

acute critic and searcher after truth. He was president of the Aristotelian Society in 1921, and had from 1906 onwards contributed to its *Proceedings* a large number of papers. At philosophical gatherings he was a well-known figure; he read, for example, a paper at the International Congress of Philosophy, held at Harvard in 1926. To *Mind* he was a frequent contributor, and was for many years treasurer of the *Mind* Association. In 1926 he was elected a fellow of the British Academy. In 1929 he was appointed visiting professor in the University of Southern California, and was accustomed latterly to spend half of each year in the United States and half in England.

Schiller's student life in Oxford began immediately after the death of T. H. Green, but from the outset he was out of sympathy with Green's idealism. In his earliest book, "Riddles of the Sphinx", published under the pseudonym "A Troglodyte" in 1901 (2nd edition, revised, with the author's own name, in 1904, new edition 1910), Schiller followed largely in the line of the evolution theory, as expounded by Darwin; and developed at some length a view, not unlike that of J. S. Mill, of God as a finite individual, immanent in the world as a living activity, but transcendent as a true personality. In the following year, in 1902, the volume entitled "Personal Idealism" appeared, containing contributions from eight members of the University of Oxford; Schiller's essay therein was on "Axioms as Postulates", and in this essay he outlined for the first time the position which, following William James, he designated as that of 'pragmatism', or later 'humanism'.

Truth, Schiller maintained, is *human truth*, and is incapable of coming into being without human effort and agency. Human action is psychologically conditioned; consequently, the concrete fullness of human interests, desires, emotions, satisfactions, purposes, hopes and fears is relevant to a theory of knowledge and must not be abstracted from. The world of our experience is not a ready-made datum; it is essentially what we make of it. Fruitless, therefore, is it to attempt to define it by what it was originally or by what it would be apart from us; it *is* what is made of it. Accordingly, the world is *plastic* and may be moulded by our wishes, if only we are determined to give effect to them, and are content to learn from experience, that is, by trying *by what means* we may do so. The principles we employ in such construction are, it was urged, in the beginning *demands* we make upon our experience, postulates or hypotheses, "starting-points and stepping-stones". Of these, when tried, many have to be abandoned; others remain precarious, and more or less 'matters of faith'; only a few rise to be unquestioned axioms. The "making of truth" is thus, it was contended, in a very real sense also a "making of reality". For in validating our claims to 'truth' we really 'discover' realities; and we virtually *transform* these by our cognitive efforts, thereby proving our desires and ideas to be real forces in the shaping of our world.

Perhaps Schiller's chief contribution to the thought

of his time is to be found in his sustained insistence on the way in which principles, even those which appear to be the most self-evident and fundamental, are in point of fact tentative, and require to be tested by their success or want of success in enabling the investigator to get into touch with natural events; and in the repeated emphasis which he laid on the manner in which apparent facts receive modification through the growth of science. Furthermore, that man is not to be separated from Nature, and looked upon as a mere observer of a series of events which he can do nothing to alter, that revaluation and not static finality is a main feature of any truth discoverable by man—these are certainly points which it was worth while to emphasize, and upon them Schiller was constantly laying stress.

In addition to the works already referred to, Schiller was the author of "Humanism", 1903 (2nd edition 1912), "Studies in Humanism", 1907 (2nd edition 1912) and "Plato or Protagoras", 1908. He wrote also two books on logic—one, "Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem", 1912, which was a sustained attack on what he regarded as the futility, the verbalism, the self-contradictoriness of the traditional logic; the other, which was a more constructive work, "Logic for Use", 1929. In the latter the logic which he desiderated was not the logic of proof but the logic of discovery, and he has said probably wellnigh everything there is to say on this subject. Nor must one omit to mention the two contributions he made to Singer's "Studies in the History and Methods of Science", on "Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof" in vol. 1 (1917) and on "Hypothesis" in vol. 2 (1921). G. D. H.

WE regret to announce the following deaths:

Prof. Hendrik Aldersloff, director of the State Serum Institute at Utrecht, president of the Dutch Society for the Advancement of Medicine, editor of the *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Hygiëne*, aged sixty years.

Prof. P. W. Cloassen, professor of biology in Cornell University, known for his work in economic entomology, on August 16, aged fifty-one years.

Prof. J. E. Duerden, who was associated with the Wool Industries Research Association, Torridon, Headingley, Leeds, and formerly professor of zoology in the Rhodes University College, Grahamstown, on September 4, aged seventy-two years.

Prof. Albert Heim, For. Mem. R.S., formerly director of the Geological Museum and Swiss Geological Survey, Zurich, on September 1, aged eighty-nine years.

Prof. M. Maclean, emeritus professor of electrical engineering in the Royal Technical College, Glasgow, on September 2.

Prof. Pietro R. Pirotta, formerly professor of botany in the University of Rome, on August 4, aged eighty-three years.

Mr. F. C. Thompson, lecturer in the Department of Leather Industries in the University of Leeds, aged forty-six years.