Abstract
We donate billions to charities each year, yet much of our giving is ineffective. Why are we motivated to give but not to give effectively? Building on evolutionary game theory, we argue that donors evolved (genetically or culturally) to be insensitive to efficacy because people tend not to reward efficacy, as social rewards tend to depend on well-defined and highly observable behaviours. We present five experiments testing key predictions of this account that are difficult to reconcile with alternative accounts based on cognitive or emotional limitations. Namely, we show that donors are more sensitive to efficacy when helping (1) themselves or (2) their families. Moreover, (3) social rewarders don’t condition on efficacy or other difficult-to-observe behaviours (4, 5), such as the amount donated.
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Data availability
The data that support the findings reported in this paper are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Acknowledgements
We thank E. Yoeli, A. Bear, M. Singh, J. Jordan and P. DeScioli for their feedback on this manuscript; N. Baloch, Y. Mehra Bardoloi, K. Barolak, B, Davis, O. Lala and H. Mullins for their help in calculating and awarding the bonuses; S. Ryan, A. Viser, E. Wilson and P. Choi for their help in formatting the manuscript and editing the figures; and the John Templeton Foundation for financial support. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.
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All authors edited the manuscript and approved the final version. B.B. and M.H. designed the studies and wrote the manuscript, in consultation with M.N. B.B. collected and analysed the data. The study designs were based on theory developed by M.H.
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Burum, B., Nowak, M.A. & Hoffman, M. An evolutionary explanation for ineffective altruism. Nat Hum Behav 4, 1245–1257 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-00950-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-00950-4
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