A fundamental but rarely contested assumption in economics and neuroeconomics is that decision-makers compute subjective values of risky options by multiplying functions of reward probability and magnitude. By contrast, an additive strategy for valuation allows flexible combination of reward information required in uncertain or changing environments. We hypothesized that the level of uncertainty in the reward environment should determine the strategy used for valuation and choice. To test this hypothesis, we examined choice between risky options in humans and rhesus macaques across three tasks with different levels of uncertainty. We found that whereas humans and monkeys adopted a multiplicative strategy under risk when probabilities are known, both species spontaneously adopted an additive strategy under uncertainty when probabilities must be learned. Additionally, the level of volatility influenced relative weighting of certain and uncertain reward information, and this was reflected in the encoding of reward magnitude by neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.
Custom computer codes that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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We thank E. Chu, S. Nichols-Worley and L. Tran for collecting human data, and C. Strait and M. Mancarella for collecting monkey data in the gambling task. This work is supported by the National Science Foundation (CAREER Award no. BCS1253576 to B.Y.H. and EPSCoR Award no. 1632738 to A.S.), and the National Institutes of Health (grant no. R01 DA038615 to B.Y.H., grant nos. R01 DA029330 and R01 MH108629 to D.L., and grant no. R01 DA047870 to A.S.). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.
The authors declare no competing interests.
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Scientific Reports (2019)