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Climate negotiators’ and scientists’ assessments of the climate negotiations

Abstract

Climate negotiation outcomes are difficult to evaluate objectively because there are no clear reference scenarios. Subjective assessments from those directly involved in the negotiations are particularly important, as this may influence strategy and future negotiation participation. Here we analyse the perceived success of the climate negotiations in a sample of 656 experts involved in international climate policy. Respondents were pessimistic when asked for specific assessments of the current approach centred on voluntary pledges, but were more optimistic when asked for general assessments of the outcomes and usefulness of the climate negotiations. Individuals who were more involved in the negotiation process tended to be more optimistic, especially in terms of general assessments. Our results indicate that two reinforcing effects are at work: a high degree of involvement changes individuals’ perceptions and more optimistic individuals are more inclined to remain involved in the negotiations.

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Figure 1: Overview of outcomes that were evaluated.
Figure 2: The average estimated probability of being optimistic based on the number of conferences attended as party.
Figure 3: The average estimated probability of being optimistic in a subsample who attended two or three COPs as party.

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Acknowledgements

The work has been supported by the European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 Program, action ERC-2014-STG, Project HUCO, grant number 636746. A.T. acknowledges financial support by the Enel Foundation Grant ‘Climate Negotiations’ (RGI-U885). A.T. is supported by the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, which is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.

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A.D. and A.T. designed research; A.D. and S.Z. analysed data; A.D., S.Z. and A.T. wrote the paper.

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Correspondence to Astrid Dannenberg.

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The authors declare no competing financial interests.

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Dannenberg, A., Zitzelsberger, S. & Tavoni, A. Climate negotiators’ and scientists’ assessments of the climate negotiations. Nature Clim Change 7, 437–442 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3288

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