciences and philosophy the concept must be improved or abandoned, left for non-scientific discourse. I suggest modified versions of philosophical terminology, a proposal of new, hopefully more fruitful conceptual conventions.

The proposed definitions belong to the tradition of describing integrity as a moral purpose and as a virtue (Ashford, 2000, Halfon, 1989, Scherkoske, 2012, Cox et al., 2003, Audi and Murphy, 2006). Moreover, they strive to develop and modify some characteristics suggested by theorists believing that (moral) integrity is something very general rather than a narrowly conceived moral quality.

I am not going to go over all the problematic definitions of moral integrity—this has been done by various other authors (e.g., Cox et al. 2016)—but below my definitions readers can find explanations for why I use the definitions, and what possible advantages may be drawn from the new conceptualization. Needless to say, the definitions are not hypotheses or theories but conventions that must justify their usefulness and coherence. The proposed conceptualization is just a first step to much more complex descriptions of moral integrity and for that reason is preparatory rather than final.

If readers cannot accept these definitions denying that the definienda (e.g., moral integrity) and the definientia match each other, they can treat the article as a sketch of a conception of moral and ethical commitments.

Definition 1 Formal moral integrity is a) a relatively coherent b) relatively permanent, freely chosen, and deliberate commitment c) linked to moral life in general.

The integrity as commitment to coherent morality involves coherence between basic moral norms (principles) and derivative rules, e.g., if we follow the principle of maximizing happiness, we cannot make aggressive wars that make masses miserable. It also demands coherence between moral ends and means, e.g., immoral means do not justify moral ends and moral means do not justify immoral ends (see section 3.1.).

Moral integrity does not need coherence between declarations and practices as its necessary condition for good declarations in bad situations can cause pain or death (see section 3.1.).

Integrity is always associated with a sort of integration, so the definition retains this intuition. This relative integration does not exclude changes, dynamism, improvements. It is just a regulative ideal the person of integrity aspires to. Integrity of the mortal, integrity of the finite is always incomplete, imperfect.

The coherence is relative not because it is subjective or whimsical but due to its objective relations to inner or outer circumstances and knowledge of the moral agent.

Like every virtue, integrity is not a temporary or accidental attitude: it must be relatively permanent and well thought out. It is freely chosen, not imposed by a society for fear of terrestrial or infernal punishments. For example, when morality in organizations is enforced and virtues are only for show, the situation violates the freedom and rationality of persons.

Integrity does not involve a specific moral goal, like being polite to a particular person, otherwise even a Mafia boss is a man of integrity—he is sometimes nice. Institutions can help to build wells in Africa and at the same time repeatedly exploit workers and destroy the environment, so they actually lack integrity. Integrity is a general moral commitment, a general attitude to life. All structures of organizations must be devoted, in a more or less appropriate way to certain moral goals before they can be called institutions of integrity. Otherwise any criminal organization could be deemed an organization of integrity if it has performed any morally praiseworthy act or when it treats anybody well. Integrity is something general, not something particular. The moral feature is planned as a quality of the whole person or the whole organization, not as a good fragment of them.

Formal moral integrity is strictly linked to morality, but this morality can variously be flawed, high-quality, rational, irrational, tolerant, strange, caring, murderous etc. The word “integrity” is also a form of praise, but if moral integrity is a commitment, the ordinary praise reveals its odd nature: commitment to bad morality breeds bad moral integrity. Gandhi’s satyagraha (“insistence on truth”) is an almost non-controversial sort of formal moral integrity. However, “Kantian-Nazi” integrity of Adolf Eichmann or lethal integrity of some Islamic State fighters are specific varieties of formal integrity: they are relatively coherent, relatively permanent, freely chosen, and deliberate commitments linked to moral life in general. The first has the appearance of rationality, the second is overtly irrational. Both of them have wallowed in blood. Formal moral integrity does not demand good or rational morality—any morality will do. Moreover, this integrity is not necessary for the sake of morality. Instead of moral objectives, it can be an interest in earning money, worshiping gods, or pleasing beloved leaders.

Definition 2 Formal ethical integrity is a) a relatively coherent, b) relatively permanent, freely chosen, and deliberate commitment c) linked to rational moral life in general d) for the sake of rational morality.

Rational morality encompasses the principle of coherence, the principle of right sources, and the principle of right methods (see section 'Integrity and moral integrity, descriptive and normative approaches'). Rational moral life is an application of those principles, although I do not think that rationality must be reduced to the three principles. As in Stoicism and Aristotelianism, rationality is at the center of ethical integrity, hence cognitive values are in accordance with ethical values due to their rational nature.

The consequences of rational integrity both for individuals and organizations are far-reaching: they have to learn, study and practice rational morality as frequently and profoundly as possible. Every ethical institution ought to resemble ancient philosophical schools because its main goals are ethical, but if institutions are not philosophical schools, they should be focused on practical and applied ethics: How to alleviate suffering of patients? How to reduce unemployment? How to build a better social system?

Unlike the case of moral integrity, ethical integrity requires an additional condition: morality has to be practised for the sake of morality, not for gods, money or social acceptance. Morality is an end, not a means. The notion excludes being “socially responsible” to earn money, or else organizations can benefit from wrongdoing when their situation aids profits from immoral activities, for example by sending technologies to the Nazi concentration camps—as in the case of IBM (Burkeman, 2002).

The concept of ethical integrity posits that rational moral values are at the top of hierarchy of values regardless of their harmony or dissonance with other values. Without this feature, any non-moral value is able to transform the person of integrity into somebody who easily violates ethical principles when other values are taken into consideration.

The superiority of ethical values is based on the assumption that some moral values are distinct from certain non-moral values, e.g., rational moral values are separated from pure business values, such as profit. On the other hand, linkages among moral and non-moral values are possible and actual.

In some theoretical structures it is possible to regard aesthetic values as internally linked to ethical values. The concept of integrity in this paper remains open in this area, although the author believes in maintaining strict linkages between the two groups of values.

The superiority of ethical values does not necessary imply that cognitive or aesthetic values are at lower positions in the hierarchy of values—they can be interconnected or they can merge together.

Definition 3 Material moral integrity is a) a relatively coherent, b) relatively permanent, freely chosen and deliberate commitment c) linked to moral life in general d) for the sake of morality and e) it aims to maximize central ethical values, such as freedom, justice, happiness and love.

This definition demands core values that are rooted in human moral intuitions, and even more in rational ethical traditions of the East and the West. I would here mention at least four values: freedom, justice, happiness and love. I do not assert that those values are the only necessary values for ethical integrity, but they have been extremely relevant in various moral discourses.

The first reason is that these values are widespread in many moral systems, cultures, and religions, including philosophical theories. The Torah is full of references to justice, almost all ancient Greek philosophers pursued eudaimonia, Christianity centers its message around agape, Mahayana Buddhism around karuna. Ethics from the Renaissance onwards has been focused on freedom, especially after the French Revolution. The second reason is that they are very useful in applied ethics in the form of an ethical matrix (Mepham et al., 2006). The third reason is that all ethical values might possibly be either reduced or internally related to them (Polowczyk, 2013b).

Definition 4 Material ethical integrity is a) a relatively coherent, b) relatively permanent, freely chosen and deliberate commitment c) linked to rational moral life in general, and d) for the sake of rational morality, and e) it aims to maximize central ethical values, such as freedom, justice, happiness and love.

The concept of normative morality has been outlined in section 'Integrity and moral integrity, descriptive and normative approaches'. According to this, good normative morality is internally linked to rationality and central moral values, such as happiness, justice, freedom and love.

Material ethical integrity can be treated as a moral maximum: its content is the most demanding, its requirements both intellectual (coherence, rationality) and practical (permanence, impartiality, justice, love, freedom, happiness) are the highest. Formal moral integrity can be described as a moral minimum: its content is the least demanding, its requirements are not determined, so they may be lenient.

I have developed an ideal of integrity strictly linked to an ideal of morality. I call it “material ethical integrity”. If somebody prefers other wording, I can refer to it as “the real moral integrity” or “the only moral integrity”, but the cost is that if we have to establish one morality and one moral integrity, simultaneously we have to jettison Christian integrity, Buddhist integrity, Epicurean integrity etc.

Moral integrity as a first level virtue

Moral integrity is a virtue because it requires constant effort, deliberation and “spiritual exercise”. It motivates people to study and practice moral principles, and to develop cognitive skills and habits, like the understanding of coherence. Those features do not entail that people who have less intelligence or who are illiterate, are not able to possess these traits. This virtue requires minimum cognitive skills and habits for a conscious being that cannot change its inborn aptitudes. Ethical integrity is more cognitively demanding, because it needs mastering principles, perceiving coherence, and learning different types of observations and reasoning. Both moral integrity and ethical integrity are contingent on cognitive skills and knowledge, so rocks, plants and shrimps cannot possess these qualities and neither can humans with seriously damaged brains or foetuses.

I suggest a concept of integrity as a first level virtue. Moral integrity can be seen as first level virtue because all other virtues demand moral commitment as a necessary condition, and integrity does not require other virtues in temporal order. In the first phase of moral life it only needs activities towards building up virtues. In other phases moral integrity maintains other virtues as a “will to morality”. In a logical order it is always connected with pre-virtues and second level virtues. Pre-virtues are germs of virtues, virtues in progress, virtues “under construction”, such as pre-courage, pre-justice, pre-moderation etc. As a decision to be moral, as a moral attitude and effort, moral integrity assists in creating them. They have no raison d’etre without integrity. We do not desire to become courageous, just or moderate unless we want to be moral at all. Second level virtues, such as courage, justice, moderation etc., are also contingent on moral integrity: their existence, maintenance and conservation are redundant without moral commitment. We do not need to be courageous, just or moderate unless we want to be moral at all.

It is significant to show a partial but essential disagreement between my concept of moral integrity and theoretical propositions of some influential authors. An interesting distinction among concepts of integrity was made by Audi and Murphy (Audi and Murphy, 2006). The authors differentiate between the aretaic and integrational sense of the word “integrity”. “The aretaic sense (from the Greek arete meaning ‘virtue’), in which integrity is identified either with specific virtues such as honesty or, significantly if less commonly, with virtue in general” (Audi and Murphy, 2006, p 12) is distinct from “integrity in the integrational sense: as an integration among elements of character” (Audi and Murphy, 2006, p 9). The researchers believe that “no moral commitment or standard is entailed by the trait in question”, i.e., integrity in the integrational meaning (Audi and Murphy, 2006, p 18). They also distinguish between “substantive moral virtues, such as honesty, fairness, and beneficence (…) traits that are morally good in themselves” (Audi and Murphy, 2006, p 11) and adjunctive virtues—like courage and conscientiousness—that “strengthen moral character”, but none of them is “a self-sufficient ethical standard” (Audi and Murphy, 2006, p 12). These scholars maintain that integrity belongs to the category of adjunctive virtues (Audi and Murphy, 2006, p 12).

I see integrity neither as a “specific virtue”, nor as virtue in general. Integrity is not a classical higher-level virtue like justice or kindness. Aretaic virtues need integrity to arise and survive: the primary virtue exists to construct them and cherish them. Integrity is not a “super virtue” that is “a synthesis of virtues, working together to form a coherent whole” (Solomon, 1999, p 38). It is just a first-level virtue. Moral integrity is neither a commitment to honesty and sincerity, nor an involvement in courage or conscientiousness—it makes possible any moral virtue because the primary virtue is a beginning, conservation and development of any moral life.

My use of the term “integrity” resembles both the aretaic sense and the integrational sense, but actually it is something else. Its integrational function and aretaic function work on a disparate, more fundamental level and in a different way: neither by synthesis of virtues nor by the force of particular virtues but by creating, maintaining and improving virtues.

My demarcation between first and second level virtues is dissimilar to the division between higher-level substantive and adjunctive virtues. Moral commitment as a first level virtue is fundamental: both higher levels substantial moral virtues and adjunctive virtues require it to come into existence and to flourish.

Moral integrity is neither adjunctive virtue nor higher-level substantive virtue. Moral integrity is a first-level substantive virtue because moral commitment is good in itself: it creates, conserves and develops other virtues. Moral integrity not so much strengthens the moral character as enables it: if you do not possess courage, you can possess a will to build up courage; if you do not exercise your courage, you can lose it. In a word: you can exhibit moral integrity as a relatively consistent moral commitment without courage and other adjunctive virtues.

Moral integrity enables elaborating, cherishing, improving any other virtues due to its nature of moral will and moral action. It also incorporates moral insights or moral knowledge without which it would be “blind”: we need to know what is moral to be moral, and what is the world to act in the world, even if our thinking is a modifiable set of hypotheses. If persons do not want to be virtuous and they do not act to be virtuous, they will not be virtuous. Moral integrity has to be a fundamental moral virtue, something morally good in itself, because serious morality does not exist without moral commitment. If I could agree that “no moral commitment or standard is entailed by” integrity (Audi and Murphy, 2006, p 18), I would say that it is because integrity is a moral commitment in itself.

My analysis can be compared to Hary Frankfurt’s account of self-integration when the author describes various levels of volitions and desires: first-level (or first-order), second-level (or second-order) etc. (Frankfurt, 2003).Footnote 1 I perceive moral integrity as a last level of moral commitment: the will to morality itself, the desire to be moral. For example, I can refuse to eat highly caloric sweets although my organism has a fleeting desire to do so. This is first-level desire. I have decided to do it due to my sports plan in callisthenics. This is second-level desire. I want to be strong, fit, and healthy. This is my third-level desire. Morality has not started yet. I want to be strong, fit, and healthy because it will help me to be courageous. This is the first step in morality. The fourth-level desire. I want to be courageous to maximize freedom in the world. The fifth-level desire. I want to maximize freedom in the world because I have chosen to be moral. This is the source of any intentionally selected morality: moral commitment, the first-level virtue. The virtue is connected here to the sixth-level desire, but I do not insist that there are only six levels of desire. The description aims to point out similarities and to facilitate understanding of my idea of integrity, not to put forward another new hypothesis.

Definition 5 Organizational formal ethical integrity is a) an institutional, b) relatively permanent, freely chosen and deliberate commitment c) linked to rational moral life in general, d) for the sake of rational morality.

Social institution is “a stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” (Huntington, 1965, p 394); “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment” (Turner, 1997, p 6) or “(…) an interlocking double-structure of persons-as-role-holders or office-bearers and the like, and of social practices involving both expressive and practical aims and outcomes” (Harre, 1979, p 98). Organizational integrity is not ephemeral. It must be an institution, something organized around some moral goals.

“Institutional” means that this integrity is a part of social relations, and as such this virtue can be regarded as either interpersonal, shared or collective. Interpersonal interpretations are in accordance with individualistic methodologies, while collective interpretations harmonize with non-individualistic approaches. Some authors believe that moral agency cannot be ascribed to organizations (see, for example, Watkins, 1957). Others are convinced that one can legitimately attribute moral agency to organizations (see, for example, Pettit, 2009). This second approach indicates that moral agency should be neither ascribed only to individuals according to common sense, nor generally attributed to them. Organizations can be simultaneously unifying and divisive, for example as stratified conglomerates, that may involve class conflicts when various groups have different moral agency and separate responsibilities. For example, from a Marxist point of view, corporate moral agency as a particularly significant version of current institutional agency is sometimes viewed as severely constrained by inter-capitalist competition and class struggle (Nunn, 2012). It is also possible to think about distributed, fuzzy agency when integrity is identified as shared but not collective (Polowczyk, 2012). This type of integrity is trans-individual and trans-contributive. “Trans-individual” means that the general contribution is not a sum of individual contributions, because there are no absolute borders between individuals and the groups to which they belong. The borders are fuzzy and changeable. “Trans-contributive” means that organizational integrity does not include only real results of activity and passivity but also probable results—expected results are linked to group intentions that belong chiefly to institutional centers of power (Polowczyk, 2012).

I’m not going to settle here whether the institution should be described in an interpersonal, shared or collective manner. It is enough to agree that integrity can be institutional, or that institutions can be devoted to moral goals.

Corporate integrity is seen as an especially relevant case of organizational integrity in modern capitalist society. Goodpaster believes that corporations have a mindset, i.e., “habits and practices that are action-guiding and not merely thought-guiding” (Goodpaster, 2007, p 35). M. T. Brown (Brown, 2005) describes different dimensions of corporate integrity: cultural integrity as openness, interpersonal integrity as relational wholeness, organizational integrity as pursuing a worthwhile purpose, social integrity as civic cooperation, environmental integrity as natural prosperity. The question arises whether corporations fall short of this ideal.

According to my definition of OEMI, transnational corporations—when they want to be organizations with ethical integrity (“maximalist organizations”)–should be identified by: (1) institutionalized moral intentions and actions (organizational culture of integrity): integrity as a virtue must be consciously planned, expressed and developed; (2) all institutional structures must be internally related to studied and practised rational morality; (3) real actions devoted to ethical goals ought to be performed in every unit of the organization. We have a great deal of articles and books that have found that these companies do not get very close to this ideal (for example: Bakan, 2005; Michalowski and Kramer, 2006; Pontell et al., 2007; Yunus, 2007; Polowczyk, 2013a).

The standards are high, but moral philosophers often set high standards for persons and low standards for organizations. Corporate Social Responsibility is an example of low requirements that can signify surrender or flattery (Polowczyk, 2013a).

Definition 6 Organizational material ethical integrity is a) institutional, b) a relatively permanent, freely chosen and deliberate commitment c) linked to rational moral life in general and d) for rational moral sake, and e) it aims to maximize central ethical values, such as freedom, justice, happiness and love.

Organizations supporting freedom should be focused on cherishing and promoting freedom inside and outside of them: any form of institutional tyranny or dictatorship—economic or political—must be eliminated. They should be characterized by institutional concern about freedom, knowledge of freedom, “spiritual exercises” of freedom, and totality of involvement in freedom in every unit, department or subsidiary. One of the interpretations of this requirement determines direct democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy as necessary conditions for ethical organizations (Polowczyk, 2013b). The same relates to justice, happiness and love. The organizations which claim to have ethical integrity ought to do their best to get close to their ethical targets, but they do not need to be perfect.

Good and bad counterfeits of integrity

There is not one morality, and there is not one moral integrity as moral commitment, so there are different types of integrity and different types of false integrity. If we do not think that all moralities are equally good, so we must change our evaluations of particular types of moral integrity and false moral integrity. Clear distinction between integrity and false integrity concerns truth and falsity and it does not relate directly to evaluation in some other respects. Evaluation of integrity and false integrity is connected with concepts of coherence, rationality, fundamental values, etc. (see section 'Morality and definitions of integrity').

Typology of false moral integrity

The question of the moral value of fake integrity is the issue of moral value of appearances or illusions. Traditionally false identities were linked to lies, temptations, deceptions, and generally seen as morally reprehensible: “Let what you say be simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; anything more than this comes from evil” (Matthew, 5, p 37) as Jesus of Nazareth put it. In Buddhism the powerful demon Mara is the epitome of deceptive, dark forces that hinder spiritual enlightenment. It is sometimes thought that only bad people or morally wrong activities are connected with illusions. Platonic and Kantian ethics are mostly expounded in this manner. Moreover numerous business authors, when writing of integrity, describe the notion as a sort of naive self-presentation: “We hold honesty and integrity as our guiding principles” or “We are proud of the integrity, sincerity and transparency our employees demonstrate every day” (Ashkenas, 2011).

But the interpretation of this tradition is wrong and oversimplified. Jesus of Nazareth hid his identity as he “warned his disciples not to tell anyone that he was the Christ” (Matthew, 16, p 20). The Buddhist zen master Hakuin concealed his goodness and lost his reputation to save an abandoned baby (Reps, 1998: pp 12–13). Sometimes good organizations and good people have to hide their real identities for a cause. Camouflages are created for diverse purposes, morally good, bad or neutral. Let us think of the Polish nurse and social worker, Irena Sendler, a member of the Polish Underground in German-occupied Poland. Under the pretext of carrying out sanitary inspections within the Warsaw Ghetto, she and her group (the children’s section of Żegota) smuggled out and saved 2500 Jewish children. To help the most powerless victims of Nazism, she assumed the nom de guerre “Jolanta” and provided them with false identity documents (Zimmerman, 2015: p 304, p 415). Falsehood can be “a moment of truth”. Irena Sendler counterfeited an obedient slave. She simulated a variety of slave morality against their overlords in an act of “moral aikido”. Camouflage can be ethically good if misleading appearances can minimize suffering, slavery, injustice and hatred, and maximize happiness, freedom, justice and love.

False (counterfeit) integrity is a set of features that simulate integrity but they do not form integrity. False integrity is not a simulation of particular behaviors, emotions, desires or beliefs. One moral behavior is not equivalent to a relatively permanent and consistent moral commitment, and one fake moral behavior is not a sort of false integrity. If emotions, beliefs, desires, actions, behaviors do not form a practical, perceivable moral system, and do not point towards a general moral attitude, they are not counterfeits of a moral commitment. False integrity imitates a first-level virtue and the highest-order volitions, something that holds them together and that is expressed by them.

Pseudo-integrity is false integrity in symbolic respect: in descriptions as a language illusion or in a wider sense as a symbolic illusion in paintings, sculptures, murals, soundtracks, films, websites etc. False OMR without deluding symbolic representations seem to be rare, because symbols are usually able to reinforce desirable results. Fake moral integrity is the camouflage made of invisibility, incomprehensibility, and illusions. The camouflage helps organizations or systems to survive and achieve their goals.

These characteristics do not clinch whether the features are deliberately or incidentally produced as pretense. Let us imagine someone whose whim was to offer 100$ to a beggar. People may perceive the person as a man of integrity when he keeps doing this. What if he always kills the beggar afterwards and nobody knows of that? Let us assume that the killer does not want to pretend. Thus “the integrity” is really false but the phenomenon seems to be true “in the eye of beholder”.

We can distinguish between intentional false integrity and incidental false integrity. It is about an agent’s intentions or lack of intention. The division does not concern the observer or the interpreter. The observer and the interpreter are captured in the difference between effective false integrity and ineffective false integrity.

Effective false integrity is false integrity perceived as true integrity by some subjects. The illusion is active, successful and victorious. Somebody has been trapped. Slaves supporting “a good slave owner”, bondsmen admiring “merciful” feudal lords, strikebreakers causing harm to their social class, or hostages defending their captors in the classical Stockholm syndrome case belong to this category. Effective false integrity is a type of wrong perception and misunderstanding. This erroneous recognition is more or less pernicious to the interpreter. Ineffective false integrity is an unsuccessful, futile, vain illusion. Nobody sees it as reality. The phenomenon is imperceptible or someone sees through it.

George Orwell describes the totalitarian social system in which borders between integrity and counterfeit integrity are “deconstructed”: “War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength” (Orwell, 2013). “ Integrity 1984 ” is a sophisticated type of counterfeit integrity that enables destruction of concepts, minds and lives from within. Like a bacteriophage changing its victim’s DNA, integrity 1984 transforms not just single concepts, but the whole symbolic system. The attacked bacterium has become one of “the living dead”. The seeming identity with old notions is just a face of the dead worn by the murderer. But the stratagem is more treacherous because the new identity contains somehow the old identity. Behind the mask hides the new man who is his mask.

The following types of false moral integrity are directly contingent on definitional properties of ethical integrity. I call them fundamental types of false integrity. Counterfeit integrity lacks rationality, truth, permanence or generality.

Irrational false integrity means that persons or organizations intend to be morally good but they do not conduct any scientific or philosophical research and do not use experience or reasoning to find out about the best possible ethical principles and rules. Irrational false integrity can be divided into irrational false moral integrity and irrational false ethical integrity. The first is related to an almost totally irrational attitude to moral principles and rules, linked to blind obedience to authorities, dogmas, superstitions, whims, impulses etc. The approach is uncritical, unquestioning, below the level of quasi-rationality of theological deliberations. The second simulates significance of rationality, produces deductions and inductions, performs experiments, and makes observations to conceal its dogmatism, reasoning-resistance, and wishful thinking. Its representatives know in advance what conclusions have to be drawn, and what theses should be refused.

Show integrity is the false integrity based in false commitment. In this case moral commitment is just a show, illusion, “magical trick”. Moral actions are not taken and they are replaced by means of PR, propaganda, myths or actions which are taken without moral intentions to gain power, profits, favors, land etc. Organizations with profit-oriented hierarchy of values fake their moral commitment by means of attractive websites, advertising campaigns, CSR departments, hyped charity but actually money is their god—they buy the public with “moral currency”.

Ephemeral integrity is a temporary moral commitment, e.g., during an inspection. The feature cannot be a virtue because virtues require relatively permanent commitment. Ephemeral integrity is either unsuccessful virtue or show virtue.

Local integrity is spatially or geographically limited commitment, e.g., to one department, one branch, one subsidiary etc. Real moral integrity needs the whole person or organization to be morally involved. Counterfeit integrity produces moral façades.

False integrity as incoherence encompasses three forms: unnecessary incoherence between declarations and practices, incoherence between moral norms, incoherence between moral ends and means.

Incoherence between declarations and practices should not be reduced to hypocrisy. In hypocrisy as an example of unnecessary incoherence between declarations and practices moral wrong puts on the mask of rigorous morality, in case of necessary incoherence between declarations and practices, moral good disguises itself as passivity, ignorance, or other forms of acceptance of a bad situation in order to defend good or defeat evil.

Incoherence between moral ends and means concerns the incoherence between moral norms of higher and lower order, e.g., incompatibility between moral principles and moral rules. It can be exemplified by the thesis that the end justifies the means, that the moral end justifies the immoral means. e.g., introducing paradise on earth by infernal methods: torture, execution etc. But this is not the only case. Immoral purposes can be justified by moral practices. Malevolent dictators and greedy corporations are able to do praiseworthy deeds to “buy” their position in the state or on the market. Building motorways or sending computers to Africa may be a method: the motorways are meant to serve the army and the computers are just a toxic e-waste.

False OMR can adopt various strategies depending on the three variables—symbolic presentation, minor (superficial, secondary) activities, major (core, primary) activities. Three of them seem to be prevalent: “the empty symbols strategy”, “the hidden-core strategy”, “Sendler’s strategy”.

“ The empty symbols strategy ” is a typical pure propaganda strategy—reality behind symbols does not exist: organizations are not involved in any morally good actions, neither in core activities nor in superficial ones, but they propagate their morally glorious image to achieve their goals. Institutions make use of public relations techniques, political propaganda, advertising campaigns, “artificial worlds” of branding, hollow promises, brainwashing etc.

According to the Gospel of Matthew 23,27, Jesus of Nazareth said “Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you are like whitewashed tombs, which outwardly appear beautiful, but inside are full of dead men’s bones and all uncleanness”. “Whitewashed tombs strategy” or“The hidden-core strategy” means that primary bad activities are imperceptible “behind the curtain” of secondary good activities of the organization.

In “ Sendler’s strategy ” false self-description or other symbolic misrepresentation is combined with superficially wrong behaviors. Superficial manifestation of anti-values, seeming cooperation with moral wrong or moral evil in order to weaken it, outwit it, defeat it, and to reinforce the disadvantaged, the poor, the needy, to rescue its victims, is equivalent to becoming a noble warrior of illusions. Irena Sendler is an exemplar of this kind of strategy. Her cooperation with the Nazis in minor matters was just a cover for good core activities: saving human lives from exceptional bestiality. Like a master of aikido, she used energy of a Nazi institution—its permits and possibilities—against it.

The empty symbols strategy and the whitewashed tombs strategy are examples of false ethical integrity—their agents want to pass for representatives of good or the best morality, e.g., “master morality” or overrated common sense morality, but actually they personify degenerate morality, something irrational, full of hatred, injustice or misery. The Sendler’s strategy is an expression of genuine ethical integrity although simultaneously the ethical magic presents itself as bad morality in its outer layer.

Good and bad counterfeits of integrity

This part is crucial. I argue here that illusions of integrity have no single ethical value. Their assessments vary greatly in detail. Some of them are morally reprehensible, others are relatively neutral or even praiseworthy.

Bad illusions

Bad false moral integrity is one of the most dangerous and powerful phenomena playing a leading and sinister role in the history of the human race. Ethics should devote more effort to exposing and defeating the underrated combat camouflage of false integrity. False moral integrity as an ideological weapon should be much more recognizable than it is. Ethics, business ethics and political philosophy need sensitive instruments to combat moral counterfeits.

When rational morality is feigned to offer an excuse to kill, when justice, love, freedom and happiness are faked to control, enslave, and torture, that form of integrity has to be wrong or evil. It is not about bad morality or amorality that presents its essence in an easy, straightforward manner, but the problem relates to bad morality or amorality depicted as if it was good morality or rational morality.

Counterfeits integrity can exist in every domain of society. Stalinism is an extreme and bloody version of false ethical integrity on organizational and systemic levels. This ideology was a call to action in the name of science (rational society), freedom (liberation of the working class), justice (rejecting unjust capitalist relations of production), happiness (for workers), and care (non-capitalist welfare state). The conceptual apparatus of Stalinism was “infected” in a similar way to Orwell’s Oceania with its English Socialism, Ministry of Plenty, Ministry of Truth, and Ministry of Love (Orwell, 2013). Critical thinking was replaced by an obligatory unquestioning attitude, liberation proved to be slavery, “happiness” meant “overworking” or “heroic death” for Stalin, care had one fundamental, excluding subject—God-Stalin.

The Stalinist system and its institutions were involved in ethical goals irrationally (dogmatically) and falsely. Incompatibility between their lofty declarations and despicable practises was enormous. Analogously there was incoherence between their pseudo-main principles (“You shall liberate the working class” etc.) and their practical rules and directives (kill the members of the working class if they do not obey), as well as incompatibility between moral ends and means, e.g., introducing paradise on earth by infernal methods: torture, famine, murder, genocide. On top of that, Stalinism was deeply anti-Marxist and its existence was the most effective method of subjugating the working class and rejecting real Marxism (Chomsky, 1986).

Although nowadays Stalinism is an easy target for liberal criticism, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) still needs to be argued over. Numerous critical authors, such as M. Albert, J. Bakan, N. Chomsky, S.B. Banerjee. G. Aras, D. Crowther, A.C. Fernando, E. Chiapello, S. Žižek, M.Yunus, have put forward a great deal of strong arguments against transnational corporations and CSR.

According to M. Yunus CSR forms two basic types (Yunus, 2007): weak and strong CSR. The weak follows the principle: “Do not harm to people or the planet (unless that means sacrificing profit)” (Yunus, 2007, p 15). The strong version prefers a more positive attitude: “Do good for people and the planet (as long as you can do so without sacrificing profit) (Yunus, 2007, p 15). If this is an adequate description of CSR companies, the problem with corporate “integrity” is that corporations treat moral commitment as a means not as an end. “The virtue” is often regarded as a method of earning money by corporate centers of power: “the effort should be profitable in the judgment of senior leadership. The guiding principle is that a good corporate responsibility strategy is about how to make money, not give it away” (Jerome and Kleinbaum, 2012). Pseudo-integrity related to CSR is not freely chosen as a moral obligation but enforced by law, PR requirements, branding, market competition etc. This attitude violates my definitional condition of ethical integrity: morality for moral sake (See Definition2 and its explanation). “Of course, CSR is not always imposed by law, but that does not make it ethically optional in the sense of not obligatory. Ethics knows no optional obligations. CSR apparently does. That is a substantial difference. Motivation also becomes shallower in the transition from ethics to CSR” (van Luijk, 2011, p 8). CSR seems to be a part of business interests rather than a component of an ethical commitment.

In many cases “integrity” of CSR companies is fragmentary—one department, one activity, a few employees are regarded as a proper expression of moral commitment (Polowczyk, 2013a), but actually rational moral commitment is always total (see Definition 1 and its explanation). Microsoft has its own CSR policies: “At Microsoft, our policies and business practices reflect a commitment to making our planet a better place” (Microsoft, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/about/corporate-responsibility), and the company was ranked number one in CSR in 2013 (Reputation Institute, https://www.reputationinstitute.com/Resources/Registered/PDF-Resources/The-2013-CSR-RepTrak%C2%AE-100-Study-Results.aspx), but the company is repeatedly accused of spying on their customers and violating their privacy: “Windows snoops on users, shackles users and, on mobiles, censors apps; it also has a universal back door that allows Microsoft to remotely impose software changes. Microsoft sabotages Windows users by showing security holes to the NSA before fixing them“ (Stallman, 2015). In other words: Microsoft software is a sort of malware. If it is true, moral commitment of one of the greatest CSR companies is at best fragmentary.

“Integrity” of CSR companies can be incoherent due to their morally self-contradictory activities—their show virtues and hidden vices. Many well-known transnational corporations have CSR policies and at the same time they are in the reports and books on immoral corporate practices or corporate crimes. For example, “socially responsible” Citibank was forced by The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to pay “$700 million in consumer relief for illegal credit card practices” (CFBP: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-citibank-to-pay-700-million-in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-credit-card-practices/). One of the most “satanic” scenarios happens when “the same company that devotes a penny to CSR spends 99 cents on moneymaking that make social problems worse” (Yunus, 2007: 16). Their mindset seems to be similar to this: “Make as much money as you can, even if you exploit the poor to do so—but then donate a tiny portion of the profits for social causes or create a foundation to do things that will promote your business interest” (Yunus, 2007, p 16). This strategy enables companies to create an excellent corporate image while doing very little (Aras and Crowther, 2010). Corporate Social Responsibility can be a part of a corporate Janus face.

Corporate “integrity” is at least partially irrational. Ethical commitment entails serious study of practical and applied ethics (see Definition 2 and its explanation). Organizations need not be universities but they ought to systematically devote a certain amount of time to honing their moral life if they are really interested in morality. Theoretical knowledge and moral exercises are methods to strive after moral perfection. CSR companies rather fall short of this ideal. Although some companies teach business ethics, it does not mean that they are ethically committed. It is difficult to find any company whose members regularly study and practice rational morality.

This is not an exposition of arguments against “corporate integrity” and CSR, but just several instances of the systemic critical potential of the concept of material ethical integrity. It means that it is probably not necessary to reach for higher level virtues and more complex theories to undermine CSR organizations.

In general, if states or transnational corporations simulate ethical commitment, they choose effective and detrimental methods of propaganda. The type of camouflage is frequently offensive and aggressive: it aims to weaken or destroy other states and competitors, to subjugate people, to wipe out trade unions, to exploit labor etc. Counterfeits of ethical integrity are always ethically reprehensible, because they imitate moral good to bolster moral wrong or evil. The delusions are especially powerful and misleading if they are institutional or systemic rather than individual. In moral terms, fake integrity “wreaks havoc” by seduction and is one of the most powerful ways to spread slavery, injustice, misery and callousness on the planet. Instead of individual, malicious, psychopathic seducer, we see institutional or systemic “vampires”, smiling, charming, lethal, living “whitewashed tombs”.

Good illusions

Counterfeit integrity can be either ethically good or bad. Everything depends on the quality of accepted morality. The premise of the reasoning—that one should not treat every moral system as equally valuable (see 1) - belongs to the tradition of normative perspective on morality.

Bad versions of morality help to deceive and enslave humans, make them unhappy, as well as steal their lands, resources, time, health or life, e.g., the moral camouflage of sweatshop owners or Jihadists. Good versions undermine or dismantle bad situations or systems, e.g., the moral camouflage of human rights organizations or ethical-political groups, like early “Solidarity” in Poland or contemporary hacktivists.

Ethical integrity does not demand naive, irrational self-presentation: telling the truth to anybody, anywhere in any circumstances, on any condition whatever the price may be. Misleading self-presentation can be an expression of integrity because ethical integrity does not exclude stratagems, delusions, smoke screens etc. The ethical strategy entails truthfulness at least in certain respects, and do not stand in contradiction to hiding the truth in other respects—when “dishonesty” is able to gain freedom, do justice or save life.

Ethical self-presentation does not require full transparency or a naive kind of sincerity in every situation. However, ethical self-presentation excludes: (1) self-deception because ethical agents ought to have self-consciousness and make self-assessment in moral matters; and (2) true self-presentation that leads to unnecessary suffering and death, or to injustice and slavery. Ethical self-presentation demands: (1) true presentation to recognized ethical community, e.g., members of the resistance movement; (2) true presentation to opponents and enemies if the presentation may minimize moral wrong.

The idea of crystal-man or crystal-organization as a totally transparent unit in every circumstance seems to be attractive, but crystals can be easily broken if they are not in a heaven or in a just society of the (im)possible future. Camouflage, appearances, simulacra, stratagems can be ethically good in hostile, corrupt environments when slavery, serfdom, racism, exploitation of labor is regarded as permissible or even desirable. The conclusion is that they are in many cases more or less ethically needful but not always inescapable. They are not moral ends—they are just moral means.

Fake formal OMI is possible and morally good when: (1) agents and institutions imitate an external side of bad morality (symbols, language etc.) to survive or to help the persecuted, but any essence of bad morality cannot be adopted; (2) they pretend to accept passivity but the real activity is a fight against the system, especially if the structure of society is linked to suffering, distress and death.

Integrity freed of illusions is a product of a sloppy thinking or a method of enslaving others by knowing their secrets and weaknesses. The man of integrity must be at least occasionally a man of illusions, an ethical prestidigitator. Noble lies are tools of care, justice and well-being. If Big Brother is watching, counterfeits of Maoist morality or other harmful morals serve as the proper tactics to undermine his power. Camouflaging oneself as a Christian in the hell of the Holy Inquisition, pretending to be a Muslim in the abyss the Islamic State can be correct ethical responses to an “infernal” environment.

Conclusions

I have established the concept of organizational material ethical integrity (OMEI) as an ideal or maximalist sort of integrity for organizations. OMEI is an institutional, relatively permanent, freely chosen and deliberate commitment to rational moral life in general and for rational moral sake, as well as having the aims of maximizing central ethical values, such as freedom, justice, happiness and love. If we use the ideal of OMEI and compare it to integrity of many self-proclaimed ethical organizations, both their declarations and practices seem to be quite far away from rational moral commitment. Neither CSR institutions, nor social businesses are ethically committed in this way.

In practical terms, OMEI requires from business institutions far more than common CSR practices: their members ought to study rational ethics—profits or power should not be their main purposes, maximization of ethical values must be their fundamental purpose in every activity, every department, every subsidiary, every day. In other words, OMEI organizations, have to resemble philosophical schools but still remain focussed on their specific practices, e.g., economic, politic or medical.

OMEI resembles the idea of social business: the organization must be cause-driven, but it concerns any kind of institution, political, cultural etc. Unlike social business, the OMEI organizations is focused on improvement of the rational moral life of its members: studying and exercising rational morality. This highly ambitious ideal may not be realistic in current capitalist society, and if so, it may be a call for a change of the social system, for a construction of a more ethical world.

I distinguish the following types of false moral integrity: pseudo-integrity, intentional false integrity, incidental false integrity, effective false integrity, ineffective false integrity, integrity 1984, irrational false moral integrity and irrational false ethical integrity, show integrity, ephemeral integrity, local integrity, false integrity as incoherence, false integrity as “The empty symbols strategy”, false integrity as “Whitewashed tombs strategy”, false integrity as “Sendler’s strategy”. They may be helpful in practical identification of diverse varieties of falsehood in moral life because they offer more complicated bases for moral assessments instead of oversimplified divisions into always good true integrity and always bad false integrity.

Ethical integrity is not naive sincerity. Naive sincerity puts morally committed persons at risk of harassment, torture or death. Camouflage can be ethically good if a misleading appearance can minimize suffering, slavery, injustice and hatred, and maximize happiness, freedom, justice and love. The concept gives ethical justification for tools of self-defense and counter-attack under bad circumstances: masks, mirage, simulacra, smokescreens, covers, false identities etc. I do not think here about faking particular activities, behaviors, actions or emotions. If you imitate specific behaviors, somebody can recognize that the behaviors do not form a system, so they do not express a general attitude, something more fundamental, your moral commitment—so you are suspect or dead.

Counterfeit ethical integrity is always ethically bad because when somebody simulates secondary features of a good morality without applying its essential qualities, it is a kind of bad morality and it can be used as destructive camouflage against individuals and organizations. This is a strategy used by oppressive organizations.

Sometimes the oppressed or rebels need “counter-illusions”. Counterfeit moral integrity can be ethically good if it simulates bad morality for a good purpose. The simulation does not concern any fundamental principles of bad morality. Misleading appearances imitate symbolic and less ethically wrong features of bad morality. It opens possibilities for ethical prestidigitators either on individual (Irena Sendler) or organizational levels (Żegota).

The consciousness that creating illusions, even very general illusions, is not in contradiction with moral integrity, and that it is its possible component, can not only be helpful but also liberating for individuals and organizations. Ethically committed members of resistance movements, revolutionaries, whistleblowers or hackivists may find additional justifications for their risky, courageous, and cause-driven activities.

Data availability

Data sharing is not applicable to this paper as no datasets were generated or analysed.