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Human behaviour

Don't lose your reputation

Nature volume 432, pages 449–450 (2004)Cite this article

Collective action in large groups whose members are genetically unrelated is a distinguishing feature of the human species. Individual reputations may be a key to a satisfactory evolutionary explanation.

The puzzle behind this cooperation can be summarized as follows. Institutions that enhance within-group cooperation typically benefit all group members. The effect of a single group member on the institution's success is negligible, but the contribution cost is not negligible for the individual. Why, therefore, should a self-interested individual pay the cost of sustaining cooperative institutions? More generally, why should a self-interested individual contribute anything to a public good that — once it exists — an individual can consume regardless of whether he contributed or not? On page 499 of this issue2, Panchanathan and Boyd substantially advance the scope of reputation-based models3,4,5 and show that individuals' concern for their reputation may be a solution to this puzzle.

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Figure 1: Call to arms.

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  1. the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Blumlisalpstrasse 10, Zurich, CH-8006, Switzerland

    Ernst Fehr

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  1. Ernst Fehr
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Fehr, E. Don't lose your reputation. Nature 432, 449–450 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1038/432449a

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