Abstract
The law of supply is a fundamental principle of economics and states that any increase in price will increase the quantity supplied. In the case of prosocial behaviour, however, increasing rewards have reduced supply, posing a challenge to standard economic theory. Attempts to study such ‘crowding-out’ have been limited by their small scale and the inherent difficulties posed by calibration of experimental tests. We analyse a large-scale natural experiment in the environmental domain consisting of 20,370 independent observations derived from aggregation of approximately 27 million individual decisions. We find that aggregate supply of prosocial behaviour is ‘s-shaped’, demonstrating how attempts to increase prosocial behaviour using monetary rewards can be counter-productive. Our study shows that results derived from a small set of data points collected from an underlying s-shaped data-generating process are vulnerable to misinterpretation, and that proxy measures of intrinsic motivation ought to be collected to ensure theoretical advance.
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Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available for replication from the corresponding author on request. The data cannot be made publicly available due to property rights held by COOP and Statistics Sweden. Source data are provided with this paper.
Code availability
Custom code that supports the findings of this study is available from the corresponding author on request.
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Acknowledgements
Financial support from the Adlerbertska Foundation (Adlerbertska Forskningsstiftelsen) (C.E.W.), and the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet, 2018-04793) (C.E.W., P.M.) is gratefully acknowledged. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript. Access to data was generously provided by P. Rosengreen (COOP), K. Lundell (Returpack), A. Jensen (Kooperation utan gränser) and E. Ebbeson (Returpack). We thank participants at the Copenhagen Network for Experimental Economics (CNEE), the International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioural Economics (IMEBE), C. Akinci, E. Persson, H. Gutierrez Rufrancos and members of Stirling Behavioural Science Centre, especially P. Ebert, M. Moro and F. de Vries, for helpful comments. Views herein are exclusively those of the authors.
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C.E.W., M.K. and P.M. designed the research. C.E.W., M.K. and P.M. performed the research. C.E.W. and M.K. analysed the data. C.E.W. wrote the paper.
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Extended data
Extended Data Fig. 1 Box plot of expected reward E[rt] by year.
The center line denotes the median; box limits denote first and third quartiles; whiskers denote the highest (lowest) value within 1.5x the interquartile range, measured from box limits; points denote outliers defined as observations larger (smaller) than 1.5x the interquartile range measured from box limits (n = 20,370).
Extended Data Fig. 2 Box plot of quantity of recycled cans by year.
The center line denotes the median; box limits denote first and third quartiles; whiskers denote the highest (lowest) value within 1.5x the interquartile range, measured from box limits; points denote outliers defined as observations larger (smaller) than 1.5x the interquartile range measured from box limits (n = 20,370).
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Source Data Extended Data Fig. 1
Statistical source data for Extended Fig. 1.
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Wollbrant, C.E., Knutsson, M. & Martinsson, P. Extrinsic rewards and crowding-out of prosocial behaviour. Nat Hum Behav 6, 774–781 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01293-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01293-y
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