

(2) Mr. Coates shares with Prof. Hicks his impatience of the philosophizing men of science. Unfortunately, he has not much tolerance of philosophers; he repudiates "as metaphysical nearly the whole course of philosophical speculation from the time of Thales to the present day" (p. 27). "The root fallacy of the metaphysician", he says, "consists in applying the categories of science outside the sphere where they properly belong, and in reducing the whole of existence to the form of the subject-object relation" (p. 29). Mr. Coates believes that the proper attitude of the philosopher should be that of the historian for whom the problem of appearance and reality, of subject and object, never arises in the form which this problem has taken in the philosophical tradition. The historian deals with persons knowing, acting, and feeling, one with another; he recognizes a plurality of persons in intersubjective intercourse.

The working out of this point of view occupies

the greater part of the book. It is extremely well done. Mr. Coates is emphatic that a philosophy is a personal point of view. He is, however, more concerned to convert others than he is perhaps himself aware. The method of conversion is to induce acceptance of a common language. Perhaps Mr. Coates unduly simplifies the problem. At times he seems to suggest that if only you and I would agree to accept the commonsense usage of language as our norm, then our philosophical perplexities would be dispelled. "People exist; things are real" (p. 227). Accordingly, "existence is not subordinate to reality, but reality to existence".

How far does such a statement enlighten us? To know the answer to this question, it is necessary to read Mr. Coates's book. Whether one agrees or not with his point of view, it must be admitted that Mr. Coates has written an interesting book and has much that is important to say with regard to the relation of language and logic.

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Indian Realism

Indian Realism

By Prof. Jadunath Sinha. Pp. xvi + 287. (London: Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd., 1938.) 10s. 6d. net.

THIS is no simple exposition either of the doctrine of the Yogacara *Vijnanavada* or subjective idealism, or of the criticisms of the doctrine by the different schools and representatives of Indian realism. The arrangement of the text is so confusing that although the book would probably be an excellent accompaniment for the student who is preparing to read the original texts for himself, it is emphatically not a work for the philosophically minded reader who wishes to be orientated in traditional Indian philosophical thought. To begin with, the exposition is presented in a very complicated form. The co-ordination is faulty, there is no summarizing to help the reader; and it is difficult to disentangle the author's own comparisons with the views of European realists, where these occur. However, once the student has straightened out this confused presentation and has managed to ignore the unnecessary repetitions of Sanscrit terms, he will find that he has acquired a good deal of valuable knowledge on the subject.

In the opening chapters, Madhavacarya's account of Yogacara subjective idealism is followed by a reconstruction of the doctrine from the works of such typical exponents as Santaraksita and Kamalasila, whose arguments against the existence

of external objects have not apparently been given in any other works dealing with Yogacara idealism.

The Yogacara arguments may, in general, be divided into two classes—epistemological and metaphysical. The epistemological argument shows that cognitions are self-aware and cannot apprehend external objects, of which, again, the existence cannot be proved; and the metaphysical argument consists in showing that the nature of an external object cannot be ascertained. Then in the following chapter, the arguments of the Sautrantika realists against the Yogacara doctrine of the non-existence of the external world is outlined by Madhavacara; while their own doctrine, which advocates a representationist theory of perception akin to that of Descartes and Locke, is expounded. This is followed by the counter-argument of Yogacara idealism against the Sautrantika representationist theory, which is set forth by Jayanta Bhatta; and an exposition by Sridhara of the Yogacara argument against the realist doctrines of the Sautrantika. Further expositions and criticisms of Yogacara subjective idealism by the Jaina, Sankhya Yoga, Mimasaka and Nyaya-Vaisesika realists, take up the succeeding chapters. Finally, the Vedanta critique of subjective idealism, in which the absolute idealism of Sankara is contrasted with the Yogacara subjective idealism, is set forth in the concluding chapter.