A Manufactured Plague: The History of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Britain

  • Abigail Woods
Earthscan: 2004. 224 pp. £19.99, $35 1844070808 | ISBN: 1-844-07080-8
Control measure: disinfectant sprays have been used for a century to stop the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. Credit: DEPT OF AGRICULTURE & TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION FOR IRELAND

The 2001 epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in Britain will long be remembered by the farming community. But why? Because of the terrible suffering and high death rate of animals unfortunate enough to be infected? Or is it little to do with the disease itself and more to do with the reaction to it?

In this excellent book, Abigail Woods presents a compelling case that during FMD epidemics in Britain over the past century or so, it was the action taken by the agencies charged with controlling the disease that caused suffering in the farming community, rather than FMD itself. The disease is not, Woods argues, as fearsome as it is widely perceived to be. Foot-and-mouth disease is not a ‘natural plague’ of animals like, for example, rinderpest, which can spread rapidly and has, in the past, killed millions during pandemics. Rather, it is a manufactured plague — the suffering associated with it is largely of our own making.

How did this come about? Woods provides a fascinating account of the history of FMD in Britain, from its first discovery in 1839 to its most recent appearance in 2001. She shows how the disease was transformed from being a minor affliction to one of the most feared of all livestock diseases.

A key event in this transformation was the 1865–67 rinderpest epidemic in Britain, which killed one out of every 15 cattle. Traditional control measures failed and the disease was finally checked by slaughtering all the infected animals and their contacts, and placing restrictions on cattle movements. These control measures were found to reduce the spread of FMD as well. However, at the time FMD was considered to be a mild disease and, accordingly, the UK government's Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869, laid out more lenient control measures for FMD than for rinderpest; notably, FMD-infected animals needed only to be isolated until their recovery, not slaughtered.

These measures failed to control an epidemic of FMD that, coincidentally, arose in 1869. Opinion was divided over whether FMD was a serious disease that merited stringent control measures, including a ban on live-animal imports, or whether it was largely inconsequential. The former view was held by upper-class farmers of pedigree stock and Tory members of parliament (MPs), whose own animals would increase in value should live animal imports be stopped. The latter view was supported by Liberal and urban MPs, who were concerned about maintaining the meat supply to the working classes and the principle of free trade.

Opinion gradually settled on FMD being a serious disease. All livestock imports were banned in 1884 and, in 1892, an act of parliament ordered the slaughter of animals infected with FMD. Woods attributes this transformation to several factors, including the greater influence of pedigree breeders and Tory MPs; the greater susceptibility of new breeds of livestock developed in Britain at that time; and the growing importance of meat and milk to British agriculture, which meant that losses from FMD were felt more keenly. But the most important factor, Woods contends, was the legislation used to control the disease. She writes: “FMD-as-plague wasn't always ‘out there’ in nature, awaiting discovery by enlightened individuals. It was a new creation, a by-product of the processes involved in its control. And as this new vision of FMD grew in strength, its social origins were gradually obscured, until it came to be viewed as an incontrovertible fact of nature.”

The control measures were successful and, after 1885, Britain experienced nearly 40 years with only a handful of FMD outbreaks. Woods thinks that the agency responsible for British farming acquired a taste for freedom from FMD that, subsequently, it could not give up. Small outbreaks were easily controlled by the slaughter of infected animals and their contacts. Large outbreaks tested this approach to its limit, often with no sign of disease control in sight, despite the culling of large numbers of livestock. In all cases, however, wholesale slaughter remained the principal control method, and alternatives, such as letting the epidemic take its course or, since the 1950s, vaccination, were ignored. In Woods' view, this stubborn approach, which has cost the lives of millions of animals, is mistaken.

A Manufactured Plague is a delight to read. Too many popular-science books today seem to be little more than adverts for the erudition and breadth of knowledge of the author, or are the work of a non-specialist with a good idea. Woods, a graduate of both veterinary medicine and the history of medicine, has written a book that resounds with her depth of knowledge of the subject matter. This account of the history of FMD in Britain, and its political context, will be enjoyed by anyone interested in the disease, whether scientist or student, legislator or farmer.

Woods provides detailed accounts of most of Britain's FMD outbreaks over the past hundred years, but the one disappointment is the relatively short shrift given to the 2001 epidemic: it receives only six pages, compared with 20 or more for the epidemics of 1922–24 and 1967–68. It is the 2001 epidemic, more than any other, to which the concept of a ‘manufactured plague’ can be most readily applied. In 2001, fewer farms were affected than in the two aforementioned outbreaks, but 20–30 times as many animals were slaughtered. Woods alludes briefly to the role of mathematical models in directing this control policy but, regrettably, steers clear of detailed analysis.