

aware that he may be asked what are his qualifications for the necessary degree of scientific impartiality and aloofness, seeing that a man can no more get away from his own upbringing than he can get away from his own shadow. To meet this objection, he gives enough of his personal history to enable the reader to judge for himself.

At an early point in his inquiry, Prof. Pear states a curious fact which has probably escaped the attention of many serious students of psychology. No living English professional psychologist appears to have come from any of the great public schools, no matter how strictly or loosely you define 'great'. We have no account of his social psychology, "written by one who not only sympathises with but 'empathises' their special culture pattern". We lack also a corresponding description of his way of living by a proletarian psychologist. Until recently, "our English social psychology has been written by the middle class about the middle class". He says this fact is well known; it is no doubt well known to some people.

Prof. Pear concludes his fresh and interesting investigation by expressing his full agreement with Prof. D. W. Brogan's opinion, that "politically England is a democracy, perhaps the most mature democracy in the world. But democracy is not merely a matter of government—it is an attitude to life. And England will not be a full or anything like a full democracy as long as one of the kindest and most united peoples in the world is internally divided in a fashion that impoverishes the national life".

Such is the verdict of one who has done his utmost to pursue scientific truth, wherever it may lead him.

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NATURALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

(1) Verifiability of Value

By Ray Lepley. (Columbia Studies in Philosophy, No. 7.) Pp. xi+267. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1944.) 22s. net.

(2) Naturalism and the Human Spirit

Edited by Yervant H. Krikorian. (Columbia Studies in Philosophy, No. 8.) Pp. x+397. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1944.) 30s. net.

THESE two books are expositions of the naturalistic philosophy now popular in the United States and mainly derived from the teaching of John Dewey. The starting point is the view that scientific methods of investigation are valid for all spheres of thought and action. These Naturalists, however, do not use the arbitrary restrictive criteria of truth and verifiability of the Logical Positivists, and therefore their theory does not run counter to actual scientific practice as Positivism does. So far as the argument in Lepley's book is designed to show that judgments of value can be accommodated within the scientific scheme just as easily as judgments of fact and that they do constantly occur, it is evidently sound. Those essays in Krikorian's book which are straightforward inquiries into specific subjects are well done. Thus, Eliseo Vivas on "A Natural History of the Aesthetic Transaction", George Boas on "The History of Philosophy", Edward W. Strong on "The Materials of Historical Knowledge", the editor on "A Naturalistic View of Mind" and, especially,

Ernest Nagel on "Logic Without Ontology" make valuable contributions to their subjects—so far as they go. These essays display the best aspect of Dewey's teaching; they are careful, fair-minded, undogmatic.

It is when they come to questions which are most genuinely philosophical, those concerned with underlying presuppositions, that writers of this school tend to shirk or fumble. Lepley, in the first volume, argues that judgments of fact and of value, descriptive and normative judgments, occur together inseparably connected and that both sorts are found equally within the sphere of science, as ordinarily understood, and the spheres of art and morals; that verification in science, though perhaps simpler and easier, is not radically different from verification in art or morals. All this may be granted. But he fails to observe that discussion on matters of art and morals constantly turns on questions of ends, as distinct from questions of means where the factual and causal element enters. In scientific discussion, ends are taken for granted and are not discussed, so that all ordinary judgments that are in any way valuational or normative are judgments of means only. Lepley does not consider whether a judgment about an end, say truth or justice, can be dealt with naturalistically: whether science can produce criteria to judge the value of its own method.

Similar defects appear in those essays in the second volume which should deal with such problems. In the one on "Naturalism and Democracy" by Sidney Hook, we are given to understand that the justification of democracy is that it is an experiment designed to realize certain moral ideals which is in fact successful; also that the moral ideals are hypotheses requiring empirical verification. Thus, if Hitler had won the War, the writer would presumably have decided that the democratic experiment had failed and the related hypotheses were false. Both Hook and Sterling P. Lamprecht, who writes on "Naturalism and Religion", consider that there is not enough empirical evidence to justify the hypothesis of theism, but the evidence is not examined; nor is there any attempt to discover those ends of thought and action of which religion is the expression. The writers appear to be following fashionable opinion instead of examining their presuppositions. Similar criticisms apply to other essays. This does not mean that their presuppositions are not in fact sensible and their positive statements also sensible. It only means that they have neglected their philosophical duty. Nothing is said to prevent Naturalism from sinking to intellectual indolence. Science is fashionable; so let us call our opinions on any subject scientific and then stop thinking.

The essay on the Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge by Harry Todd Costello (containing a pleasing story about Bernard Shaw) is puzzling, as are the other references to Woodbridge, because no writer of recent years has so neatly and effectively displayed the defects of Naturalism ("An Essay on Nature", 1940, p. 265ff.). Three other essays should be mentioned. One, on "The Unnatural", a good piece of metaphysical argument, seems rather out of place among its companions. One, on "Naturalism and the Sociological Analysis of Knowledge", may be excellent but is written in a difficult dialect of jargonese. Finally, there is an essay by the octogenarian Dewey, who attacks the things he dislikes with a vigour that puts more youthful disciples to shame.

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