his life, from his appointment as assistant physician in 1891, to the time of his very sudden death whilst in active work. In addition to the posts he held in his old school, he had occupied numerous other appointments, as curator of the museum and pathologist to the Middlesex Hospital, pathologist and assistant physician to the City of London Hospital for Diseases of the Chest, and physician to the Hospital for Consumption, Brompton.

In 1895 Martin was elected F.R.S. and he served on the council in 1919-1921. He was elected F.R.C.P. in 1891, served on the council 1909 to 1911, was censor in 1915-1916, and gave the Lumleian lectures in 1915. He did a considerable amount of public work and was a member of the Royal Commission on Tuberculosis, in the work of which he took an active part. During the War he served on the staff of the 3rd London General Hospital, and was a member of the Committee of Reference that carried out important work in connexion with the provision of medical officers for service overseas. He was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund from its inception in 1902, and had recently been appointed chairman in succession to Sir William Church.

MR. F. H. BRADLEY, O.M.

IN Francis Herbert Bradley, who died on September 18 in a nursing home after a short illness, mainly the result of an accident, British philosophy has lost its most distinguished representative. Born in 1846, his life covered a period of unexampled activity in this department of thought, of which his may be said to have been the central influence. Himself profoundly influenced by Kant and Hegel, and having the advantage of the stimulus which the earlier expounders of their philosophy, notably Caird and Green, gave, his method and his achievements were entirely his own, and he stands out as one of the great line of Locke and Berkeley and Hume.

It is difficult in an obituary notice to indicate the ground of this claim. We have heard of a poets' poet. Bradley was a thinkers' thinker. He never lectured and was under no temptation to popularise his thought. On one occasion of controversy with a distinguished opponent, he complained of him that he lectured instead of writing philosophy. What gave Bradley a unique position among his contemporaries was, in the first place, the vigour and incisiveness with which he put an end to old ideas, and in the second place, the splendid lucidity of the statement, and the thoroughness in the detailed application of the ideas which he believed had to be put in their place.

It was thus in his "Ethical Studies," "the most readable work on serious philosophy in English," as it has been called, which appeared in 1876, that Bradley gave the *coup de grâce* to Hedonism, and in the celebrated chapter on "My Station and its Duties" provided the concrete foundation on which the best ethical thought of our time has since been content to build. Unfortunately, this book has long been out of print. Bradley had the intention at one time of reprinting it with notes and additions, as has recently been done with the "Principles of Logic," and it is greatly to be hoped that it will be found he had carried out part of this intention.

The "Logic," which appeared in 1883, occupies a similar place. On one hand, the theory which, as in

Bain and Mill, attempted to found inference on the association of ideas, is subjected to annihilating criticism; on the other hand, for the old idea of the syllogism as linear inference from isolated elements of identity, was substituted the idea of continuity with the organic system of experience as the principle of the forward movement of thought. The fertility of Bradley's work in these fields is familiar to students of philosophy in the brilliancy with which the underlying ideas of the "Principles of Logic" have been applied in logic by Bosanquet, and in psychology by Prof. G. F. Stout.

It is, however, in his last great work on "Appearance and Reality" (1893) that Bradley's originality is most conspicuous. As in the previous books he had waged relentless war against abstract ideas in logic and ethics, so here in metaphysics—or the search for ultimate reality. The goal here is not to be found in any of the forms (space-time, quality, soul or self) in which philosophers have sought it. Even the worlds of thought and will give us only partial aspects of the complete experience which alone can satisfy. Taken in themselves they are the products of abstraction—*res rationis*, as Spinoza would have said. The ultimate reality is something at once simpler and more complex. It is simpler because it is something present with us all in simple or again in exalted feeling; it is more complex because it must be conceived of as containing all the subtleties of difference and relation that science and philosophy find in it.

The dialectical form of this work, the deadly thrust with which the claim of each category is transfixed, has given the impression, even to philosophers, that it is mainly destructive. It has been called the *disappearance* of reality. What Bradley, on the contrary, was asserting was the growing fullness of the world in which we live as we rise from the more abstract and more obviously inadequate and relative forms of reality, such as space-time or matter, to the more concrete of human personality and its life in art, morality, and religion. Bradley was a relativist before Einstein. But his relativism differed from Einstein's in being universal and in being balanced and outweighed by his sense of the necessity of presupposing an absolute as at once the criterion of the degree of relativity of any particular form of reality and the source of its significance and value.

Taken along with the volume of collected articles "Essays on Truth and Reality" (1914), and the notes and "Terminal Essays" in the new edition of the "Principles of Logic" (1922), the essential constructiveness of Bradley's work is unmistakable. But it is not by his contribution to idealistic philosophy alone that his influence on his generation has to be measured. It was the clearness and uncompromisingness with which the main principle of idealism was stated in his chief work, that, more than any other single influence, was the source of the violent reaction against it which marked the end of last century and the beginning of this under the forms of pragmatism and the new realism. The battle is still hot, and this is not the place to enter into the issues that are there being fought out. When one of the contributors to the recent volume on "Contemporary British Philosophy" suggested that it should be dedicated to F. H. Bradley as a tribute to "the chief," among the representatives of every school, there was no dissentient voice except Bradley's own to forbid it.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.