Perspective | Published:

Systemic risk in banking ecosystems

Nature volume 469, pages 351355 (20 January 2011) | Download Citation

Abstract

In the run-up to the recent financial crisis, an increasingly elaborate set of financial instruments emerged, intended to optimize returns to individual institutions with seemingly minimal risk. Essentially no attention was given to their possible effects on the stability of the system as a whole. Drawing analogies with the dynamics of ecological food webs and with networks within which infectious diseases spread, we explore the interplay between complexity and stability in deliberately simplified models of financial networks. We suggest some policy lessons that can be drawn from such models, with the explicit aim of minimizing systemic risk.

Access optionsAccess options

Rent or Buy article

Get time limited or full article access on ReadCube.

from$8.99

All prices are NET prices.

References

  1. 1.

    Homage to Santa Rosalia, or why are there so many kinds of animals? Am. Nat. 93, 145–159 (1959)

  2. 2.

    The Ecology of Invasions by Animals and Plants (Methuen, 1958)

  3. 3.

    Fluctuations of animal populations, and a measure of community stability. Ecology 36, 533–536 (1955)

  4. 4.

    Will a large complex system be stable? Nature 238, 413–414 (1972)

  5. 5.

    et al. Quantitative patterns in the structure of model and empirical food webs. Ecology 86, 1301–1311 (2005)

  6. 6.

    & Ecological Networks: Linking Structure to Dynamics in Food Webs (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006)

  7. 7.

    et al. Network structure and robustness of marine food webs. Mar. Ecol. Prog. Ser. 273, 291–302 (2004)

  8. 8.

    Network structure and the biology of populations. Trends Ecol. Evol. 21, 394–399 (2006)

  9. 9.

    Disentangling the web of life. Science 325, 416–419 (2009)

  10. 10.

    & Cooperative network dynamics. Nature 458, 979–980 (2009)

  11. 11.

    et al. Compilation and network analyses of Cambrian food webs. PLoS Biol. 6, e102 (2008)

  12. 12.

    Rethinking the financial network. 〈〉 (2009)

  13. 13.

    Preventing system failure. Cent. Banking 21, 69–75 (2010)The survey of recent thinking about financial networks, in lay language.

  14. 14.

    Market force, ecology and evolution. Ind. Corp. Change 11, 895–953 (2002)

  15. 15.

    The $100 billion question. 〈〉 (2010)

  16. 16.

    Chairman’s Letter. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2002 Annual Report 15. (2002)A prescient and clearly expressed warning of problems inherent in derivatives.

  17. 17.

    & General Black-Scholes models accounting for increased market volatility from hedging strategies. Appl. Math. Finance 5, 45–82 (1998)

  18. 18.

    & A market-induced mechanism for stock pinning. Quantit. Finance 3, 417–425 (2003)

  19. 19.

    Macro lessons from microstructure. Int. J. Finance Econ. 11, 55–80 (2006)

  20. 20.

    , & More hedging instruments may destabilise markets. J. Econ. Dynam. Cont. 33, 1912–1928 (2008)

  21. 21.

    , & Eroding market stability by proliferation of financial instruments. Eur. Phys. J. B 71, 467–479 (2009)A sophisticated and important analysis of a major flaw in the pricing of derivatives.

  22. 22.

    Introduction to Mathematical Finance: Discrete Time Models (Blackwell, 1997)

  23. 23.

    & Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica 22, 265–290 (1954)

  24. 24.

    Stability and Complexity in Model Ecosystems (Princeton Univ. Press, 1973)

  25. 25.

    , , & Network models and financial stability. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 31, 2033–2060 (2007)

  26. 26.

    & Contagion in financial networks. Proc. R. Soc. A 466, 2401–2423 (2010)

  27. 27.

    & Systemic risk: the dynamics of model banking systems. J. R. Soc. Interface 7, 823–838 (2010)

  28. 28.

    & Liquidity hoarding, network externalities, and interbank market collapse. Proc. R. Soc. A 466, 2401–2423 (2010)

  29. 29.

    et al. Economic networks: the new challenges. Science 325, 422–425 (2009)

  30. 30.

    , & Complex systems: ecology for bankers. Nature 451, 893–895 (2008)A brief overview of the 2006 NAS/FRBNY study on systemic risk.

  31. 31.

    et al. Network and eigenvalue analysis of financial transaction networks. Eur. Phys. J. B 71, 523–531 (2009)

  32. 32.

    , & Networks of sexual contacts: implications for the pattern of spread of HIV. AIDS 3, 807–818 (1989)

  33. 33.

    et al. The architecture of mutualistic networks minimizes competition and increases biodiversity. Nature 458, 1018–1020 (2009)

  34. 34.

    et al. Tolerance of pollination networks to species extinctions. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 271, 2605–2611 (2004)

  35. 35.

    , , , & Liaisons dangereuses: increasing connectivity, risk sharing and systemic risk. 〈〉 (2009)

  36. 36.

    Contagion, liberalization, and the optimal structure of globalization. J. Global. Develop. (in the press)

  37. 37.

    Banking on the state. 〈〉 (2009)This gives a more full account of the policy issues discussed here.

  38. 38.

    & Infectious Diseases of Humans: Transmission and Control Ch.12.3 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1991)

  39. 39.

    Linked: The New Science of Networks (Perseus, 2002)

  40. 40.

    Bank of England. The role of macroprudential policy: a discussion paper. 〈〉 (2009)

  41. 41.

    The debate on financial system resilience: macroprudential instruments. 〈〉 (2009)

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to colleagues (particularly S. Kapadia, N. Arinaminpathy and G. Sugihara), who made many helpful comments and constructive criticisms.

Author information

Affiliations

  1. Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London EC2R 8AH, UK

    • Andrew G. Haldane
  2. Zoology Department, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 3PS, UK

    • Robert M. May

Authors

  1. Search for Andrew G. Haldane in:

  2. Search for Robert M. May in:

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing financial interests.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Robert M. May.

About this article

Publication history

Published

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1038/nature09659

Further reading

Comments

By submitting a comment you agree to abide by our Terms and Community Guidelines. If you find something abusive or that does not comply with our terms or guidelines please flag it as inappropriate.