Anthropology and Administration.

IN the hundred years that have elapsed since the birth of Huxley, anthropology has made greater strides than perhaps any other branch of science with which he was concerned. The measure of his contribution to that advance cannot be gauged only by the results of his purely anthropological work. It is to be judged as much by the spirit and the outlook with which he approached the scientific problems of his day. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that in Huxley's earlier years the study of primitive peoples was little more than a collection of facts, while any attempt at generalisation was usually subservient to some preconceived theory. The application of the Darwinian hypothesis to the study of man as a social and moral being, as well as a physical entity, by Huxley and his fellow-workers, diverted that study from the static to the dynamic point of view. This change of outlook, which involved the fundamental conception of the essential unity of the human race and of human culture, laid the foundation of anthropological studies as a science in aim and in method. Looking back on the work of the latter half of the last century, it is easy to criticise the facile generalisations which arose from an unwarranted extension of a purely biological hypothesis; but it opened the way to the conception of continuity in development and the phylogenetic study of anthropological data—a fruitful source of advancement in the study of man and his works.

Huxley's aim as a scientific man was to promote the increase of natural knowledge and to forward the application of scientific methods of investigation to all the problems of life. The practical application of the results of anthropological study, perhaps in a sense more immediate than Huxley intended, has been forced upon the attention of the anthropologist by the march of events to which the growth of the British Empire has been due, and the inclusion under our rule of many millions belonging to the races which, in the main, are the raw material of his investigation. With the Indian Mutiny began a process of change in our attitude towards primitive races which was still going on at the time of Huxley's death, when we were only just setting foot beyond the fringe of tropical Africa, and is not yet perhaps complete. The indifference of the early days of colonisation which led to an appalling mortality among subject primitive populations and in some cases to their extinction, has given way to a conception of responsibility, not merely for their control and government, but also for their development along lines leading to a higher plane of culture.

The history of our relations with primitive races can be written in a few words—indifference, sometimes tempered by hostility, exploitation, protection, and now at last an increasing disposition to accept a system of tutelage. In all the early stages an exception must be made in the case of the great work of the missionaries who, whatever their errors of judgment, toiled wholeheartedly and with single purpose for what in their eyes seemed the good of their charges; in recent years they have proved the valued allies of administrators.

Problems of administration have become increasingly grave and difficult of solution since the War. Leaving aside India and Egypt, from all parts come accounts of unrest, or of an awakening which may lead to unrest, among native populations. The return of troops from active service, the propaganda of political agitators among the more advanced, and the increased prosperity of the individual, as in Uganda since the cotton boom, have contributed to this in varying degree. In Africa in particular these problems have become acute. All credit must be given to both missionaries and administrators who have endeavoured to cope with the evils, political, social, and moral, arising from the process of rapid detribalisation which is going on in certain parts of Africa. They look to education to substitute a controlling influence in place of the old tribal regime.

It is clear, however, that to be effective in securing this end, any system of education must tend to raise the level of the population as a whole, and not merely afford opportunity to individuals of exceptional capacity. Both the Phelps-Stokes Educational Commission and the Advisory Committee on Education in Tropical Africa have recognised the principle that education should be vitally related to the life of the tribe, its religion, its agriculture, its industries, its hygiene, and its recreations. The latter body, in a recently published memorandum, "Education Policy in British Tropical Africa" (Cmd. 2374), points out that

> "the central difficulty in the problem lies in finding ways to improve what is sound in indigenous tradition. . . . Since contact with civilisation—and even education itself—must necessarily tend to weaken tribal authority and the sanctions of existing beliefs, and in view of the all-prevailing belief in the supernatural which affects the whole life of the African, it is essential that what is defective should be replaced."

In defining the general character and aim of the type of education the Committee has in view, it is stated that its object *inter alia* should be "the training of the people in the management of their own affairs and the inculcation of true ideals of citizenship and service." The intention of this memorandum is admirable and the aim it states is beyond reproach. It is, however, permissible to doubt whether an anthropologist might not have put the case rather differently. While granting that "citizenship and service" may be the avowed aim of education in a western community, and quite possibly the only aim for whatever people an educational system may be devised, it is somewhat remote from a mentality such as that of an African native, to whom it is quite logical to demand a fee from a Medical Officer by whom he

has been treated or compensation for the time his children may spend in being educated in a school—a mentality which by tradition of generations immemorial knows no constraint beyond the *force majeure* of a primitive belief, a primitive tribal custom, and the power of his chief.

While watching with interest the experiments at Achimota in the Gold Coast Colony, and at Fort Hare in South Africa, for developing a purely African training for the Africans by themselves, the anthropologist realises the burden to be laid upon the administration, to whom will fall the task of working out the details of a scheme of education on the lines suggested. Experience has shown in Africa and elsewhere the danger of eliminating any detail in a primitive social system which may to the European appear detrimental or otiose. The psychological effect of the suppression of head-hunting in New Guinea has frequently been quoted. The mistaken ban on the *lobola* (bride price) in South Africa led to social disaster. In Central Africa the loss of their cattle in certain tribes through the ravages of the tsetse fly has compelled them to take to agriculture, but has produced matrimonial chaos through the destruction of the medium for acquiring a partner in marriage. Examples could be adduced almost without number to illustrate the difficulties and dangers besetting any change made without the most intimate knowledge of the ramifications of tribal custom and belief.

Anthropologists for long have urged that officials who are engaged in administering the affairs of peoples of non-European culture should receive a training in anthropology and its methods. They have pointed out that such training, by enabling them to get more quickly into touch with the mentality of the people over whom they have jurisdiction, would eliminate the mistakes which are inevitable until they have acquired by long experience a sympathetic understanding of their customs and ways of thought. The importance of this as a factor in administration has been enhanced by the difficulties which have arisen since the War, but it will be increased many fold should it fall to the official to be responsible for the modification of tribal custom in such a way that tribal authority may not break down before some adequate substitute can be found.

It may not be out of place to refer to the recent correspondence in the *Times* in which a number of prominent anthropologists expressed in the strongest terms their sense of the importance of the study of primitive races and of the training of officials in such studies in the interests of imperial administration. It was further pointed out that a central organisation was needed at which data relating to these peoples might be collected and collated for study and official use. In indicating the Royal Anthropological Institute as the body most fitted for this purpose, it is interesting to note that they named an organisation of which Huxley was virtually the founder.

Natural Science and Religious Beliefs.

(1) *What I Believe.* By Bertrand Russell. (To-day and To-morrow Series.) Pp. 95. (London: Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1925.) 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

(2) *The Religion of a Darwinist: Conway Memorial Lecture delivered at South Place Institute on March 26, 1925.* By Sir Arthur Keith. Pp. 76. (London: Watts and Co., 1925.) 2*s.* net.

(3) *Science and Religion.* By Prof. J. Arthur Thomson. Pp. ix+238. (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1925.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE fame of most scientific men depends on their positive contributions to some particular branch of science; but Huxley's fame depends mainly on the clarity and fearlessness with which he not only expressed scientific conclusions, but also extended their application to the beliefs popularly held in his time, and particularly to theological beliefs. The smoke of controversy rolled round his writings forty or fifty years ago, and, though some of it has cleared away, it still continues to roll round the subjects on which he wrote. The three short books referred to above are sufficient evidence of this.

In his "What I Believe" Mr. Bertrand Russell expresses the view that reality as described in the terms of existing physics corresponds to ultimate reality:

"Given," he says, "the laws governing the motions of electrons and protons, the rest is merely geography—a collection of particular facts telling their distribution throughout some portion of the world's history. The total number of facts of geography required to determine the world's history is probably finite: theoretically they could all be written down in a big book to be kept at Somerset House, with a calculating machine attached, which, by turning a handle, would enable the enquirer to find out the facts at other times than those recorded." . . . "Of this physical world, uninteresting in itself, Man is a part. His body, like other matter, is composed of electrons and protons, which, so far as we know, obey the same laws as those not forming part of animals and plants." . . . "God and immortality, the central dogmas of the Christian religion, find no support in science." . . . "Fear is the basis of religious dogma, as of so much else in human life. Fear of human beings, individually or collectively, dominates much of our social life, but it is fear of nature that gives rise to religion." . . . "The philosophy of nature must not be unduly terrestrial: for it the earth is merely one of the smaller planets of one of the smaller stars of the Milky Way. It would be ridiculous to warp the philosophy of nature in order to bring out results that are pleasing to the tiny parasites of this insignificant planet. Vitalism as a philosophy, and evolutionism, show in this respect a lack of sense of proportion and logical relevance. They