Letters to Editor | Published:

Philosophy and Modern Science

Naturevolume 135page912 (1935) | Download Citation



THE necessity for condensed expression is, I think, responsible for the questions raised by Dr. Jeffreys. I admit (indeed, insist on) the distinction between sensations and concepts, but left it unstated because I thought it was implied in the language used. The principle of rejection of unobservables must refer only to concepts; we cannot speak of observing sensations because a sensation is an observation, not a thing to be observed. I cannot reject a sensation of whiteness which may come to me, but I can reject the concept, ghost. I do not share Dr. Jeffreys's objection to the phrase, “observing a concept” (for example, observing Neptune). It is unambiguous and far more concise than any alternative which his letter suggests.

Access optionsAccess options

Rent or Buy article

Get time limited or full article access on ReadCube.


All prices are NET prices.

Author information


  1. Imperial College of Science, London, S.W.7



  1. Search for HERBERT DINGLE in:

About this article

Publication history

Issue Date



Further reading


By submitting a comment you agree to abide by our Terms and Community Guidelines. If you find something abusive or that does not comply with our terms or guidelines please flag it as inappropriate.