reading, for it contains much incidental wisdom, mainly of a practical kind. I will conclude by quoting some sentences which express a truth needing to be emphasized. "It is time for some statesman or philosopher, some modern Plato, to draw up a Bill of Duties to match and balance our Bill of Rights. It is said that society owes every man a living, leisure, opportunity, freedom, but there is less emphasis upon what every man owes to society. There are no human rights that have not been earned by human effort, no social rights that are not balanced against social duties". W. R. MATTHEWS.

PROF. MOORE AND PHILOSOPHY

The Philosophy of G. E. Moore

Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. (The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 4.) Pp. xvi+717. (Evans-ton and Chicago: Northwestern University; London: Cambridge University Press, 1942.) 30s. net.

THIS book tries to reproduce the conditions of a seminar. There is a common theme: the philosophy of G. E. Moore; there are nineteen philosophers, considering, interpreting and criticizing Moore's presuppositions, approach and philosophic method—both in general and in the specific cases of ethics and the theory of perception; there is, finally, a lengthy answer by Prof. Moore in which he takes up some of the points raised and deals with them with particular relish for fine detail, avoiding, however, treatment of more general problems.

The nineteen essays seem quite independent of each other. None of the authors appears to have had the opportunity of taking account of the content of other contributions. I do not suggest that an agreement about views and a fusion of the exposition would have been desirable; but, if collaboration had been possible, some repetition of arguments in the five hundred pages of criticism might have been avoided and a more connected vision of Moore's philosophy achieved. The lack of collaboration is probably due to quite external circumstances, but the nature of Prof. Moore's reply cannot be thus accounted for. I cannot be alone in my poignant regret that G. E. Moore, after fifty years of philosophizing, embodied in reviews, essays, lectures and only one full-length book, did not give us—instead of a hundred and fifty pages of disconnected detail—a systematic account of his present philosophic position.

But I may be asking for the wrong thing. Perhaps it is not paradoxical to suggest in the face of this very voluminous book called "The Philosophy of G. E. Moore" that there is no such thing as the philosophy of G. E. Moore. There is indeed something: the attitude of G. E. Moore, and G. E. Moore's doubts, even bewilderment, about different philosophies. Something, I think, must here be said about this attitude. But I cannot hope to reproduce in a few words any of the important and penetrating things said by experts in this volume; nor dare I, without the opportunity for elaborate reasoning, contradict their points.

This book also contains an important weapon for the criticism of Moore's philosophic attitude, namely, his autobiography. This weapon, I suppose, has not been at the disposal of his nineteen critics. There is a method of philosophic criticism which is perhaps not universally recognized as fair and relevant; it

is Nietzsche's 'unmasking'; that is, the tracing back of philosophic views to personal attitudes. If the autobiography—unlike the photographs included—is instrumental to the work's main purpose of philosophic elucidation, it can only suggest this method. If I seem to administer a kick from behind, I must insist that I have been specially led to take up this position. I quote an illuminating passage from the autobiography: "I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophic problems. What has suggested philosophic problems to me are things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences . . . first, the problem of trying to get really clear as to what on earth a given philosopher meant by something which he said, and, secondly, the problem of discovering what really satisfactory reasons there are for supposing that what he meant was true, or alternatively, was false".

I think that Moore's unwillingness to give an author the benefit of the doubt or to try to see—behind the inevitable misuse of language and the cramping effort of philosophic creation—that important insight and satisfactory vision flows from the attitude expressed in the quotation. It is from this point of view that he insists that he does not understand unless he is told in plain English. (Thus, for example, his surprising refusal to understand the word 'postulate' and therefore Mr. Edel's essay.) He is more interested in the minute inconsistencies of terminology than in the broad issues of which they are the vehicle.

Equally his defence of common sense flows from his preference for criticism to philosophic creation. While a defence of common sense may be a salutary corrective to some rash philosophic views, an imaginative conception of philosophy will not see in common sense an independent criterion, but only the popularized philosophy of the day before yesterday.

A different yet connected aspect of Moore's attitude is his position as reviver of 'realism'. I suggest that 'realism' as much as 'idealism' flows from, and is in an important sense largely an expression of, an experience of the way in which a mind works. This is certainly less than the last word about those philosophic schools, but perhaps more than an empirical statement of psychology. Moore's incapacity for, or mistrust of, creative speculation has led him to resign the claim of the mind-dependence of the world, just as Bradley's exuberance of creative force which speaks through his style and imagery tempted him into the elevation of mind to despotic power.

I have no space in which to make fully explicit the presuppositions of my approach. I have not undertaken to decide about the truth of philosophies or to pass value judgments upon them. It is perhaps obvious from my account that I believe much of Prof. Moore's approach futile. But it would be both useless and improper to assert a judgment without the opportunity for a full exposition of reasons. Only the utility of the whole work is here under consideration.

Moore's is a distinctive philosophic attitude which has exercised considerable influence. The critical consideration of this attitude and the ramifications symptomatic of its influence, together with his reply, certainly represents an important document about the state of philosophy in our time, and is rich in suggestions for the future critical historian of twentieth-century philosophy.

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