

# NATURE

No. 3773 SATURDAY, FEB. 21, 1942 Vol. 149

## CONTENTS

	Page
International Aspects of Reconstruction . . . . .	201
Domination or Relationship? By H. G. Baynes . . . . .	203
The Endocrine Organs in Health and Disease. By Dr. F. H. A. Marshall, C.B.E., F.R.S. . . . .	204
Scientific Child-study. By T. Raymont . . . . .	204
Engineering Design . . . . .	205
Galileo Galilei, 1564—1642. By Prof. H. C. Plummer, F.R.S. . . . .	206
Food and Agriculture . . . . .	208
Preparation of Perspective Diagrams. By Dr. C. D. Hobson . . . . .	209
Obituaries :	
Prof. R. S. Seton. By Prof. N. M. Comber . . . . .	213
Prof. J. P. d'Albuquerque. By Sir Algernon Aspinall, K.C.M.G., C.B.E. . . . .	213
News and Views . . . . .	214
Letters to the Editors :	
Hydrogen Bonds Involving the Sulphur Atom.—T. G. Heafield, G. Hopkins and Dr. L. Hunter . . . . .	218
Quantum Efficiency of Photosynthesis.—Prof. E. C. C. Baly, C.B.E., F.R.S. . . . .	218
Waves and Tidal Streams.—P. J. H. Unna . . . . .	219
Normal Rumen Microflora and Microfauna of Cattle.—Frank Baker . . . . .	220
Afferent Innervation of Mammalian Abdominal Viscera.—W. Burns . . . . .	221
Biology and War.—Sir John Graham Kerr, M.P., F.R.S. . . . .	221
Research Items . . . . .	222
Evolution in the Petroleum Industry . . . . .	224
The Lightning Discharge . . . . .	224
South African Prehistory. By M. C. Burkitt . . . . .	225
Drug Production in the British Empire . . . . .	225

*Editorial and Publishing Offices*  
MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.,  
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON, W.C.2

Telephone Number : Whitehall 8831  
Telegrams : Phusis Lesquare London

*Advertisements should be addressed to*  
T. G. Scott & Son, Ltd., Three Gables, London Road, Merstham, Surrey  
Telephone: Merstham 316

The annual subscription rate is £4 10 0, payable in advance, Inland or Abroad  
All rights reserved. Registered as a Newspaper at the General Post Office

## INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF RECONSTRUCTION

BEFORE the United States entered the War, the question of Anglo-American co-operation after the War and the implications of the fifth article of the Atlantic Charter were under discussion, and attempts were being made to face the more obvious difficulties which will confront the world in the years to come. Speeches by Mr. Attlee and Mr. Eden, as well as by Mr. Sumner Welles, revealed agreement not only on ultimate purpose but also on some of the measures by which those purposes should be pursued. Mr. Eden's broadcast following his visit to Moscow showed that the confidence entertained that the Soviet Government will fully support those purposes and measures is well founded. Moreover, the announcement made by President Roosevelt during Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that all barriers to the full pooling of reserves between Canada and the United States would be removed, in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint War Production Committee of Canada and the United States, indicates that unity of command in the military, naval and air operations is being accompanied by equal unity in the economic sphere.

The tendency to unity has thus been greatly accelerated by Japanese aggression, and the disturbance in the economic sphere arising out of the immediate Japanese gains in Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines and Borneo raises problems in the sphere of production and war economy no less difficult than those offered to war strategy and tactics in the military or naval sphere. Only concerted economic policy can enable the available resources of the free nations to be devoted to the maximum production essential for the overthrow of the aggressor nations. The effort and sacrifices required of every citizen in the nations linked together in the defence of freedom must be inspired by a common policy, just as the efforts of the armed forces must be guided by a grand strategy.

The Washington and Moscow conferences have clearly laid the foundations for such a policy in the prosecution of the War, and there are equally clear indications that concerted measures and policy will not be laid aside immediately the War comes to an end. There may be differences of opinion as to the extent to which effort can at present be devoted to planning while the war effort has still to reach its peak, but Mr. Churchill's speech to Congress shows that the lessons of twenty-five years ago are impressed on the minds of our leaders; that it is no empty hope, in the words of his peroration, that "the British and American peoples will for their own safety and for the good of all walk together in majesty, in justice and in peace". The urgent needs of war are fashioning habits and weapons of co-operation that it would be the height of folly to destroy before we have determined how far or with what modifications they might equally serve the purposes of peace.

Much indeed has happened to give impetus to Anglo-American co-operation since Mr. Harold Butler wrote so wisely and presciently of it in his

brilliant book "The Lost Peace". Our hopes both of economic revival and of a stable peace rest largely on the assumption by the English-speaking countries of their responsibilities for leadership in a bold and broad spirit. Such leadership, in which constructive statesmanship, stimulated by the strong social consciousness manifest in both countries and in the Dominions, with as general objective not only the restoration of economic stability but also the progressive improvement of standards throughout the Continent, may well prove the surest way of consolidating our friendship and understanding with the Soviet Government, and of enlisting a degree of willing co-operation from the neutral as well as Allied Governments which would not be obtained by any political appeal.

Given both the general objective and the broad lines of policy, there are still many difficult problems to be resolved before even at the end of hostilities effective action in their furtherance is possible. There is the problem of the future of Germany inherent in the realization of such a common primary aim as that of ensuring that German aggression shall never endanger the peace of the world. There is the related problem of the basis of a system of collective security on which Mr. Butler writes succinctly and sagely. There are all the immense problems of re-starting the economic life of the world, the planning of post-war industry, the reconstruction of world trade and the like, with the further complications in the way of supplies and diversion or redistribution of industrial activity which the outbreak of war in the Far East has already necessitated.

If we are not to be overwhelmed by the magnitude of so stupendous a task or engulfed in non-essentials and irrelevances, the clear recognition of ultimate objectives and of fundamental principles is essential. Only so can we keep a sense of perspective when we come to the discussion of particular intricate problems, as Prof. J. B. Condliffe has done in a recent admirable analysis of the reconstruction of world trade\*. In its absence, a certain air of unreality is attached to some of the discussions on the machinery of international organization like federal union. Mr. Butler suggests that the British and American peoples will go farther and faster along the road together if they keep their national identities, than if they try to merge them in a common government, which would not be palatable to either. What matters most is in fact not the form of the machinery or organization but the spirit in which it is used. The machinery can be modified or shaped to reach the desired purpose, given the spirit and the will, but in their absence any machinery may be wrecked or left idle. That, as Mr. Butler sees it, is essentially the lesson of the last peace. For lack of will and lack of vision, organization which might have served the peace was never really used, and unless we can bring to the service of the new order of security and peace something which will inspire the coming generations with the same enthusiasm and the same spirit of sacrifice that the defence of freedom now evokes in the youth

\* The Reconstruction of World Trade. By Prof. J. B. Condliffe. Pp. 427. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1941.) 12s. 6d. net.

of so many lands in war, that new order will not be durable. In the great tasks ahead of us we have to enlist all the idealism and devotion of the best men and women in the world. As Mr. Butler reminds us, love and charity are the only foundations upon which a real civilization can be built, and a real and lasting peace will come only when the notion of service is expanded beyond national boundaries and foreign policy is guided by Oliver Cromwell's maxim: "God has not brought us hither where we are but to consider the work we may do in the world as well as at home".

From such a constructive idealism our plans and our lines of advance must start. With it must go the readiness to learn the lessons of the past and to shape new methods if the old or traditional ones are inadequate to our purpose. The sober realism that tempers Mr. Butler's judgment on the last peace must guide our handling of the reconstruction that will begin when the War ends, and of the planning and preparation that must already be put in hand. We cannot postpone this realistic attempt to organize the economic and political life of the world on broader, more international lines. We can avoid the mistake of thinking of the world in nineteenth-century terms, which did so much to lose the last peace, and we can profit from the failure of our first experience in organizing the world for peace by reading its lessons aright.

Fortunately, much of our experience in the War itself is forcing us to recognize not merely the economic unification of the world under the pressure of technical progress but also the political consequences, just as organization being established to serve immediate war purposes is equally apt to serve those of economic relief after the War. We should recognize further not only that some new form of international organization is indispensable if war is to be banished, but also with that the extent to which our civilization still owes its vitality, its culture and its rich diversity to the national ideal. Sound opinions on vital aspects of post-war policy must, as an admirable report of the Committee on Reconstruction produced by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, issued for private circulation, points out, be based on accurate information, and much in the programme of inquiries suggested by the committee is relevant to the winning of the War. No policy based on reason can be consistently and effectively applied in the absence of a certain degree of unity and steadiness in the public mind.

It is the function of the discussions and inquiries proceeding to contribute to the formation of sound public opinion as well as to the maintenance of moral and the provision of a basis for policy and action at the right time. In all this, preservation of a sane balance is a first essential. A sane balance between town and country is a prime requirement in national policy and stability. Social equilibrium is the first requisite of political stability, and ultimately the political, economic and social security of nations depends mainly on the extent to which the conjugation of their national policies is calculated to prevent international disorder and secure economic

stability. The reconciliation of both national and international needs under the stress of war is being effected under our eyes. It will issue in a durable peace when men, as in science itself, are the servants of some purpose capable of satisfying their spiritual instincts and setting them on a new adventure in the quest of higher things.

## DOMINATION OR RELATIONSHIP?

### The Impulse to Dominate

By D. W. Harding. Pp. 256. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1941.) 7s. 6d. net.

ANY serious attempt to survey the psychological causes of war is noteworthy. But a work which leads logically and inevitably to the conclusion that war is inherent in our social pattern, relying as this essentially does upon dominative and prestige values, must challenge our best attention. In D. W. Harding's book, the author traces our individual failure in responsibility to two main problems. On one hand we need to become aware of certain unconscious tendencies which have fostered, and still maintain, the relation of domination or submission as the evolutionary ground-pattern in the development of our social and international relationships. On the other hand, the extreme complexity of the political issues of the great modern States makes it well-nigh impossible for the inexperienced citizen, however intelligent, to participate responsibly in the crucial decisions of statesmanship. Since little can be done to reduce the latter factor to manageable proportions, the author wisely focuses attention upon those unconscious tendencies which can be largely modified through the cultivation of psychological responsibility.

Without minimizing the contribution which Freud and his followers have made in reducing the cause of war to the existence of infantile aggression and sadism, the author trims the balance by bringing into relief the basic dominative pattern which pervades our whole social atmosphere and which, therefore, must be regarded as a *representation collective* (Lévy-Bruhl), namely, an emotional preconception which everybody acts upon but nobody thinks.

Inasmuch as the author has called his work "The Impulse to Dominate", one could have wished for more enlightenment on the immense biological tail which civilized man has to draw after him in the realm of these archaic instincts. The general relation of the impulse to dominate to an underlying sense of insecurity is correctly stressed, but the perspective whereby this civilized mechanism is seen to derive its original dynamism from the primordial state whence, through the creation of communal solidarity, precarious solitariness was converted into a status of biological power and superiority, is strangely omitted. The author discusses Perry's anthropological evidence in support of the theory that violence is a cultural product and not, therefore, indigenous to our fundamental instinctual make-up. But Perry's contention that aggressiveness is a kind of diffusional accident is shown to be psychologically untenable, since it is impossible to believe that human beings could have built up a fundamental social structure which had no relation to their basal instincts. The fact that certain primitive tribes make violence their primary concern, while others, like

the Eskimo, have produced an effective cultural breakwater against aggression, merely illustrates the difference of attitude with which the primitive mind has become adapted to a vital social problem. Perry's anthropological evidence is none the less significant. If the Eskimo have succeeded in creating a non-aggressive social pattern by a peculiar sense for communal responsibility, it is surely possible for us in the face of immediate necessity to cultivate the integrative pattern of relationship instead of the dominative. This fundamental change in attitude comes into the realm of the feasible, when it is borne in mind that the impulse to dominate is countered by its opposite, which might be called communal solidarity, or relatedness. When the one hypothesis leads us to the very brink of chaos, it is conceivable that a human migration towards the other pole will eventually create a sense of community among men in which the bare threat of domination will evoke instant response like that of the fire-alarm. The nation-wide discipline of fire-watching could even be regarded as a first step towards the development of a general attitude of responsibility in regard to the latent archaic potentialities in human nature. The author's insistence throughout the book upon the superiority of the integrative type of relation—based essentially upon a living feeling for human individuality—is supported by psycho-therapeutic experience. It is indeed in the cultivation of a relation of candour between patient and doctor, in which the distinctiveness and totality of the personality are unreservedly accepted, that the healing value lies.

From the psychological point of view, the only criticism of Harding's work that can be made (though a significant one) is the omission of any reference to the general dynamic determinants which are comprised in the various national myths. The myth of a people is more than a poetic heirloom. It is an incalculable storehouse of explosive energy, as we have seen to our cost in the resurgence of the tribal myth in Germany and Japan. The term 'pattern' is altogether too static and thin to comprehend the stupendous reserves of energy-potential which are evoked from the racial unconscious in times of national crisis. This omission is all the more singular inasmuch as the author's somewhat discursive review of the various regressive social phenomena of war-time, such as acquiescence, credulity, sadism, cruelty and sexual interest, demands just this comprehensive conception of the activation of the archaic unconscious to bring the total picture into a comprehensive focus. In point of fact, it was the abundance of similar evidence of archaic social tendencies which led Jung in the first place to postulate the existence of a general unconscious. The author perceives the psychological inadequacy of the attempt to explain the war-time psyche from analysable factors in the personal unconscious, but he apparently recoils from the wider conception which could alone make it intelligible. The path which Trotter blazed during the War of 1914-18 in his "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War" served us well for a time; but, since Trotter wrote, psychology has placed valuable tools in our hands which cannot be ignored.

Harding's work is compact and readable. If it has suffered from the exigencies of war-time economy, this necessary circumscription will make the book accessible to a larger public. It is a work that merits wide acceptance.

H. G. BAYNES.