The assumption of rationality is at the heart of action explanations. A Bayesian model of theory of mind, which explicitly relies on this assumption, can predict with high accuracy the inferences that people make about the mental states underlying others’ actions.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution
Access options
Access Nature and 54 other Nature Portfolio journals
Get Nature+, our best-value online-access subscription
$29.99 / 30 days
cancel any time
Subscribe to this journal
Receive 12 digital issues and online access to articles
$119.00 per year
only $9.92 per issue
Buy this article
- Purchase on Springer Link
- Instant access to full article PDF
Prices may be subject to local taxes which are calculated during checkout
References
Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford Univ. Press, 1980).
Dennett, D. C. The Intentional Stance (Bradford Books, 1987).
Jara-Ettinger, J., Gweon, H., Schulz, L. E., & Tenenbaum, J. B. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20, 589–604 (2016).
Heider, F. & Simmel, M. Am. J. Psychol. 57, 243–259 (1944).
Liu, S. & Spelke, E. S. Cognition 160, 35–42 (2017).
Baker, C. L., Jara-Ettinger, J., Saxe, R. & Tenenbaum, J. B. Nat. Hum. Behav. 1, 0064 (2017).
Baker, C. L., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. Cognition 113, 329–349 (2009).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Competing interests
The author declares no competing interests.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Csibra, G. Cognitive science: Modelling theory of mind. Nat Hum Behav 1, 0066 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0066
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0066
