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Abstract

Replying to: G. Kahane & N. Shackel Nature 452, doi:10.1038/nature06785 (2008)

Kahane and Shackel argue1, on the basis of a re-classification of the moral scenarios used in our study2, that our conclusion of a utilitarian bias among patients with ventromedial–prefrontal–cortex (VMPC) damage is unwarranted. Here we provide a re-analysis of our data based on precisely the classification scheme that Kahane and Shackel suggest. This re-analysis confirms our conclusion that damage to the VMPC results in an increase in utilitarian judgements.

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References

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Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R. et al. Koenigs et al. reply. Nature 452, E5–E6 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1038/nature06804

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