Australian fauna, to the gain of science. Nor was Gilbert a mere collector. It was surely a remarkable thing that, even when short of food, clothing and every other necessity and at the end of a day of hardships, he would sit down and write several thousand words on the habits of birds and beasts observed during the day. To those who have experienced even a minor degree of such conditions it must appear still more remarkable that he wrote all his notes neatly with pen and ink. He had the true spirit of science, and Chisholm is to be thanked for letting us know more about John Gilbert the naturalist as distinct from John Gilbert the man who collected for Gould.

The reviewer has only one regret after reading this valuable addition to our knowledge of birds and men in the early days of Australia. Surely the title—"Strange New World"—is a trivial and even misleading one under which to launch so important a contribution to biography. F. WOOD JONES.

OBITER DICTA OF A SOCIOLOGIST

Diagnosis of Our Time

Wartime Essays of a Sociologist. By Karl Mannheim. (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.) Pp. xi+179. (London: Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd., 1943.) 10s. 6d. net.

PROF. MANNHEIM has achieved a position of deserved distinction among sociologists as the author of "Ideology and Utopia". In the present volume he gathers together a number of his addresses delivered to audiences as diverse as the staff members of the University of Durham and the listeners-in of the B.B.C. overseas broadcasts.

In his addresses on education he shows an approach that is in many ways typically Continental and which, in my experience, shows itself whenever the representatives of European universities, secular or Catholic in type, meet representatives of the universities of the English-speaking world. Values are known, Prof. Mannheim feels, and the educator must teach them. In the English-speaking world there is a persistent (and to my mind valuable) prejudice to the effect that truth has to be groped for and that, when 'values are taught' dogmatically, this generally ends by meaning that the schools will teach whatever particular set of values the government and politicians of the day find convenient—whether it be the commandment of the Decalogue "Thou shalt not kill" or conversely the maxim *dulce et decorum est pro patria occidere*. Either way the pure light of disinterested inquiry is smoked.

Prof. Mannheim, however, performs a very valuable service in raising this issue of values, even if his language occasionally seems too guarded and discreet and as if he had the sense of being a guest. Mr. Lewis Mumford and Dr. Archibald MacLeish have raised this issue in the United States and, in a very different but more profound sense, Mr. Herbert Read has done so in Great Britain, as have various theological writers such as Niebuhr and Berdyaev. Prof. Mannheim has my sympathy in endeavouring, unlike the last-named, to state his values in humanistic terms. Like Dr. Peter Drucker he is concerned with what he calls "planning for freedom", and the type of civilization of which he approves, neither National Socialist nor National Communist, fits into this

framework. He rightly insists that although we can perhaps teach mathematics, we cannot teach, for example, history, without a sense of social values (which does not mean that it is futile to try to teach history or political science 'objectively'). If this sense is not permitted explicit expression, then, as with the village atheist teaching in the village church school, it finds expression covertly. We have to decide whether we approve of the current worship of 'dynamism' and of what Dr. Mannheim calls "the demoniac image" (by some others called "the heroic image") "of man emphasizing power and the military virtues of discipline", etc. I am frank to say that I myself, holding very strongly views which I imagine are those of Prof. Mannheim, would yet like to see senior schools in which both views—the dynamic-heroic (or demoniac) and the religious-quietist—were taught. I agree with Plato—and I suspect disagree with Prof. Mannheim—in believing that the human race is not monotonous and all cut out of one cloth, but functional—some natural economic Marxists, some natural Fascists or pro-Fascists (such people, for example, as some of our most vocal patriots and contemplatives, bomber-leaders), and some natural or rulers (spiritually or techno-oratorically speaking). The real problem of values is to give to each of these attitudes due weight and no more than due weight.

Prof. Mannheim obviously distrusts the Marxist basically economic interpretation of history; is concerned about the excesses of an industrial civilization; touches on that question of neighbour relations now preoccupying the mind of MacMurray, Heard and others under the name of 'community' (incidentally resurrecting the good Prof. Cooley). He assumes, unlike Prof. Laski, "fundamental agreement on the method of experiment" in our democracy. He aspires to develop a philosophy of 'the middle way' between *laissez faire* and totalitarianism. I myself, having sought precisely such a middle way in my "Preface to Action", and found it, as between Germany and the U.S.S.R., as the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of experiment, or what Dr. Fromm calls 'spontaneity', am now inclined to the more pessimistic belief that a rhythm occurs in history between the extremes, and that the only remedy for the extremity of the extreme is to be found in a humanistic scepticism about what can be achieved in the formally political or governmental sphere. What matters are the outlooks of societies rather than the forms of government. What really matters is the conformity of local institutions to the simple human intuitions, and not this plan or that plan as a creed or as more than an empiric instrument to be discarded at convenience. There can be a 'planned freedom' for a steel worker in need of employment and sport; I do not see how there can be a planned freedom, in any profound sense, for an artist of vision. He will have to find his own 'like-minded society'. Freedom, in the last resort, is not a political matter (despite Prof. Mannheim's antithesis of individual and society, meaning society-under-government) but a spiritual matter. However, that what is here called "value standardization" is not only possible in small communities but also can be successful in large is shown by the example of China. I put down this book with the feeling that I should like to see many of its central ideas further developed, and with a desire to be present at a debate between Dr. Mannheim and Dr. Niebuhr. I should be an impartial arbiter.

GEORGE CATLIN.