

Dr. Folsom has here made a very thorough study of his subject. The family is examined first as a means of satisfaction for certain human needs; it is then surveyed as a working system, and the differences in the family of the savage and the civilised man are contrasted with the view of showing what the function of the family may be in differing circumstances. The changes which are taking place in romantic love, courtship, sexual relations, married life, divorce, irregular unions, the relations of parents and children and so forth, are then surveyed in the light of the data which have been collected both in Europe and in the United States. Much of this material is familiar in a general way, even to those who have not made a special study of the subject; but it is here set forth in convenient form and discussed quite impartially by the author. A considerable part of the book is devoted to a practical application of the conclusions which the author has reached, with the view of alleviating or remedying certain of the maladjustments which experience shows now enter into the social problem.

*Science and Monism.* By Dr. W. P. D. Wightman. (History of Science Library.) Pp. 416. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1934.) 15s. net.

DR. WIGHTMAN makes a rapid survey of philosophical speculations concerning the character of the universe as a whole from Thales to Whitehead and of their interaction with physical theory. Biological theory too he takes in his stride. It is a little breathless and too much of it merely summarising other people's summaries; but he is always clear and obviously has the capacity to seize on the essentials. His comments, where he allows himself any, are pertinent and pointedly expressed. Where he is dealing with thinkers he understands thoroughly, as Spinoza, he is an excellent exponent and critic.

At the end, however, it is difficult to suppress certain doubts. We may take monism in a loose sense as meaning no more than that there is a wholeness of things within which events happen with some recognisable order, or in other words that though we may expect some surprises we are not always being surprised. In this sense, monism has always been the principle inspiring scientific investigation and speculation. But if this were all, there would be no need to write a book about it. Monism evidently means more than this for Dr. Wightman, as it has for everybody, and it is doubtful whether any strict kind of monism is compatible with empirical science. If the universe is really in any way compact and homogeneous, then we cannot know anything truly about any part until we know about the whole, and if we know anything at all, in principle at least, we know everything. Consequently scientific procedure, which consists in finding out about the parts without troubling about the whole, is fallacious and unnecessary, as Hegel and some of his followers appear to have thought. Perhaps Dr. Wightman will next consider whether some kind of dualism or pluralism is not an essential postulate of science.

*Philosophical Studies.* By the late Dr. J. McT. Ellis McTaggart. Edited, with an Introduction, by Dr. S. V. Keeling. Pp. 292. (London: Edward Arnold and Co., 1934.) 12s. 6d. net.

THE day has gone when a book of philosophical studies, even though its author was distinguished only as a metaphysician, is to be regarded as necessarily outside the province of a scientific journal. The frontiers between science and metaphysics are no longer so rigidly drawn as they were a generation ago. Science may shade off into metaphysics, and metaphysics may be informed with the scientific spirit. McTaggart, for example, insisted that there is only one way of getting at the truth, and that is by proving it. He would have nothing to say to the doctrine that a thing must be true because we want it to be, except that such doctrine is "false and rather cowardly". There spoke the man of science, though not of physical or biological science. Again, he was lucid and definite in his broad demarcation between the aims of metaphysics and of science. The former is concerned with the ultimate nature of reality; the latter is also concerned with reality, but not with its ultimate nature—a definition which is something to go on with, but perhaps not to be maintained to the end.

The papers collected in this volume, under the extremely able editorship of Dr. Keeling, give an interesting summary of McTaggart's philosophical method and conclusions; and would serve as a good introduction to the study of his chief published works. We quite agree with the editor that the paper entitled "An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy" is an outstanding example of philosophical summarising. It is well worth the careful attention of all who are interested in the borderland between science and philosophy, as well as of those whose main interest is in philosophy.

*Must Philosophers Disagree? and other Essays in Popular Philosophy.* By Prof. F. C. S. Schiller. Pp. xi+359. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1934.) 12s. 6d. net.

THE essays in this collection, like all Dr. Schiller's work, are amusing and provocative, and sometimes more than this. The three essays on William James and his work, coming from a fervent admirer, are interesting and valuable. Many who do not agree with James's philosophy would yet agree with Dr. Schiller that he is one of the creative thinkers of modern times. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book are the four connected essays called "A Philosophical Survey"; the last of which is on "Man's Future on the Earth". The author makes the useful point that at any moment there are some factors making for improvement and others for deterioration; so that a survey of present conditions, with the future unknown, provides equally good arguments for optimists and pessimists. There has been progress, but not always, or in straight lines, and it is always precarious.