Abstract
To guarantee the security of quantum key distribution (QKD), security proofs of QKD protocols have assumptions on the devices. Commonly used assumptions are, for example, each random bit information chosen by a sender to be precisely encoded on an optical emitted pulse and the photonnumber probability distribution of the pulse to be exactly known. These typical assumptions imposed on light sources such as the above two are rather strong and would be hard to verify in practical QKD systems. The goal of the paper is to replace those strong assumptions on the light sources with weaker ones. In this paper, we adopt the differentialphaseshift (DPS) QKD protocol and drastically mitigate the requirements on light sources, while for the measurement unit, trusted and photonnumberresolving detectors are assumed. Specifically, we only assume the independence among emitted pulses, the independence of the vacuum emission probability from a chosen bit, and upper bounds on the tail distribution function of the total photon number in a single block of pulses for single, two and three photons. Remarkably, no other detailed characterizations, such as the amount of phase modulation, are required. Our security proof significantly relaxes demands for light sources, which paves a route to guarantee implementation security with simple verification of the devices.
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Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) holds promise for informationtheoretically secure communication between two distant parties, Alice and Bob.^{1} Since QKD is a physical cryptography in which security is based on a mathematical model of the devices, several assumptions on Alice’s light source and Bob’s measurement unit have to be satisfied to guarantee the security. Any discrepancies between the device model and properties of the actual devices could be exploited to hack the implemented QKD systems. In fact, several experiments to crack implementation of QKD systems have been reported,^{2,3,4,5,6} which is a crucial threat for security of QKD, and therefore it is important to close the gap between theory and practice.
So far, tremendous efforts have been made to relax the demands for light sources (see e.g., a review article^{7}). Possible approaches to close the gap are to use device independent (DI) QKD (see, e.g.,^{8} and references therein) or entanglement based QKD with trusted detectors.^{9} On the other hand, as for the devicedependent QKD, the BB84 protocol^{10} is one of the most investigated protocols, and its security assuming an ideal singlephoton source^{11,12,13} and an ideal phase randomized coherentlight source^{14} with the decoystate method^{15,16,17} were proved. The security proofs were generalized to accommodate dominant imperfections of the devices. For example, perfect phase randomization is relaxed to discrete phase randomization,^{18} interpulse intensity correlations between neighboring pulses have been accommodated,^{19} and a perfectly symmetric encoding of random bit information is relaxed to asymmetric encoding with the losstolerant protocol.^{20,21} Another promising protocol is the roundrobin differential phase shift (RRDPS) protocol.^{22} Its implementation security proof has been studied,^{23} which shows that the RRDPS protocol is robust against source flaws. However, the variabledelay interferometer used in this protocol is an obstacle to simple implementation.
In this paper, we adopt the differentialphaseshift (DPS) protocol^{24} and drastically mitigate the demands for light sources, which is useful for simple characterization of the devices with quantified security. Our characterizations of light sources are based on the photonnumber statistics of emitted pulses. Specifically, we suppose that the vacuum emission probability of each pulse is independent of a chosen bit, and an upper bound q_{n} (for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}) on the probability that each block of pulses contains n or more photons. Here, these probabilities are the ones that would be obtained if we performed a photon number measurement, and we do not assume that the state is a classical mixture of Fock states. Remarkably, detailed characterizations of the source devices that were needed in previous security proofs of DPS protocol^{25,26} and the original DPS protocol,^{24} such as the precise control of phase modulations, complete knowledge of the photonnumber probability distribution, blockwise phase randomization, and a singlemode assumption on the emitted pulse are not necessary. At the end of this section, we remark the meaning of characterized sources in our title in comparison with the previous work in ref. ^{27} whose title implies that secure QKD can be realized with an uncharacterized source. An important note here is that the uncharacterized source in ref. ^{27} does not mean no assumptions on light sources. Indeed, this proof assumes that the state emitted by the source, averaged over the values of Alice’s key bit, is basisindependent. Therefore, both our proof and the proof in ref. ^{27} have some characterizations on the emitted pulses, but just the ways are different.
Results
Assumptions on the devices
Before describing the protocol, we summarize the assumptions we make on the source and the receiver. First, we list up the assumptions on Alice’s source as follows. In this paper, for simplicity of the security analysis, we consider the case where Alice employs three pulses contained in a singleblock. Note that experimental implementations remain the same with and without assuming blocks. But if blocks are employed, classical postprocessing needs to be modified such that at most onebit key is extracted from a singleblock.

(A1)
Alice chooses a random threebit sequence \(\vec b_A: = b_1^Ab_2^Ab_3^A \in \{ 0,1\} ^3\), and \(b_i^A\) is encoded only on the ith pulse in system S_{i}. Depending on the chosen \(\vec b_A\), Alice prepares a following threepulse state in system S := S_{1}S_{2}S_{3}:
$$\hat \rho _S^{\vec b_A}: = \mathop { \bigotimes }\limits_{i = 1}^3 \hat \rho _{S_i}^{b_i^A}.$$(1)Here, \(\hat \rho _{S_i}^{b_i^A}\) denotes a density operator of the ith pulse when \(b_i^A\) is chosen. We suppose that each system R_{i} that purifies each of the state \(\hat \rho _{S_i}^{b_i^A}\) is possessed by Alice, and Eve does not have access to system R_{i}.

(A2)
The vacuum emission probability of the ith pulse is independent of the chosen bit \(b_i^A\). That is, we require that the following equality holds for any i:
$${\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_i}^0{\mathrm{vac}}\rangle \langle {\mathrm{vac}} = {\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_i}^1{\mathrm{vac}}\rangle \langle {\mathrm{vac}},$$(2)where vac〉 is the vacuum state.

(A3)
For any chosen bit sequence \(\vec b_A\), the probability that a singleblock of pulses contains n (with n ∈ {1, 2, 3}) or more photons is upperbounded by q_{n}. That is,
$${\mathrm{Pr}}\{ n_{{\mathrm{block}}} \ge n\} \le q_n,$$(3)where n_{block} denotes the number of photons contained in a singleblock. Note that n_{block} is the sum of the number of photons in all the optical modes. By using a calibration method based on a conventional HanburyBrownTwiss setup with threshold photon detectors,^{28} Alice can verify \(\{ q_n\} _{n = 1}^3\) before running the protocol. If \(\{ q_n\} _{n = 1}^3\) are estimated from such an offline test, we need to assume that these bounds do not change during the online experiment.
We note that our security proof does not cover a situation where there is a Trojan horse attack.^{29} This is because one cannot verify whether or not Eve has an ancillary system of the injected light, and hence the last requirement of assumption (A1) is not satisfied. However, unless there are sidechannel attacks, our security proof has following practical advantages to source imperfections. We emphasize that for the security proof, we do not make any assumptions on phase modulations. That is, the precise control over the phase modulation and its characterization are not needed. We also emphasize that we do not make the singlemode assumption on the pulses, and the optical mode of the emitted pulse can depend on the bit \(b_i^A\). This includes, for example, the case where the state of the pulse when \(b_i^A\) = 0 (1) is horizontal (vertical) polarization state. Our framework covers the original DPS protocol^{24} using coherent states {α〉, −α〉}. In this case, q_{n} in Eq. (3) is obtained through a priori Poissonian assumption. We note that the previous security proofs^{25,26} of the DPS protocol have assumed ideally phase modulated singlemode coherent states {α〉, −α〉} with blockwise phase randomization, which is removed in our analysis.
Next, we list up the assumptions on Bob’s measurement as follows. Note that to fulfill the last requirement of (B2), one may need to adopt proper countermeasures against attacks on the detectors such as blinding attack^{5} or timeshift attacks.^{4}

(B1)
Bob uses a onebit delay Mach–Zehnder interferometer with two 50:50 beam splitters (BSs) and with its delay being equal to the interval of the neighboring emitted pulses.

(B2)
After the interferometer, the pulses are detected by two photonnumberresolving (PNR) detectors, which can discriminate the vacuum, a singlephoton, and two or more photons of a specific optical mode. A click event of each detector corresponds to bit values of 0 and 1, respectively. We suppose that the quantum efficiencies and dark countings are the same for both detectors.
In Bob’s measurement, the jth (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) time slot is defined as an expected detection time at Bob’s detectors from the superposition of the jth and (j + 1)th incoming pulses. Also, the 0th (3rd) time slot is defined as an expected detection time at Bob’s detectors from the superposition of the 1st (3rd) incoming pulse and the 3rd incoming pulse in the previous block (1st incoming pulse in the next block).
Protocol
Before presenting our DPS protocol, we summarize in Table 1 the differences in our DPS protocol from the original one.^{24} The protocol runs as follows. In its description, κ denotes the length of a bit sequence κ. Figure 1 depicts a protocol with a coherent laser source, which is one possible implementation within our security framework.

(P1)
Alice chooses a random threebit sequence \(\vec b_A\) and sends three pulses in a state \(\hat \rho _S^{\vec b_A}\) to Bob via a quantum channel.

(P2)
Bob receives an incoming three pulses and puts them into the MachZehnder interferometer followed by photon detection by using the PNR detectors. We call the event detected if Bob detects exactly one photon in total among the 1st and 2nd time slots. The detection event at the jth (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) time slot determines the raw key bit k_{B} ∈ {0, 1}. If Bob does not obtain the detected event, Alice and Bob skip steps (P3) and (P4) below.

(P3)
Bob announces the detected time slot j over an authenticated public channel.

(P4)
Alice calculates her raw key bit \(k_A = b_j^A \oplus b_{j + 1}^A\).

(P5)
Alice and Bob repeat (P1)–(P4) N_{em} times.

(P6)
Alice randomly selects a small portion of her raw key for random sampling. Over the authenticated public channel, Alice and Bob compare the bit values for random sampling and obtain the bit error rate e_{bit} among the sampled bits. This gives the estimate of the bit error rate in the remaining portion.

(P7)
Alice and Bob respectively define their sifted keys κ_{A} and κ_{B} by concatenating their remaining raw keys.

(P8)
Bob corrects the bit errors in κ_{B} to make it coincide with κ_{A} by sacrificing κ_{A}f_{EC} bits of encrypted public communication from Alice by consuming the same length of a preshared secret key.

(P9)
Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by shortening their keys by κ_{A}f_{PA} to obtain the final keys.
In this paper, we only consider the secret key rate in the asymptotic limit of an infinite sifted key length. We consider the limit of N_{em} → ∞ while the following observed parameters are fixed:
Security proof
Here, we summarize the security proof of the actual protocol described above and determine the fraction of privacy amplification f_{PA} in the asymptotic limit. The proof is detailed in Methods section. Our proof is based on the security proof^{26} of the DPS protocol with blockwise phase randomization that employs complementarity.^{30} A major difference between our proof and the previous proof^{26} is that we do not assume blockwise phase randomization. If blockwise phase randomization is performed, the state of each singleblock can be seen as a classical mixture of the total photon number state. This phase randomization simplifies the security proof because the amount of privacy amplification κ_{A}f_{PA} can be estimated separately for each photon number emission. However, under our assumptions (A1)–(A3), a phase coherence generally exists among blocks, and the state of each singleblock cannot be regarded as a classical mixture of photon number states. Therefore, we need to take into account this phase coherence in proving the security. In our security proof, the central task is to derive the information increase due to this phase coherence among the blocks.
For the security proof with complementarity, we consider alternative procedures for Alice’s state preparation in step (P1) and the calculation of her raw key bit k_{A} in step (P4). We can employ these alternative procedures to prove the security of the actual protocol because Alice’s procedure of sending optical pulses, and producing the final key is identical to the actual protocol. Also, Bob’s procedure of receiving the pulses and making his public announcement j (for each round) in the actual protocol is identical to the corresponding procedure in the alternative protocol.
As for Alice’s state preparation in step (P1), she alternatively prepares three auxiliary qubits in system A_{1}A_{2}A_{3}, which remain at Alice’s site during the whole protocol, and the three pulses (system S) to be sent, in the following state:
Here, \(\hat H: = 1/\sqrt 2 \mathop {\sum}\nolimits_{x,y = 0,1} {(  1)^{xy}} x\rangle \langle y\) is the Hadamard operator, and \({\psi _{b_i^A}}\rangle _{S_iR_i}\) is a purification of \(\hat \rho _{S_i}^{b_i^A}\), namely, \({\mathrm{tr}}_{R_i} {\psi _{b_i^A}}\rangle \langle {\psi _{b_i^A}} _{S_iR_i} = \hat \rho _{S_i}^{b_i^A}\). Note from the assumption (A1) that system R_{i} is assumed to be possessed by Alice.
As for the calculation of the raw key bit k_{A} in step (P4), this bit can be alternatively extracted by applying the controllednot (CNOT) gate on the jth and (j + 1)th auxiliary qubits with the jth one being the control and the (j + 1)th one being the target followed by measuring the jth auxiliary qubit in the Xbasis. Here, we define the Zbasis states for the jth auxiliary qubit as \(\{ {\left 0 \right\rangle _{A_j},\left 1 \right\rangle _{A_j}}\}\), and the CNOT gate \(\hat U_{{\mathrm{CNOT}}}^{(j)}\) is defined on this basis by \(\hat U_{{\mathrm{CNOT}}}^{(j)}\left x \right\rangle _{A_j}\left y \right\rangle _{A_{j + 1}} = \left x \right\rangle _{A_j}\left {x + y\,{\mathrm{mod}}2} \right\rangle _{A_{j + 1}}\) with x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Also, the Xbasis states are defined as {+〉_{A_j}, −〉_{A_j}} with \(\left \pm \right\rangle _{A_j} =( {\left 0 \right\rangle _{A_j} \pm \left 1 \right\rangle _{A_j}} )/\sqrt 2\).
In order to discuss the security of the key κ_{A}, we consider a virtual scenario of how well Alice can predict the outcome of the measurement complementary to the one to obtain k_{A}. In particular, we take the Zbasis measurement as the complementary basis, and we need to quantify how well Alice can predict its outcome z_{j} ∈ {0, 1} on the jth auxiliary qubit. To enhance the accuracy of her estimation, Alice measures the (j + 1)th auxiliary qubit in the Zbasis after performing \(\hat U_{{\mathrm{CNOT}}}^{(j)}\) on the jth and (j + 1)th auxiliary qubits. As for Bob, instead of aiming at learning κ_{A}, he tries to guess the complementary observable z_{j} to help Alice’s prediction. More specifically, Bob performs a virual measurement to learn which of the jth or (j + 1)th half pulse has a singlephoton, whose information is sent to Alice. We define the occurrence of phase error to be the case where Alice fails her prediction of the complementary measurement outcome z_{j} (see Eq. (21) for the explicit formula of the POVM element of obtaining a phase error). Let N_{ph} denote the number of phase errors, namely, the number of wrong predictions of z_{j} among κ_{A} trials. Suppose that the upper bound f(ω_{obs}) on the number of phase errors is estimated as a function of ω_{obs} which denotes all the experimentally available parameters Q, e_{bit} in Eq. (4) and \(\{ q_n\} _{n = 1}^3\) in Eq. (3). In the asymptotic limit considered here, a sufficient amount of privacy amplification is given by^{30}
where h(x) is defined as \(h(x) =  x\log _2x  (1  x)\log _2(1  x)\) for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and h(x) = 1 for x > 0.5. Then, the secret key rate (per pulse) is given by
The quantity \(e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}^{\mathrm{U}}: = f(\omega _{{\mathrm{obs}}})/{\boldsymbol{\kappa }}_A\) in Eq. (7) is the upper bound on the phase error rate e_{ph} := N_{ph}/κ_{A}. Our main result, Theorem 1, derives \(e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}^{\mathrm{U}}\) with experimentally available parameters Q, e_{bit} and \(\{ q_n\} _{n = 1}^3\) (see Methods section for the proof).
Theorem 1
In the asymptotic limit of large key length κ_{A}, the upper bound on the phase error rate is given by
with \(\lambda = 3 + \sqrt 5\).
From this theorem and Eq. (7), the scaling of the key rate R with respect to the channel transmission η is estimated. If the protocol is implemented by a weak coherent laser pulse as a light source with its mean photon number μ, the detection rate Q is in the order of O(μη) and both \(\sqrt {q_1q_3}\) and q_{2} are in the order of O(μ^{2}). To obtain a positive secret key rate, the upper bound on the phase error rate must be smaller than 0.5:
To maximize the key rate under this constraint, μ is decreased in proportion to η. Therefore, we find that the scaling of the key rate is in the order of R = O(μη) = O(η^{2}).
Simulation of secure key rates
We show the simulation results of asymptotic key rate R per pulse given by Eq. (7) as a function of the overall channel transmission η (including detector efficiency). For simplicity of the simulation, we assume that each emitted pulse is a coherent pulse from a conventional laser with mean photon number μ. In this setting, q_{n} in Eq. (3) is given by
We adopt f_{EC} = h(e_{bit}) and suppose the detection rate as Q = 2ημe^{−2ημ}, where in the simulation we omit the cost of random sampling as its cost is negligible in the asymptotic limit. In Fig. 2, we plot the key rates for e_{bit} = 0.01, e_{bit} = 0.02 and e_{bit} = 0.03 (from top to bottom). The key rates are optimized over μ for each value of η. The optimized values of μ when e_{bit} = 0.02 is about 7 × 10^{−5} (with η = 10^{−2}) and about 7 × 10^{−3} (with η = 1). From these lines, we see that all the key rates are proportional to η^{2}. If we consider the overall channel transmission as \(\eta = 0.1 \times 10^{  0.2\ell /10}\) (with \(\ell\) denoting the distance between Alice and Bob) and laser diodes operating at 1 GHz repetition rate, we can generate a secure key at a rate of 170 bits s^{−1} for a channel length of 50 km and a bit error rate of 1%. Note that in Fig. 2, we assumed that the bit error rate is independent of channel transmission η. An ηdependence of the bit error stems from, for instance, the dark count of detectors. When dark count rate (P_{dark}) becomes compatible with Q, no key can be generated. For example, if P_{dark} = 10^{−7}, P_{dark} becomes compatible with Q at η = 10^{−2}, which can be found by substituting a typical value μ = 10^{−5} at η = 10^{−2}.
Discussion
In this paper, we have provided the informationtheoretic security proof of the DPS protocol based on simple source characterizations. Once one admits the commonly used assumption (A1) to be physically reasonable, our proof only requires the independence of the vacuum emission probability from a chosen bit, and the upper bounds \(\{ q_n\} _{n = 1}^3\) on the probabilities that a singleblock contains at least n (n ∈ {1, 2, 3}) photons. Even with these experimentally simple assumptions, we demonstrated that we can generate a secret key at the rate of about 100 bits s^{−1} for innercity QKD (\(\ell \sim 50\) km) given realistic bit error rate of 1–3%. Compared with the decoyBB84 and the RRDPS protocols, the key rate and the achievable distance of our DPS protocol are limited. This is because the keyrate scaling of our protocol is in the order of O(η^{2}), while the decoyBB84 and the RRDPS protocols can achieve scaling of O(η).
We end with some open questions.

1.
As we have only provided the security analysis in the case of three pulses in a singleblock, we leave the question about the optimal number of pulses contained in a singleblock.

2.
In a practical perspective, it is important to refine our proof to achieve an improved key rate. The DPS protocol has no limitations on surpassing the key rate scaling of O(η^{2}). Indeed, the DPS protocol with blockwise phase randomization^{25,26} can achieve the order of \(O(\eta ^{\frac{3}{2}})\) in a low bit error rate regime when the block size is larger than three. It is an interesting question whether the minimal assumptions adopted in this paper is enough or we need to make additional assumptions to achieve the same improved scaling.

3.
It is an interesting problem to construct a secure coherentstatebased DPS protocol combined with measurementdeviceindependent setting.^{31}

4.
As for Alice’s side, it is interesting to extend our security proof by relaxing the assumption (A2) to the case where the vacuum emission probability is different \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_i}^0{\mathrm{vac}}\rangle \langle {\mathrm{vac}}\, \ne\, {\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_i}^1{\mathrm{vac}}\rangle \langle {\mathrm{vac}}\), and Alice only knows the bounds on \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_i}^0{\mathrm{vac}}\rangle \langle {\mathrm{vac}}\) and \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_i}^1{\mathrm{vac}}\rangle \langle {\mathrm{vac}}\).

5.
As for Bob’s measurement unit, it is important to relax the assumption (B2) to allow the use of threshold detectors. One can extend our proof to the use of threshold detectors by following the same argument done in the paper.^{32} To extend our proof with these detectors, we need to upperbound the rate of detection events where two or more photons are received by Bob. This can be done by monitoring the number of doubleclick events occurring in a singleblock of pulses. To estimate this quantity, an optical shutter needs to be placed in a long arm of the Mach–Zehnder interferometer.
Methods
Outline
Here we prove our main result, Theorem 1. First, we introduce notations that we use in the following discussions. Second, we introduce the POVM (positive operator valued measure) elements corresponding to a bit and phase error. Third, we explain the relation between the Zbasis measurement outcome (z_{j}) on the auxiliary qubit system A_{j} and the number of photons contained in the jth emitted pulse. Finally, we prove Theorem 1 by using two lemmas, Lemmas 1 and 2. We leave the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 to Sections I and II in the Supplementary Information, respectively.
Notations
We first summarize the notations that we use in the following discussions:
for a vector ψ〉 that is not necessarily normalized, and the Kronecker delta
Furthermore, we introduce the Zbasis states of Alice’s auxiliary qubit system A as
with z = z_{1}z_{2}z_{3} and z_{i} ∈ {0, 1}, and wt(z) denotes the Hamming weight of a bit string z:
Let us define the projectors \(\hat P_a\) (with 0 ≤ a ≤ 3), \(\hat P_{{\mathrm{even}}}\) and \(\hat P_{{\mathrm{odd}}}\) as
POVM element for a detected event
We introduce POVM elements for Bob’s procedure of determining the detected time slot j and the bit value k_{B}. Based on the following procedure, Bob can determine whether the event is detected or not prior to determining j and k_{B}. Bob sends the first pulse to the first BS in Fig. 1, and after the first pulse is split, one of the pulses goes to the long arm of the Mach–Zehnder interferometer, and we call it first half pulse. Bob keeps the second pulse as it is, and sends the third pulse to the first BS. After the third pulse is split at the first BS, one of the pulses goes to the short arm of the Mach–Zehnder interferometer (we call it the third half pulse). Bob then performs the quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement of the total photon number among the first half pulse, the third half pulse and the second pulse. The detected event is equivalent to an event where the QND measurement reveals exactly one photon. If the detected event occurs, the state of the three pulses after the QND measurement is in the subspace spanned by the orthonormal basis \(\left\{ {\left {i_B} \right\rangle } \right\}_{i = 1}^3\) with i representing the position of the singlephoton (at the half pulse when i = 1, 3 and at the original pulse when i = 2). Given the detection, the POVM elements \(\left\{ {\hat {\Pi}_{j,k_B}} \right\}_{j,k_B}\) for detecting the bit k_{B} at the jth time slot (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) is given by
with
where w_{1} = w_{3} = 1 and w_{2} = 1/2.
Bit and phaseerror POVM elements
Here, we construct the bit and phaseerror POVM elements \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{bit}}}\) and \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}\), respectively. Alice and Bob measure their systems A and B just after the QND measurement reveals exactly one photon to learn whether a bit error or phase error exists. Importantly, these POVM elements are defined only on Alice’s auxiliary qubit system A and Bob’s system B, and the assumptions on the encoded states in system S do not come into their description. Therefore, even if the assumptions on Alice’s emitted states are different from those in the security proof^{26} of the DPS protocol with blockwise phase randomization, the same formulas of the bit and phaseerror POVM elements in^{26} can be used. Here, we only provide brief explanations of how to construct \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{bit}}}\) and \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}\), and refer details to ref. ^{26}
First, we introduce the POVM element \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{bit}}}^{\,j}\) corresponding to announcing the jth time slot and the occurrence of a bit error. As a bit error occurs when k_{A} (Alice’s Xbasis measurement outcome of the jth auxiliary qubit after performing \(\hat U_{{\mathrm{CNOT}}}^{(j)}\) on the jth and (j + 1)th ones) and Bob’s measurement outcome k_{B} are different, \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{bit}}}^{\,j}\) is given by
Here and henceforth, we omit identity operators on subsystems, such as those for Alice’s irrelevant auxiliary qubits in the above equation. Equation (18) is reexpressed as
This equation shows that there are no cross terms between even parity terms (\(\left {z_jz_{j + 1}} \right\rangle _{A_jA_{j + 1}}\) with z_{j} + z_{j+1} is even) and odd parity terms (\(\left {z_jz_{j + 1}} \right\rangle _{A_jA_{j + 1}}\) with z_{j} + z_{j+1} is odd). Therefore, we have
This equation can be derived more intuitively. The parity of wt(z) can be determined by measuring the auxiliary qubits in the Zbasis except for the jth one after performing \(\hat U_{{\mathrm{CNOT}}}^{(j)}\) on the jth and (j + 1)th qubits. This implies that the measurement \(\{ \hat P_{{\mathrm{even}}},\hat P_{{\mathrm{odd}}}\}\) and \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{bit}}}^{\,j}\) commute, and hence we obtain Eq. (20). Equation (20) plays an important role in proving Theorem 1.
Second, we introduce the POVM element \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}^{\,j}\) corresponding to announcing the jth time slot and the occurrence of a phase error. A phase error event is defined as an event where Alice fails her prediction of the Zbasis measurement outcome z_{j} on the jth auxiliary qubit. To enhance the accuracy of her estimation, she measures the (j + 1)th auxiliary qubit in the Z basis (with z_{j+1} denoting its result) after performing \(\hat U_{{\mathrm{CNOT}}}^{(j)}\), and Bob measures system B to learn which of the jth or (j + 1)th pulse has a singlephoton. With the help of information of z_{j+1} and Bob’s information, Alice adopts the following strategy for predicting z_{j}. As for the case of z_{j+1} = 1, if Bob reveals that the jth [(j + 1)th] pulse has a singlephoton, Alice predicts z_{j} = 1 [z_{j} = 0]. On the other hand, if z_{j+1} = 0, Alice predicts z_{j} = 0 regardless of Bob’s information. The phase error event is defined as an instance of a wrong prediction of z_{j}, and the POVM element corresponding to announcing the jth time slot and the occurrence of a phase error is represented by
Since \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}^{\,j}\) is diagonal in the basis z〉_{A}, we have
Then, by taking the sum over all the time slots, we obtain the bit and phase error operators as
It follows that the probability of having a bit error is given by \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat \sigma \hat e_{{\mathrm{bit}}}\), and the one of having a phase error is \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat \sigma \hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}\). Here, \(\hat \sigma\) denotes a state of Alice and Bob’s systems A and B just after the QND measurement reveals exactly one photon.
Relation between wt(z) and n _{block}
Here, we derive the relation between wt(z) and n_{block}. For this, we first derive the number of photons (n_{j}) contained in system S_{j} when z_{j} = 1. Recall that the assumption (A2) guarantees that \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_j}^0{\mathrm{vac}}\rangle \langle {\mathrm{vac}} = {\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_j}^1{\mathrm{vac}}\rangle \langle {\mathrm{vac}} = :P_j^{{\mathrm{vac}}}\). From this assumption, by expanding the orthonormal basis of S_{j} with the photon number states, \(\left {\psi _0} \right\rangle _{S_jR_j}\) (a purification of \(\hat \rho _{S_j}^0\)) and \(\left {\psi _1^\prime } \right\rangle _{S_jR_j}\) (a purification of \(\hat \rho _{S_j}^1\)) can be written as
Here, u_{0}〉, u_{1}〉, v_{0}〉 and v_{1}〉 are normalized vectors of system R_{j}, and \(P_{j,b_j^A}^1: = {\mathrm{tr}}\hat \rho _{S_j}^{b_j^A}1\rangle \langle 1\). Since a purification has a freedom of choosing a unitary operator \(\hat U\) on system R_{j}, the following state \(\left {\psi _1} \right\rangle _{S_jR_j}\) is also a purification of \(\hat \rho _{S_j}^1\):
In the following discussions, \(\hat U\) is chosen such that \(\hat Uv_0\rangle = u_0\rangle\) holds. Note from Eq. (5) that if z_{j} = 1, the jth state can be written as \(\left {{\mathrm{\Phi }}_  } \right\rangle _{S_jR_j}: = \left( {\left {\psi _0} \right\rangle _{S_jR_j}  \left {\psi _1} \right\rangle _{S_jR_j}} \right)/{\mathcal{N}}\), where \({\mathcal{N}}\) is an appropriate normalization constant. Using Eqs. (24) and (26) gives the vacuum emission probability of \(\left {{\mathrm{\Phi }}_  } \right\rangle _{S_jR_j}\) as
This equation means that if z_{j} = 1, the state in system S_{j} contains at least one photon. That is,
Therefore, we obtain
and from Eq. (3), the following inequality holds
Proof of Theorem 1
Here, we prove Theorem 1 in the main text. For this, we first find an upperbound on the phase error probability \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}\hat \sigma\) in terms of the bit error probability \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat e_{{\mathrm{bit}}}\hat \sigma\), which holds for any state \(\hat \sigma\). According to Eq. (21), since \(\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}\) is diagonalized in the basis z〉_{A} and \(\hat P_0\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}\hat P_0 = 0\), we have
To upperbound \({\mathrm{tr}}\hat P_1\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}}\hat P_1\hat \sigma\) with experimentally available data, we employ the following Lemmas 1 and 2 (see Sections I and II in the Supplementary Information for their proofs).
Lemma 1
with \(\lambda : = 3 + \sqrt 5\).
Lemma 2
For any density operator \(\hat \sigma\),
Applying Lemmas 1 and 2 to Eq. (31) leads to
With the relation between the bit and phase error probabilities, the next step is to derive an upper bound on the number of phase errors with experimentally available data. For this, we use Azuma’s inequality^{33} to achieve this goal. Suppose that there are N_{det} detected systems AB, and Alice and Bob sequentially measure each detected state in order. Let us consider the following specific way for choosing the sampled bits among the detected events; Alice probabilistically associates each detected event with a sample pair with probability 1 − t or a code pair with probability t, where 0 < t < 1. The sample pairs are employed for random sampling to obtain e_{bit} whereas the code pairs are for distilling secret key. For each code (sample) pair, Alice and Bob measure their systems to learn whether a phase (bit) error occurs or not. If a code (sample) pair entails a phase (bit) error, we call such an event “ph” (“bit”), otherwise we call “\(\overline {{\mathrm{ph}}}\)” (“\(\overline {{\mathrm{bit}}}\)”). Also, for each code pair, Alice measures her system A in the Zbasis to obtain the outcome wt(z) = a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Such simulataneous measurements are allowed because \([\hat e_{{\mathrm{ph}}},\hat P_a] = 0\) holds for any a (0 ≤ a ≤ 3). In this stochastic trial, the set of the measurement outcomes for each detected event is given by \({\mathcal{S}}: = \{ {\mathrm{bit}},\overline {{\mathrm{bit}}} \} \cup (\mathop {\bigcup}\nolimits_{a = 0}^3 {\{ {\mathrm{ph}} \wedge a\} } ) \cup (\mathop {\bigcup}\nolimits_{a = 0}^3 {\{ \overline {{\mathrm{ph}}} \wedge a\} } )\), and let \(\xi ^i \in {\mathcal{S}}\) denote the ith measurement outcome with 1 ≤ i ≤ N_{det}.
Next, let us introduce various parameters that are needed in later discussions. The phase error rate in the code pair and the bit error rate in the sample pair are defined as
where N_{code} and N_{sample} respectively denote the number of code and sample pairs. We define the number \(N_\Omega ^l\) of events that take \({\mathrm{\Omega }} \in {\mathcal{S}}\) among l trials as
and the sum \(P_{\mathrm{\Omega }}^l\) of probabilities of obtaining Ω at the ith trial conditioned on the previous outcomes \(\left\{ {\xi ^k} \right\}_{k = 0}^{i  1}\) with ξ^{0} being constant as
We can show that the sequence of random variables \(\{ X_\gamma ^0, \ldots ,X_\gamma ^{N_{\mathrm{det}}}\}\) (with γ ∈ {ph, bit, a}), which are defined as
and \(X_\gamma ^0: = 0\), satisfies the Martingale condition with respect to random variables \(\{ \xi ^0,\xi ^1,...,\xi ^{N_{\mathrm{det}}}\}\), that is ∀l, \(E[X_\gamma ^l\{ \xi ^k\} _{k = 0}^{l  1}] = X_\gamma ^{l  1}\). Here, E[XY] denotes the expectation of X conditioned on Y. Also, \(\{ X_\gamma ^0,...,X_\gamma ^{N_{\mathrm{det}}}\}\) satisfies a bounded difference condition, namely, ∀l, \(X_\gamma ^l  X_\gamma ^{l  1} \le 1\). Once Martingale and the bounded difference conditions are satisfied, we can apply Azuma’s inequality; it follows that ∀ζ > 0 and ∀N_{det} > 0
Since Eq. (34) holds for any \(\hat \sigma\), by using Cauchy–Schwarz inequality: \(\mathop {\sum}\nolimits_{i = 1}^m {x_iy_i} \le \sqrt {\left( {\mathop {\sum}\nolimits_{i = 1}^m {x_i^2} } \right)\left( {\mathop {\sum}\nolimits_{i = 1}^m {y_i^2} } \right)}\), we have
where \(\tilde P_{{\mathrm{ph}}}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}: = \mathop {\sum}\nolimits_{a = 0}^3 {P_{{\mathrm{ph}} \wedge a}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}}\) and \(\tilde P_a^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}: = P_{{\mathrm{ph}} \wedge a}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}} + P_{\overline {{\mathrm{ph}}} \wedge a}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}\).
By employing the consequence of Azuma’s inequality in Eq. (41) to each of all the five sums of conditional probabilities in Eq. (42), we obtain
where \(\tilde N_{{\mathrm{ph}}}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}: = \mathop {\sum}\nolimits_{a = 0}^3 {N_{{\mathrm{ph}} \wedge a}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}}\) and \(\tilde N_a^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}: = N_{{\mathrm{ph}} \wedge a}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}} + N_{\overline {{\mathrm{ph}}} \wedge a}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}\). When N_{det} gets larger with any fixed ζ > 0, the probability of violating Eq. (43) decreases exponentially. Here and henceforth, we consider the limit of large N_{det} and neglect ζ. In this asymptotic limit, as N_{code} → tN_{det} and N_{sample} → (1 − t)N_{det} in Eq. (35), we obtain
The last task for deriving the upper bound on e_{ph} is to upperbound \(\tilde N_{a \ge n}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}\) with experimentally available data. In so doing, in addition to the detected instances, we assume that Alice and Bob randomly associate each of the nondetected instances with a code instance with probability t or a sample instance with probability 1 − t. Then, we have that the the number \(\tilde N_{a \ge n}^{N_{{\mathrm{det}}}}\) of obtaining the outcome a ≥ n among the detected instances can never be larger than the one \(M_{a \ge n}^{N_{{\mathrm{em}}}}\) among the emitted code blocks. Since the probability of obtaining a code pair and the outcome a ≥ n when Alice emits the ith block is upperbounded by q_{n} according to Eq. (30), we can imagine independent trials with probability q_{n}. Therefore, we can use Chernoff bound and obtain
When the number N_{em} of emitted blocks gets larger for any fixed χ > 0, the probability of violating this inequality decreases exponentially. In the condition of asymptotic limit of N_{em}, we neglect χ in the following discussions. By substituting Eq. (45) to (44), we finally obtain
This ends the proof of Theorem 1.
Data availability
No datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.
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Acknowledgements
T.S. thanks the support from JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP18K13469. K.T. thanks the support from JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP18H05237 and JSTCREST JPMJCR 1671. This work was in part supported by Crossministerial Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP) (Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (CSTI)).
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A.M., T.S., Y.T., K.T., and M.K. contributed to the initial conception of the ideas, to the working out the details, and to the writing up the manuscript.
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Mizutani, A., Sasaki, T., Takeuchi, Y. et al. Quantum key distribution with simply characterized light sources. npj Quantum Inf 5, 87 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1038/s4153401901943
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s4153401901943