Abstract
Standard models of decision-making assume each option is associated with subjective value, regardless of whether this value is inferred from experience (experiential) or explicitly instructed probabilistic outcomes (symbolic). In this study, we present results that challenge the assumption of unified representation of experiential and symbolic value. Across nine experiments, we presented participants with hybrid decisions between experiential and symbolic options. Participants’ choices exhibited a pattern consistent with a systematic neglect of the experiential values. This normatively irrational decision strategy held after accounting for alternative explanations, and persisted even when it bore an economic cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that experiential and symbolic values are not symmetrically considered in hybrid decisions, suggesting they recruit different representational systems that may be assigned different priority levels in the decision process. These findings challenge the dominant models commonly used in value-based decision-making research.
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Data availability
The data for the analysis are available in the following code repository: https://github.com/bsgarcia/RetrieveAndCompareAnalysis.
Code availability
The analysis was performed using Matlab R2021a. The code is available here: https://github.com/bsgarcia/RetrieveAndCompareAnalysis. The different experiments were conducted on a website programmed in Javascript ES6, HTML 5, CSS 3 (client-side) and PHP 8.1 (server-side). The code for the task is available here: https://github.com/bsgarcia/RetrieveAndCompare. A simple version of the task can be tested here: https://human-rl.scicog.fr/RandCTesting.
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Acknowledgements
We thank A. Baillon, J. Daunizeau and S. Deneve for their helpful comments. S.P. is supported by the Agence National de la Recherche (CogFinAgent: ANR-21-CE23-0002-02; RELATIVE: ANR-21-CE37-0008-01; RANGE: ANR-21-CE28-0024-01). The article was prepared in the framework of a research grant of the Departement d’études cognitives (FrontCog ANR-17-EURE-0017). M.L. is supported by an SNSF Ambizione grant (PZ00P3_174127) and an ERC Starting Grant (948671). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.
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B.G. and S.P. designed the study. B.G. performed the experiments and curated the data. B.G. and S.P. defined the data analyses that were implemented by B.G. M.L. provided feedback on data analysis and the interpretation of the results. S.B.G. provided feedback on the interpretation of the results. B.G., S.P. and M.L. wrote the manuscript with input from S.B.G. All authors approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.
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Garcia, B., Lebreton, M., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. et al. Experiential values are underweighted in decisions involving symbolic options. Nat Hum Behav 7, 611–626 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01496-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01496-3
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