Corrigendum: Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything

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It has been drawn to our attention that the instability found here for zero determinant (ZD) strategies only applies to the set of coercive strategies we considered, which is a subset of all possible ZD strategies. In the Article, we pointed out that the set of ZD strategies investigated by Press and Dyson¹ was not stable under Darwinian evolution. We speculated that the instability we noted would hold for the extended set also; however, as discussed by Stewart and Plotkin, 2013 (see also Hilbe *et al.*, 2013), this speculation was unwarranted because the ZD strategies not studied by Press and Dyson are generous and therefore stable in an evolutionary sense.

Stewart, A. J. & Plotkin, J. B. From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **110**, 15348–15353 (2013).
Hilbe, C., Nowak, M. A. & Traulsen, A. Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance. *PLoS ONE* **8**, e77886 (2013).