Abstract
THE necessity for condensed expression is, I think, responsible for the questions raised by Dr. Jeffreys. I admit (indeed, insist on) the distinction between sensations and concepts, but left it unstated because I thought it was implied in the language used. The principle of rejection of unobservables must refer only to concepts; we cannot speak of observing sensations because a sensation is an observation, not a thing to be observed. I cannot reject a sensation of whiteness which may come to me, but I can reject the concept, ghost. I do not share Dr. Jeffreys's objection to the phrase, “observing a concept” (for example, observing Neptune). It is unambiguous and far more concise than any alternative which his letter suggests.
Article PDF
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
DINGLE, H. Philosophy and Modern Science. Nature 135, 912 (1935). https://doi.org/10.1038/135912a0
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/135912a0
This article is cited by
-
Philosophy and Modern Science
Nature (1935)