What motivates human behaviour in social dilemmas? The results of public goods games are commonly interpreted as showing that humans are altruistically motivated to benefit others. However, there is a competing ‘confused learners’ hypothesis: that individuals start the game either uncertain or mistaken (confused) and then learn from experience how to improve their payoff (payoff-based learning). Here we (1) show that these competing hypotheses can be differentiated by how they predict contributions should decline over time; and (2) use metadata from 237 published public goods games to test between these competing hypotheses. We found, as predicted by the confused learners hypothesis, that contributions declined faster when individuals had more influence over their own payoffs. This predicted relationship arises because more influence leads to a greater correlation between contributions and payoffs, facilitating learning. Our results suggest that humans, in general, are not altruistically motivated to benefit others but instead learn to help themselves.
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Funding provided by Calleva Research Centre for Evolution and Human Sciences, Magdalen College, Oxford (M.N.B.-C. and S.A.W.), ERC advanced grant 834164 (S.A.W.) and the University of Lausanne, Switzerland (M.N.B.-C.). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript. Thanks to Z. Griffiths for help with data collection, L. Lehmann for discussions and P. Barclay for reviewing the manuscript.
The authors declare no competing interests.
Peer review information Nature Human Behaviour thanks Pat Barclay and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.
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Burton-Chellew, M.N., West, S.A. Payoff-based learning best explains the rate of decline in cooperation across 237 public-goods games. Nat Hum Behav 5, 1330–1338 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01107-7
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